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THE DOCTRINE OF MAN IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH

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INTRODUCTION

Some modern Lutheran scholars have referred to Luther's achievement in religion as a "Copernican Revolution."[1]

> Copernicus started with a geocentric, but reached a heliocentric conception of the physical world, Luther began with an anthropocentric. . . . conception of religion, but came to a theocentric conception. In this sense, Luther is a Copernicus in the realm of religion. [2]

It is my contention that, if Luther's achievement in religion can be referred to as a "Copernican Revolution," then we may similarly refer to Karl Barth's achievement in twentieth century Protestant Christianity. Barth was influenced greatly by the liberal tradition of which Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Harnack were some of the chief spokesmen. Just as Luther was once a monk in a monastery, trying to make himself worthy before God, Barth was once a liberal who was endeavoring to establish the Kingdom of God on earth. Both Luther and Barth began with an anthropocentric conception of Christianity, but arrived at a theocentric one.

Christianity deeply involves one's relationship with God. If the essence of Christianity is one's relationship with God, then the crucial question is: How is this relationship established? Is God or man the initiator of the relationship? If the divine-human relationship depends essentially upon man, then it may be described as anthropocentric. If the relationship depends upon God, then it may be described as theocentric.

From the nature of the case, the liberal tradition could not remove all traces of theocentricity and still remain Christian, but such traces do not suffice to form what Karl Barth would call theocentric Christianity. In liberal Christianity, it is not God who determines the religious relationship; it is man. The liberals may think that God is at the center of their theology, but Barth would say that this is only an illusion. Just as illusions occur in the physical world, they also occur in the realm of religion. Copernicus has taught me that the sun, and not the earth, is the center of the universe; and the earth and I revolve around it. Yet, I often live and think as if I am the center, with the sun moving around the earth and me. This may also happen in religion. The liberal theologians would readily admit that God must be the center of existence, but they would not accept everything that fact implies; for while saying that God was at the center, they had him playing second fiddle to man. In liberal theology God had lost any real depth of meaning, because in most cases to think of God meant to think of man--religious man of course--but man. To speak of God was to speak of man with a loud voice, "while talk of dialogue with God tended to become but the mythical expression of something with him himself, of an inner monologue between his own heights and depths."[4]

We must not forget that Barth began his career as a liberal theologian; he believed that the Kingdom of God would soon be achieved through the establishment of a socialist society. He put his confidence in the latent resources of humanity; and

this meant that Barth--along with many liberal theologians of his day--believed in the adequacy of the Religious Man, the adequacy of religion and the security of the culture and civilization. The first World War shattered his hope of the Kingdom of God on earth. The "civilized man" that many believed was getter better, or at least was moving in a desirable direction, had cast himself into the orgy of destruction. In the wake of the war came Communism and Fascism, both of which denied Christian values. As a result of the war and its aftermath, Barth felt that the problem of man was much more desperate than most people realized and would not be solved simply by changing the economic structure. For a while Barth was in a state of shock. In particular he was burdened with the task of declaring the Christian message to his congregation every Sunday. What could he say? People did not want to hear, he was quite sure, his own man-made philosophy or his own opinions.

In due time Barth was led from his anthropocentric conception of Christianity to a thorough-going theocentric conception. He was led from trust in man to complete trust in God alone. He was convinced that he could not identify God's Word with man's word. No human righteousness can be equated with divine righteousness; no human act can be synonymous with God's act. Even the so-called good which man does in this world counts as nothing in God's eyes. If we identify God's righteousness with human righteousness, then we fail to see the "infinite qualitative distinction" between God and man, the distinction between that which is human and that which is divine.[5]

With their belief in natural theology, the liberals emphasized man's capacity to come to God and find Him by his own efforts. It is man who takes the initiative in the divine-human fellowship. So the liberals would have a diagram something like this:



To such a theology, Barth cried Nein! Nein! Nein! Man has no power to come to God; it is God who comes to man. Therefore, it might be said that Barth turned liberal theology upside down.



That was Barth's "Copernican Revolution" in twentieth century Protestant Christianity.

With this brief background of Karl Barth, let us now say a word about the purpose and scope of this dissertation. Its general purpose is to investigate the doctrine of man in the theology of Karl Barth. Such an investigation will necessarily center on the Church Dogmatics, III/2 (1948), since that is Barth's first and most detailed systematic treatment of the doctrine. In fact most of the present writing will consist of a critical examination of that part of the Dogmatics. However, since anthropology had been prominent in Barth's thought from the beginning, reference will be made to several of his

other works, as well.

A subsidiary purpose of this dissertation is to try to detect any major change in Karl Barth's theological outlook since the publication of his second edition to the Epistle to the Romans (1922). We have several statements from Barth himself that he had shifted his emphasis. For instance, in the preface to the sixth edition of the Epistle to the Romans he says:

> I do not wish the book to go forth once more without saying that, were I to set to work again upon the exposition of the Epistle, . . . I should certainly have to express it quite differently. . . . Much would therefore have to be drastically curtailed, and much expanded. Much would have to be expressed more carefully and with greater reserve; [6]

He also wrote in 1932 in the preface to the English edition that "those who now read it . . . ought therefore to remember that they have in their hands what is, in fact, the beginning of a development. They ought not to bind the Professor at Bonn too tightly to the Pastor of Safenwil. . . ."[7] These quotations alone are enough to show that Barth is aware of a development in his thought. Therefore, the important question is not whether he had changed, but what is the character or nature of the change. This, of course, is a much debated question. Emil Brunner, when he reviewed Barth's Church Dogmatics, III/3, entitled his article "The New Barth,"[8] indicating that Barth had made an about face in his theological outlook. Is that assertion correct?

In the second half of the dissertation the writer will evaluate Barth's doctrine of man and will try to ascertain

whether Barth had made any significant contribution to contemporary theology in this particular area. That part of the dissertation will also include the writer's own theological position as it relates to the doctrine of man.

In a word, in the first half of this essay, Karl Barth will be permitted to speak for himself without any criticisms from the outside; and in the second half, the writer will evaluate Karl Barth's doctrine in the light of contemporary scholarship.

Whenever possible, references will be made to the English translation, since the German is not available to most readers. When there is a word which cannot easily be translated from the German, the writer will make reference to this in the footnote. However, all quotations from the English translations have been carefully checked.

PART I

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF MAN IN THE EARLY WRITINGS OF KARL BARTH

CHAPTER ONE

KARL BARTH'S POLEMIC AGAINST NATURAL THEOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE DOCTRINE OF MAN

Karl Barth is known by many Americans as the great German theologian who called the Protestant Church back to the Holy Scriptures. In his efforts to perform this task he has considered natural theology to be the work of the Antichrist. Why is it, ask many Americans, that he has no place for natural theology? Barth's polemic against natural theology is an integral part of his whole theological position.

Let us begin with the Epistle to the Romans. The theme of this commentary is God's transcendence. This book owes much to the influence of Kierkegaard. Barth wrote in the preface to the second edition: "If I have a system, it is limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time and eternity. . . . 'God is in heaven, and thou art on earth.'"[1] If we listen to what Kierkegaard said, then we can easily see his influence upon Barth.

> But as between God and a human being. . . there is an absolute difference. In man's absolute relationship to God this absolute difference must therefore come to expression, and any attempt to express an immediate likeness becomes impertinence, frivolity, effrontery, and the like. . . . Precisely because there is an absolute difference between God and man, man will express his own nature

> most adequately when he expresses this difference absolutely. Worship is the maximum expression for the God-relationship of a human being, and hence also for his likeness with God, because the qualities are absolutely different. But the significance of worship is, that God is absolutely all for the worshipper; and the worshipper is again one who makes the absolute distinction. 2

The absolute distinction between God and man, which is emphasized strongly by Kierkegaard, comes out with equal or greater clarity in Barth's commentary. Barth never tires of stressing the fact that we are men, and God is God; and therefore any analogy between the two cannot come from man's side, because man, the sinner, is totally unrelated to God, the Father of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. The gulf between God and man is so great that if we venture to speak of natural theology, we expose our own ignorance, and we are guilty of blasphemy. This is his rationale for saying that natural theology is the work of the Antichrist. Natural theology--i.e., the Thomistic kind which played such a vital role in liberal Theology--presupposes that there is an analogy between God and man. Against this kind of theology Barth emphasizes the transcendence of God, the otherness of God. The cry of transcendence is what echoes through page after page of his Romans.

> The Gospel of the Resurrection is the action, the supreme miracle, by which God, the unknown God dwelling in light unapproachable, the Holy One, Creator, and Redeemer, makes Himself known. . . . No divinity remaining on this side of the line of resurrection; no divinity which dwells in temples made with hands or which is served by the hand of man; no divinity which needs anything, any human propaganda (Acts xvii, 24,25),--can be God. God is the unknown God, and precisely because He is unknown he bestows life and breath and all things. Therefore the power of God can be detected neither in the world of nature nor

> in the souls of men. It must not be confounded with any high, exalted force, known or knowable. The power of God is not the most exalted of observable forces, nor is it either their sum or their fount. Being completely different, it is the KRISIS of all power, that by which all power is measured, and by which it is pronounced to be both something and--nothing, nothing and--something. It is the Primal Origin by which they all are dissolved, the consummation by which they are all established. The power of God stands neither at the side of nor above--supernatural!--these limited and limiting powers. It is pure and pre-eminent and--beyond them all. It can neither be substituted for them nor ranged with them, and, save with the greatest caution, it cannot even be compared with them. 3

In this passage, Barth has set God qualitatively above all things. God is placed above the deities of the world in which Paul lived; and He is also set above the so-called substitutes for God which modern philosophy and scientific research into nature's forces have put into "modern" man's mind. Barth relentlessly reacts against those philosophic and scientific ideas which condition God by the laws of nature. He ever vehemently opposes those ideas of immanence which invariably infringe upon God's sovereignty. God is in heaven, and man is on earth. Any form of natural theology which attempts to decide a priori what God ought to do is presumption, that is, sin. Barth writes:

> God, the pure and absolute boundary and beginning of all that we are and have and do; God who is distinguished qualitatively from men and from everything human, and must never be identified with anything which we name, or experience, or conceive, or worship, as God; God, who confronts all human disturbance with an unconditional command 'Halt', and all human rest with an equally unconditional command "Advance"; God the 'Yes' in our 'No' and the 'No' in our 'Yes', the First and the Last, and, consequently, the Unknown, who is never a known thing in the midst of other known things; God, the Lord, the Creator, the Redeemer:--this is the Living God. 4

Barth is attacking any form of natural theology expounded by the liberal theologians and all forms of mysticism, especially that form in which man sinks within himself to find God. In opposition to these views, he affirms that God and man are on different levels; and God and man do not move in the same dimension. If there is to be any relationship between God and man, the initiative cannot come from man's side, as the exponents of natural theology assume, but it must be by God's coming down to man's level, since man cannot of himself ascend to God. As Barth somewhere writes: "God must strike down perpendicularly as the vertical line of the horizontal." God comes to us, we do not of our own power come to God. Barth will have nothing to do with any theology which begins with man, for, if man has any knowledge of God, it is because the unknown God chooses to disclose Himself. To put it religiously, the emphasis on the transcendence of God means that God is the absolute Sovereign Ruler, the Creator and Sustainer of the universe of which man is only a part. Between God, the Creator and man, the creature there is an "infinite qualitative distinction." If man could determine God in any way, the divine transcendence would vanish. Barth has no use for natural theology or the old apolegetics because they imply that there is a way for man to go "up" to God.

Having seen Barth's emphasis upon the divine transcendence and his consequent exclusion of the possibility of natural theology, let us go on to observe the effect of this emphasis on Karl Barth's doctrine of man. In other words, how does

Barth's understanding of the transcendence of God affect his understanding of human nature?

We have already seen that man the creature does not possess any power to build a ladder to heaven. According to Barth, we can also say that only when man meets the word of God does he perceive the true quality of his condition.

> Because--and only because--I believe, I see the problem of my humanity. As unbelieving, as unjudged, as a sinner undisturbed in the dream of my likeness to God, I could deceive myself about myself. But the Word of God fixes the limit for man as such and thereby defines him. That is, the Word places man over against God who (1) as Creator, (2) as Holy and Merciful, (3) as in himself the Eternal, is absolutely and wholly not man nor like man.
> . . .
> In his sinfulness, he is known by God, in it he cannot endure before God. It is the mirror of his enmity against his Lord. This mirror I hold before myself when I confess 'I believe the Church' (credo ecclesiam). Because man knows God, he knows his own destined character, he knows what it would mean to find himself, he knows that he can find himself only in wholeness. 5

The essence of sin is revolt against the Creator. Man is a sinner who wants to be like God.

> It is unintelligible unless we first recognize that precisely in the phenomena of religion there occurs visibly a rising of slaves against the authority of God. Men hold the truth imprisoned in unrighteousness. They have lost themselves. Giving pleasurable attention to the words--Ye shall be as God--they become to themselves what God ought to be to them. Transforming time into eternity, and therefore eternity into time, they stretch themselves beyond the boundary of death, rob the Unknown God of what is His, push themselves into His domain, and depress Him to their own level. Forgetting the awful gulf by which they are separated from Him, they enter upon a relation with Him which would be possible only if He were not God. They make Him a thing in this world, and set Him in the midst of other things. 6

In another passage, Barth describes sin as robbing God. This robbery takes place because of man's arrogant endeavor to cross the line by which he is bound, namely, the line of

death. In this situation, man fails to recognize the great gulf between the human and the divine. Instead, he invests men with divinity and God with humanity. "In our devotion to some romantic infinity, some 'No-God' of this world, which we have created for ourselves. . . . All the time we are oblivious that we must die in ungodliness and unrighteousness."[7] Barth's concern is to let God be God, and to let man learn once more to be man, instead of trying to be like God. The chief sin of man is that he is forever identifying God with the depths of his own self-consciousness (Schleiermacher), ever twisting the truth to suit his own pet ideas. Therefore the ruthless criticism which is quite necessary in biblical exegesis must be that of self-criticism, precisely because it has to fight against sin which is the will of man to be independent of God. Barth's aim is to make room again for the holy, transcendent God of the Holy Scriptures, of Jeremiah and of Paul--and, he could add, of Luther and Calvin and Kierkegaard.

The effect of man's rebellion reaches far beyond himself in that it affects the whole cosmos.

> There has come into being a cosmos which because we no longer know God, is not Creation. That is to say, there is a world 'without us' which has broken loose from the world 'within us', and what is in us is mirrored again in what is without us. . . . As we see it, the world is the world of time and of things, in which nature and spirit, body and soul, the ideal and the material, interact and oppose one another. It is a world in which things move towards independence, a world of things existing powerfully in their own right, a world of principalities and powers and thrones and dominations. Like men, the world is imprisoned. [8]

The chief note of sin, in Barth's doctrine of man, is pride. Man wants to become independent; he desires to ignore the "infinite qualitative difference" between God, the Creator and man, the creature. He forgets that he is man and God is God which involves two totally different dimensions. Against man's assertion of his pride, Barth sees the everlasting No of God. God's assertion of His No is not only on one particular man but the whole of mankind, and this means that the whole world is doomed to destruction.

The nature of man is such that he can do no good; when man asks the question about the so-called good (ethics), he realizes that he is nothing but, as it were, a filthy rag before a righteous God. "Man condemns himself to death by his question about the good, because the only certain answer is that he, man, is not good, and from the view-point of the good, is powerless."[9] Or, to use Kierkegaardian language, the problem of ethics is not only the sickness of man but is a sickness unto death.[10]

Karl Barth's understanding of man is made clearer if we analyze the crucial issues involved in his famous debate with Emil Brunner. Brunner, formerly an enthusiastic follower, made his break with Barth when he published an article criticizing him. The crucial issues involved were those of natural theology. According to Brunner's view-point, the image of God (imago Dei) is not totally destroyed, and this image provides a point of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt) in human nature which makes it possible for human beings to receive the

Christian gospel. Brunner also insists that God has, in some measure, revealed Himself to all men, and we can neither know nor conceive of any human beings who have not already been confronted by God.

> Our specifically human existence--and we have no other--consists precisely in our hearing the Word of God. We are what we hear from God. We are men and have our existence as men through the Word of God which addresses us and calls us into existence. . . . But that means that we do not cease to be addressed by the Word of God even when in our decision we turn away from God in our wills. In this sense there is for us no absolute hiddenness of God, but only that hiddenness in which the truth and the significance for our salvation of the divine Word is hidden. 11

According to Baillie's interpretation of Brunner, the imago Dei, therefore, is not totally destroyed by the Fall. When the Christian revelation comes, it finds man yet endowed with an intelligent and responsible human nature. With the aid of the German language, Brunner is able to combine words to denote this character. He speaks of man's Wortmächtigkeit, which might be translated as "capacity for words" or "capacity for speech"; of his Ansprechbarkeit or "addressability"; and of man as a Wortempfängliches wesen, which might be translated as a "word-receptive being."[12]

The fact that man can receive the Word of God which is addressed to him means that the imago Dei is not totally destroyed. However, receptivity and addressability, is merely the "form" or empty frame of the imago Dei. At this point, the other side of Brunner's doctrine begins to emerge; he makes an absolute distinction between the form and the content of the imago Dei. The form of the imago Dei has not been affected by the Fall, but the content which fills the form is totally

destroyed. The real content or responsibility is freedom; but man, while remaining responsible, has lost his freedom of will. The real content of rationality is goodness, but man, while remaining rational, has lost both the capacity and the desire to do good. "I agree with Barth," he writes, "in teaching that the original image of God in man has been destroyed, that the justitia originalis has been lost and with it the possibility of doing or even of willing to do that which is good in the sight of God, and that therefore the free will has been lost,"[13]

> We distinguish categorically: formally the imago is not in the least touched--whether sinful or not, man is a subject and is responsible. Materially the imago is completely lost, man is a sinner through and through and there is nothing in him which is not defiled by sin.[14]

Against Brunner, Barth affirms that there is no knowledge of God apart from God's revelation in Jesus Christ. It is only through revelation, he teaches, that one knows God; and there is no revelation except in Jesus Christ. "Only the man who knows about Jesus Christ knows anything at all about revelation," so that "the confession becomes inevitable that Jesus Christ alone is the revelation."[15]

Also in opposition to Brunner, Barth expressly and unequivocally denies that there is a point of contact or connection, Anknüpfungspunkt, between the Christian gospel and human nature. The success of Christian preaching does not in the least degree depend on anything that human nature already possesses. There is nothing that human nature contains to which the Christian preacher can address his appeal. The

Christian gospel when it is preached does not link itself to anything in human nature that was already there before, but rather replaces all that was there before by something that is totally new and altogether different. St. Paul says: "If anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation" (II Corinthians 5:17); and this expression must not be taken in a metaphorical sense, but in the most literal way possible. Conversion therefore "consists in a miracle performed upon man, in a miracle which makes it not a phrase but literal truth to say that he has become a new man, a new creature. . . ."[16] The imago Dei has been so totally defiled by the Fall that there is not a trace left behind; only a new--completely new--act of creation will suffice.

Let us put in a word of caution here, lest we misunderstand Barth's teaching. Man, to be sure, is still human in the sense that "he is still man and not a cat."[17] However, the fact that man is human in this sense does not mean that he has some innate capacity to receive the Word. Instead, his humanity has been so totally defaced by sin that no more than a cat is he able to hear God's voice until, through the work of the Holy Spirit, the imago Dei is created in him anew. The whole of man's nature, including the faculty of reason, has been so totally corrupted that we are all insane (verrückt). It has been held and is still being held today that man's reason serves as an Anknüpfungspunkt to which revelation can connect itself. And this means that only a rational being, like man, is able to receive the Word of God. Barth will not

allow man's reason to serve as an Anknüpfungspunkt. Prior to the acceptance by faith of God's Word, man has no capacity whatever to receive revelation. The capacity to receive revelation is given in and with revelation itself.

> It would be advisable to be careful about statements such as that man alone is capable of receiving the Word of God, because this leaves the angels out of account, because there might, after all, exist beings that are unknown to us, and because we have no revelation but only conjectures concerning receptivity or lack of receptivity on the part of such non-human beings as we do know. . . . What is the revelance of the formal responsibility and ability to make decisions to a 'capacity' which man possesses and which exist in him anterior to divine revelation? . . . Surely all this rationality, responsibility and ability to make decisions might yet go hand in hand with complete impotency as regards this 'matter'. . . . The fact that God 'reaches' man with his Word may well be due to something other than the formal possibility of his being addressed and his humanitas. If we are going to stick to the statement that man is ('materially')' a sinner through and through', then the 'formal factor' cannot be anything like a remainder of some original righteousness, an openness and readiness for God. 18

Barth's whole point in denying that there is any knowledge of God except in Christ--not even non-saving general knowledge as Brunner would have it, since revelation which is not saving is not really revelation--is to affirm that God is wholly independent of human nature, and man is wholly dependent upon God. If God is in any way whatever dependent upon any human quality--including man's rationality--then God has ceased to be the God revealed in Christ. When Brunner writes that all men have knowledge of God because man is man and not a stone, and this means that man has some capacity to receive revelation, Barth cannot agree; he must, if he is to remain true to his own theological convictions, reply Nein! Nein! If Barth were

to agree that there is an Anknüpfungspunkt to which revelation can link itself, then the "absolute qualitative distinction" between God and man, so vividly expressed in the Epistle to the Romans, would have to be denied. His whole theological position would be in jeopardy. It may appear that Barth is being a very rude theologian who, instead of uniting the Church, divides the Church with his arrogant, self-assertive, and anti-ecumenical theological position. To the contrary, Barth is the last theologian who would enjoy dividing the Church; but in order to remain theologically honest, he must, with all due respect to his colleague, affirm that the latter is in error. Brunner's position is, according to Barth, even more dangerous than the liberals of the nineteenth century, because the position of the latter was exposed so that one could readily see where they stood: black was not pretending to be white. Brunner, on the other hand, may appear to be on Barth's side, but upon closer examination we can see that this is much more than "a dispute about words," as Brunner appears to think. The heart of Barth's message to the twentieth century (or his "Copernican Revolution") is at stake here. All is of grace, because man is of such a nature, since the Fall, that he can do nothing to help in anyway towards his salvation.

In light of the above discussion concerning Barth's debate with Brunner, it is fitting to investigate the criticism often leveled against Barth. He has been accused of being too pessimistic; his picture of human nature was too gloomy. This criti-

cism was often made during the 1920's, 1930's and to a large extent the 1940's. Even though this criticism is not made as often today among competent scholars, the writer would like to raise the question as to whether Barth was guilty of being too pessimistic regarding human nature. Thus far the writer has dealt with Barth's anthropology as it appeared in his early writings (1922-1940), deliberately presenting only one side of his doctrine, in order to show that Barth was misunderstood by most of his contemporaries during that early period.

If his critics had read the Epistle to the Romans--or any of his other writings for that matter--with more care they would not have made the unfortunate mistake of labeling Barth as a theologian of pessimism. In one sense G. C. Berkouwer correctly entitles his book on Barth, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth,[19] because the primary purpose of Barth's work was only to emphasize the grace of God in contrast to the modernistic belief in the infinite worth of man. God's grace, and not man's sin, is the center of Barth's early works; and as far as the writer can detect there is no fundamental disjunction between his Epistle to the Romans and his later writings. There is, in contradiction to what most critics have said, one central theme--with relatively unimportant modifications--that controls the development of his whole theological outlook. The motif which governs Barth's thinking is not man's total depravity or man's utter helplesness in the face of an unknown God; it is the grace

of God in Christ, who despite man's sin, has justified him. It is only when man attempts to identify himself with God that Barth screams at the top of his voice saying, "You have forgotten about the'infinite qualitative distinction" between God and man!" Man is man and God is God, and the two cannot be rightly related if we start with man. This is said, so as to caution man from thinking that there may be some kind of natural theology. And Barth means by natural theology "every (positive or negative) formulation of a system which claims to be theological, i.e., to interpret divine revelation, whose subject, however, differs fundamentally from the revelation of Jesus Christ and whose method therefore differs equally from the exposition of Holy Scripture."[20] If there are independent systems which are built from man's view-point alone or which have man as their starting point, they usurp the sovereignty of God and infringe upon His grace. Grace is not grace unless it is given freely, wholly independent of man. This grace has come to man in Christ.

To conclude this section of our work, let it be emphasized once more that Barth's concern is with the sovereignty of the grace of God, and that any philosophical or religious conception which infringes upon God's grace is a priori wrong. This is why he must reject natural theology in any form. If he were to grant natural theology a place in his theology, then his doctrine of the sovereignty of God's grace would be in jeopardy. God would cease to be God. The sovereignty of God's grace must be the starting point of all theology.

Berkouwer expresses the central theme of Barth's theology correctly when he writes:

> Barth wishes to emphasize above all the triumph of God's grace. It is his conviction that only in this way a barrier can be erected against every triumph whose essence is not grace alone. From countless explicit statements . . . as also from the whole structure of his dogmatics, it appears that his theme has become the dominant motif in the theology of Barth. In one way or another all the discussion centering around Barth is related to this emphasis on the triumph of grace. 21

His theology does not find its center in doubt and despair. Rather, his concern is to point to the deplorable predicament of the human situation, so that, in one way or another, he can point to the sovereignty of God's grace. The idea of crisis is always related to salvation. God's grace is really and truly God's grace only when all human escapes are cut off. Salvation is God's salvation. The No of God is there to let man know that God is God and man is man, but His No is there also to point to His Yes (grace). The No of God can only be understood in the light of His Yes to man in Christ. "Grace," writes Barth, "and not sin, determines mortal men. In grace, and not in sin, God enters in on their behalf. Grace means that God reckons man's whole existence to be His and claims it for Himself."[22]

CHAPTER TWO

BARTH'S POLEMIC AGAINST L. FEUERBACH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE DOCTRINE OF MAN

One of the most interesting phenomena in contemporary theology is Barth's high esteem for the work of Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach was an avowed atheist who was convinced that all theology is anthropology, i.e., when theologians talk about God, they are really talking about man, for God is nothing but man's projection of his own humanity into divinity. In spite of Feuerbach's atheism, however, Barth regards the study of Feuerbach's writings as indispensable to contemporary theologians. Such a strong recommendation is of course quite startling. Feuerbach's orthodox contemporaries refused him a hearing. Why is it that Barth does not follow the same procedure, instead of being attracted to his opponent and paying tribute to his spirit and intention?

A clue may be found in Barth's Church Dogmatics,[1] III/3, pp. 334-349. It is here that Barth says that modern theologians must study Heidegger and Sartre if they want to understand the problem of evil. He says:

> We may certainly learn from them if we have not learned already, a more intense and acute awareness. In this sense, whether taught by Heidegger and Sartre or elsewhere, no one today can think or say anything of value without being an 'existentialist' and thinking and speaking as such, i.e., without being confronted and affected by the disclosure of the presence of nothingness (das-

Nichtige) as effected with particular impressiveness in our day! [2]

Therefore if any modern theologian wishes to speak to his contemporaries, he must be aware of the human shock experienced and attested by Heidegger and Sartre. Their writings demonstrate to us the shock that modern men are experiencing. The positive value of their writings is to introduce this age to the subject of nothingness, "in this respect they reach a point unreached in much ancient and modern--even Christian--literature".[3] Since Heidegger and Sartre are speaking to what modern men are experiencing, we as theologians must be aware of what these men are saying, even though their answer to the problem of evil is wrong. Barth, Heidegger, and Sartre agree that nothingness[4] is a basic problem in human experience but Barth's answer to the problem of nothingness is different from Heidegger and Sartre.

It would appear then, that Barth wants modern theologians to study these men because they are speaking about concrete reality when they describe nothingness. Does it follow then, that Barth recommends the study of Feuerbach for the same reason, i.e., because Feuerbach speaks about real man in concrete existence, that is, the same man that the Christian theologian is talking about? Barth pays tribute to Feuerbach because the latter speaks of real man, the "man of flesh and blood". When Feuerbach says, "The new philosophy, therefore, has for its epistemological principle, for its subject, not the Ego, not the absolute, that is, not the abstract spirit or mind, . . . not reason in and for itself alone--I hate that

Idealism which tears man out of nature,"[5] Barth readily sees that Feuerbach is interested in the concrete man of existence. Further evidence that Feuerbach is speaking of the concrete real man of everyday existence appears when Feuerbach says: "I am a world removed from these philosophers who pluck out their eyes that they may think better--the new philosophy searches rather the real and the whole nature of man."[6] Barth says, in reference to Feuerbach's description of man:

> He is concerned with the whole reality (heart and stomach) of man. It is only when one is thus concerned that one can in truth speak of God. Feuerbach is interested (one may ask whether consistently enough) in the "thatness" and the "suchness" (Dasein und Sosein) of being; in the apparently uninteresting and self-evident existence of man; in neither his spiritual existence nor his bodily existence in themselves (whether he does not place a reactionary overemphasis on "sensuousness" is again a special question) but rather in both their unity, a unity in which the existence of man is to be seen. 7

Barth is convinced that Feuerbach is speaking of the same man that the Christian theologian refers to, and in this narrow sense one may say that the Feuerbachian and the Christian views of man are the same. Barth himself is a "man of flesh and blood". He is a theologian who does not "appear" in his theology, and therefore, he is delighted that Feuerbach does understand man as a creature who has a heart and a stomach as well as a soul. Feuerbach, then, is an honest man, and "a man who does not appear in his philosophy", though in the last analysis he must be refuted. For Barth, the starting point in Christian theology must be the primacy and sovereignty of God. Since Feuerbach's starting point is one which is totally subjective, Barth recommends the study of Feuerbach to modern

theologians in order that they may see the inevitable outcome of every theology that begins with man's subjective states, such as his sense of the Holy (as with Otto) or his God-consciousness (as with Schleiermacher). Such theologies are bound to be essentially anthropological statements, though in a slightly different sense from Feuerbach's.

It is no accident that Feuerbach reduces all theology to anthropology, because his conclusion is the point in which all lines of thought seem to converge without hindrance. Feuerbach, like a keen-eyes spy, "lets the cat out of the bag". "Theology has long since become anthropology."[8] The theological contemporaries of Feuerbach were open to this crude insinuation because the starting point of their theology was the same as Feuerbach's, namely the subjective states of man. Barth writes:

> Was he in fact completely in the wrong? Had not the theologians themselves tended to work in this same direction before him? We are reminded of Schleiermacher's doctrine of the relationship between God and pious excitement, which has lost all the characteristics of an encounter. . . . and we are reminded of the same author's Christology and doctrine of atonement, seemingly projected back from the personal experience of the human subject. . . . We think of Tholuck, with his proclamation that it was the 'heart' which was the seat of divine wisdom in man. 9

The agreement and disagreements of Feuerbach and Barth lead us to the central issue in the religious life of modern men. Both Barth and Feuerbach agree that belief in religion leads inevitably to belief in man, and to say that religion will save man is the same as saying that man will save himself. To put one's faith in Christianity itself is nothing but putting one's trust in something human. The essential disagreement

between the two men is that Feuerbach and his contemporaries could in fact believe in man, while Barth cannot.

Feuerbach should be studied by modern theologians in order to prevent their own position from leaning in Feuerbach's direction. When modern theologians make incautious use of the mystical idea of a union of God and man, then Feuerbach's question becomes an acute one.

> And there is something here which should give us Protestant theologians special food for thought. Feuerbach preferred to call to witness for his interpretation of Christianity, not his theological contemporaries but Luther of all people. 10

Luther's concept of faith was used by Feuerbach because it suggests that faith has acquired the nature of a divine hypothesis, and may therefore suggest that it is the 'Creator of the Godhead' in us. Luther's Christology and doctrine of the Lord's Supper were also very important for Feuerbach. "Luther taught, with the over-emphasis of genius, that the Godhead should not be sought in Heaven but on earth, in the man Jesus, and then again that Christ's nature as the God-Man should substantially be sought in the sacred elements of Holy Communion."[11] Therefore, Barth holds that modern theology needs continually to guard itself by using the Calvinist corrective, namely the sovereignty of God.

How does one guard himself against this subjective view as expressed in Feuerbach and his contemporaries? One basic difference between Barth and Feuerbach (and his contemporaries) is their conception of the knowledge of God. For Feuerbach, the only God that a person knows is nothing but human nature

divinized and projected. One finds God by looking at his own nature. Barth, on the other hand, takes pains to emphasize that revelation--God's disclosure of Himself, God unveiling His hiddenness, encountering or confronting man--is that aspect of Christian theology which keeps one from looking for God in human nature. When theologians say that "religion is that determination of human self-consciousness by virtue of which man feels to be absolutely dependent, in such a fashion that the whence of this feeling, God, is implied in an original way",[12] then they fail to understand the truth about the Biblical revelation which emphasizes that revelation does not come from man; it is God who takes the initiative in revelation, and it is the unknown God who chooses or decides to make Himself known. God comes to us from beyond like "a bolt from the blue" to reveal himself to man; we do not of our own power find God.

It is Barth's doctrine of revelation, which emphasizes the objectivity of God's grace, that distinguishes his theology from that of Feuerbach's contemporaries. Barth is convinced that the whole of modern Protestant theology stands or falls with its subjective point of departure and that its doctrine of man--which forms the background and foundation of its entire structure--stands defenseless against the criticism of Feuerbach. Barth's polemic against Feuerbach and against anthropocentric modern theology is intimately related to his sharp rejection--dominant in his thinking from the very beginning--<u>of each and every self-justification of men</u>. He not

only opposes man's anti-religious self-justification as represented in Feuerbach, but more especially the religious self-justification of the pious man (as represented in modern Protestant theology), who formally acknowledges that he lives by God's grace alone, but whose life is really lived in terms of a system of thought which hardly leaves room for sovereign grace. It is here that Barth discovers the pride in modern Protestant theology, the religious pride of the Christian man who, in spite of his profession of living by God's grace, actually ascribes to himself, in a hidden and refined way, a decisive voice in salvation. "This is the one reason that the name of Feuerbach has become a thorn in the flesh of modern theology, and perhaps will continue to be so; so long as the relation to God is not unconditionally inconvertible for us, and does not remain so under all circumstances, we shall have no rest in this matter."[13]

In the Church Dogmatics, I/1, pp. 143 ff., Barth takes Gogarten as an example of a modern Protestant theologian who lacks the "proper anthropology", in that he has man as the starting point of his theology. Therefore, Barth raises this question: "Is this man who has ceased to be isolated from God, apart altogether from the one God-man, in a position to form the possible or necessary starting-point of thought?"[14] Barth goes on to say that Schleiermacher answered this question in the affirmative, and Feuerbach did the same, the latter, of course, from a bad motive. Barth regards this kind of anthropology as harmful because with it one cannot avoid "the danger

of handing over theology afresh to some sort of philosophy and so losing the real theological theme".

The discussion thus has centered upon the critique of Feuerbach from Barth's presuppositions: sovereign grace versus self-justification. Barth does not leave off, however, without dealing with Feuerbach from within the latter's own frame of reference. Barth's conclusion is that, even if Feuerbach were granted his presuppositions, his analysis of the essence of religion is hopelessly shallow.

The root of Feuerbach's shallowness, which in turn, accounts for the shallowness of his explanation of religion, is that he did not know (Nichtkenner) death and misunderstood (Verkenner) evil.[15] "And anyone who is not able to laugh in his face at this point will never get at him with whining or with angry criticism of his views of religion."[16] Therefore, anyone who knows that man is evil from head to foot, and anyone who realizes that we must die, would recognize it to be the most illusory of all illusions to suppose that the essence of God is the essence of man. "He certainly would not disturb 'the good Lord' by such a confusion of Him with the likes of us, even if he thought Him to be a dream."[17] So, as Barth quotes Hans Ehrenberg with approval, Feuerbach was a "true child of his century".

According to Barth, there is a third ignorance in Feuerbach's interpretation of the essence of religion, which is closely related to the mis-knowing and not-knowing. "It would have been possible to object, in terms just as basic and sweeping

as those Feuerbach himself used in speaking of man and his existence, that man's essential being, the 'consciousness of the species' which he made the measure of all things and in which he thought he saw man's true divinity, might be a supernatural fiction in exactly the same way as Hegel's concept of reason, or any other abstraction."[18] That is to say, the man of whom Feuerbach spoke was, in the last analysis, still too abstract, too ideal, too far from concrete reality. He raises the question whether Feuerbach's man is actually the real man.

> If the talk about the 'essence' of man be unmasked as the last of the priestly illusions; if I am always the real man, the burden of whose existence as a solitary individual no human Thou can relieve, and on the contrary, upon whom this burden is laid by the inexorably-present human thou; if for me the way to the God-man of Feuerbach. . . is cut off; then it is clearly possible to see . . . that the identification of God with man is impossible. If I do my thinking as a solitary individual, I am in a fair way to unlearn my blithe forgetfulness of evil and death and therefore to avoid every tendency to identify God with myself! [19]

Barth also says that Feuerbach speaks of man in general, like all the contemporary theologians of his time, and in attributing divinity to man has in fact not said anything about him as he is in reality. Feuerbach has a tendency to speak interchangeably of individual man and man in general, and as a result, he attributes divinity to the individual. This is evidently connected with the fact that he does not seem sincerely and earnestly to have taken cognizance either of the wickedness of the individual or of the fact that this individual must surely die. If Feuerbach had seen the individual man, i.e., the man that remains when the elements of abstraction

have been stripped from him, then perhaps he would have refrained from identifying God with man, the real man. The theologians of Feuerbach's time could not instruct him on these points, because they were not aware of the individual, or of wickedness or death.

> Its [the theology of Feuerbach's time] own hypotheses about the relationship with God were themselves too little affected by them. In this way they were similar to Feuerbach's and upon this common ground his rivals could not defeat him. That is why the theology of his time found it ultimately impossible to preserve itself in face of him . . . Without summoning an energetic cry of God preserve us. 20

If we are able to laugh in Feuerbach's face, why is Barth so concerned about him? We will have to take a brief look at Feuerbach's interpretation of religion before we can analyze Barth's underlying reasons. Feuerbach did not oppose the fundamental presuppositions of his contemporaries (which were based on Hegelian thinking) on religion, but merely their application. That which Feuerbach's contemporaries took as a defense of Christianity, Feuerbach read as its death warrant. According to Feuerbach, religion must be deduced from immanent principles of cognition. Thus, whatever religion turns out to be in its last essence, it will inevitably be something about man. It will be inseparable from man's nature and his five senses. Therefore, theology must be anthropology. According to Barth, Feuerbach is correct, if we agree with his assumptions, and his contemporaries were open to Feuerbach's criticisms. Modern Protestant theology cannot laugh in Feuerbach's face as long as it agrees with Feuerbach's starting point. When modern theology follows Schleiermacher (who empha-

sized inward religious experience) or Ritschl (who emphasized inward moral experience or value judgments) it has no defense against Feuerbach. Instead of faith resting upon God's objective revelation, it rests upon what happens in a man's heart. This method, according to Barth, always runs the risk of wishful thinking. What objective check is there to man's inner feelings? What objective check is there to keep theology from becoming anthropology? Modern Protestant theology, with its emphasis on subjectivity, cannot laugh in Feuerbach's face; it can only say: God help us!

We can only laugh in Feuerbach's face when we realize that true religion in the Christian sense is not something a man possesses already, in virtue of his manhood, but something freely bestowed on him by the sovereign grace of God.

Let us continue to listen to Feuerbach. Man is religious only in the sense that he projects his own nature into transcendent dimensions. The gulf or distinction between man and God lies with man himself. All the time the soul is moving exclusively within its own limits. Therefore, knowledge of "God" is not false if this knowledge is interpreted accurately, for it is a genuine knowledge possessed by man of his own being. The transcendence, if we may put it so, of the individual's life which all religion implies is a transcendence that measures not vertically but horizontally, i.e., not above and beyond us, but around us on our own level. Does this mean then that the single self envisages itself adoringly? Feuerbach is inconsistant at this point. He does not want to answer that

question in the affirmative. The infinitude necessary to the religious object he finds in the whole race. The race, according to Feuerbach, bounds and overarches the individual's puny existence, invoking thereby a specifically religious feeling. The race is the individual multiplied indefinitely; and therefore, the argument can quite as well be carried on in terms of the self as a single entity. Thus, while Feuerbach begins his interpretation by speaking of concrete man of everyday life, he very soon begins to speak of the whole race as if it were the individual man. Particular men, each of whom must die, are replaced by "man in general", who lives forever. That means that transcendence is an empty word. Faith in God is nothing but a fruitless effort to excape from the circle of one's own being. If that is true, we must translate God into human terms, never forgetting that the process of translation, to be correct, must rest on the assumption that human terms will cover the whole ground. Theology, then, when carefully analyzed, is anthropology, nothing more!

So much for Barth's critique of man-centered doctrines of man, which confuse God and man. But before we turn to Barth's own systematic investigation of the doctrine of man, what can be said about the subsidiary purpose of this dissertation? Is it really true that Barth has not substantially changed his thinking concerning anthropology?

The reader probably has already noticed that our primary concern up to this point has been with the earlier writings of Barth (i.e. his works published before his systematic treat-

ment of the doctrine of man in the Church Dogmatics, III/2). That procedure best enables us to see the development of Barth's thought and to analyze the nature of that development. The reader should keep in mind that this is not an exhaustive investigation of Barth's writings, but is limited to his major publications dealing with the doctrine of man. From an investigation of those works the writer concludes that there has been no abrupt change in Barth's anthropology from the second edition of Romans to volume III/2 of the Dogmatics. This is not to say, however, that Barth's anthropological statements have not been modified at all. As early as 1935 he wrote, in reference to his Epistle to the Romans, "I had at that time no other desire than simply to set forth the meaning of Paul's letter to the Romans. This I did partly in a remarkable wrapping of Kantian and Platonic conceptions."[22] The theologian, according to Barth, may use the language of philosophy, but certainly not its conceptions. After reflecting on his Epistle to the Romans, he realized that he was guilty of using both philosophical conceptions as well as philosophical terms. Since this early self-criticism, Barth has continually endeavored not to allow philosophic conceptions to determine his theological thinking, an effort that has necessarily modified his mode of expression. But this change does not mean that he has made a radical about-face in his doctrine of man. In 1939, he wrote:

> Shall I say something about the change in my thinking about religion in the last ten years? Then let me say first of all that my thinking in any event remains at one point the same as ever. It is unchanged in this,

> that not so-called 'religion' is its object, its source and its criterion, but rather as far as it can be my intention, the Word of God. . . . In this respect my American readers and friends must find me inexorably unchanged, I hope, to my life's end. 23

We can be sure that whatever changes have taken place in Barth's mind, they have not affected his basic contention that the Word of God alone is the object, source, and criterion of all theology. Any anthropology is false which places decisive salvific ability in man or which locates in man the source of knowledge of God. For Barth the important point is not what man can do, but what God has done for man through His Word. In this fundamental assertion, which determines his whole anthropology, Barth has not changed from Romans to Dogmatics III/2.

PART II

KARL BARTH'S CHURCH DOGMATICS III/2

CHAPTER III

MAN AS A PROBLEM OF DOGMATICS

We turn now to Barth's systematic treatment of the doctrine of man. The single chapter, nearly seven hundred pages long, which forms the content of Dogmatics, III/2, is entitled, "The Creature". As part of the doctrine of creation, it follows Barth's treatment of the act of creation (III/1), which is set within a specifically Christian view-point of the relation between creation and covenant. This chapter on the doctrine of man is divided into five sections, beginning with "man as a Problem of Dogmatics" (section 43), the section under examination in the present chapter of this dissertation.

Barth begins by saying that, since the Word of God ought to be the criterion of all theology, all inquiry concerning the nature of man should be controlled by the fact of God's having become man. The theologian's task, therefore, is to investigate the foundations of Christian speech about man, never forgetting that even in avowedly Christian anthropology all that glitters is not gold. The thesis of Barth's entire doctrine of man is that anthropology must be understood in the light of Christology, since, before we can understand the nature of man in general, we must know the particular man, Jesus Christ. At the same time we must be careful not to confuse the two theological subjects. "Christology is not

anthropology."[1]

In setting forth his methodology, Barth first asserts that:

> Because man, living under heaven and on earth, is the creature whose relation to God is revealed to us in the Word of God, he is the central object of the theological doctrine of creation. As the man Jesus is Himself the revealing Word of God, He is the source of our knowledge of the nature of man as created by God. [2]

In other words, "the doctrine of creation means anthropology--the doctrine of man."[3] But by this Barth certainly does not mean that God, the Creator of heaven and earth, made only man. "Man is certainly not His only creation. Man is only a creature and not the creature."[4] The creature of God is the totality, the whole created cosmos. Man is only a component part of the totality. He is only a creature among many other creatures.

Since this is the case, a serious question may be raised: If the theologian is going to expound the theological doctrine of the creature, why not use the whole created cosmos as the center of investigation? Why should he confine his considerations to man? Here it must be remembered that a theological doctrine of the creature must take into account that the theme of the Bible is God's relationship to man, and this carries consequences for a theology of creation. That is, we are given an ontology of man, but not an ontology of heaven and earth. This does not mean, however, that our attitude to the wider creation ought to be one of blindness, indifference, or disparagement. "We are concerned with man as set in the cosmos and therefore not with man as alone before God. . . . We see him in the proximity of angels and animals."[5] Never-

theless, those who expound world-views as found in Scholastic theology fail to see that the Word of God does not contain any ontology of the cosmos, but is concerned with the God-man relationship.

But while it is true that there is no biblical cosmology, it is also true that human faith has always associated itself with different types of cosmologies. Nevertheless, "the fact that this has continually happened does not mean . . . . that the Word of God itself, which is the object of Christian faith and therefore of Church dogmatics, contains a specific cosmology which it is our duty to expound."[6]

This procedure, therefore, in regard to anthropology, must not be confused with any form of Idealism in which man becomes the measure of all things. The theologian must dissociate himself from all forms of Idealism which sees man as the all-important reality. The being of man must not be seen as though the significance of non-human creatures was exhausted by their contribution to the being of man. Rather the theologian must recognize that man's being is limited by the reality of heaven and earth. But the theologian's starting point must be the fact that in God's Word the God-man relationship is made explicit, whereas when he considers all other being, the Creator-creature relationship is concealed. All that can be said about God's purpose for the rest of the world is based on what is revealed in the God-man relationship.

Since the being of man is knowable, an ontology of man is possible, and this carries with it a theological knowledge

of heaven and earth as the cosmos of man. This does not mean, however, that theology can ignore the question of how the cosmos subsists in itself. To the contrary, the theologian must be concerned about this question, but his relationship with cosmological speculation can at best be only an external, opportunist one. The theme of the Bible is God, and His making the world. This theme includes the fact that God has made what He has; therefore, the theologian must pay attention to contemporary scientific investigation concerning the nature and origin of the world, but he must not be committed to any present day cosmological speculations. When theology commits itself to one particular world-picture as the Biblical one, there arises a partial apostasy from faith. "Thus we lose nothing and gain everything"[7] when we absolutely refuse to make the doctrine of the creature a doctrine concerning cosmological speculations.

Because--and only because--the God-man relationship is revealed to us in the Word of God, man is made an object of theological knowledge. It is this fact alone which distinguishes man from the rest of God's creation. Concerning all other creatures of God the Word of God tells us that they are subject to God, and they are created for the glory of God. How and why this is so is not disclosed to us. But how and why man is God's creature is made known to us by the Word of God. "The description of this relationship, or the account of its history, forms the content of Holy Scripture."[8]

If the Holy Scripture in its entirety speaks of the

relationship between God and man, what then is to be the purpose of a special anthropology? Barth replies that "anthropology confines its inquiry to the human creatureliness presupposed in this relationship and made known by it, i.e., by its revelation and biblical attestation. It asks what kind of a being it is which stands in this relationship with God."[9] This does not mean, however, that theology reaches beyond the area of revelation, or behind it, but receives from the Word of God the basis and truth of its statements about man.

There is no substitute, therefore, for theological knowledge of man. But if the problem of man--directly or indirectly, openly or latently, explicitly or implicitly--has always been acknowledged as the key-problem of all human reflection, can the theologian profit from the method and results of non-theological anthropologies? Or--an even more radical question--should he deliberately regard theological anthropology merely as a species, placing it within the framework of a general non-theological anthropology, and establishing and securing it on the basis of the latter?[10] To answer these questions Barth recalls two types of non-theological anthropologies so that he can illustrate what ought be the relationship of Christian anthropology to non-theological anthropologies.

The first type is what Barth calls the speculative theory of man; this type arises always from a particular Weltanschauung. The speculative theory presupposes that man can begin with himself alone, i.e., "his own judgment, and then legitimately and necessarily push forward until he finally reaches an

absolute synthesis, a system of truth exhaustive of reality as a whole."[11] He thinks that he can analyze and know himself apart from the Word of God. This type of non-theological anthropology presupposes that man can be both the teacher and the pupil of truth. Whether the idea of God is or is not included in its teaching is not essential. The all-important point concerning this teaching is its origin; that is, it originates from a sterile corner. It assumes "that here at the start of human self-knowledge stands man himself in his unlimited self-confidence. . . ."[12] This type of non-theological anthropology is, of course, an enemy which cannot be met otherwise than by opposing the Christian confession to it. Barth writes:

> We cannot allow human self-knowledge to begin where this anthropology begins, with that unlimited self-confidence: not primarily because in view of our different understanding of man we consider that self-confidence out of place; but primarily because . . . we are not able to see the essence and nature of man apart from the Word of God. 13

The second type of non-theological anthropology is that of "the exact science of man," such as human physiology, biology, psychology, or sociology. By the very nature of its methods this type of non-theological anthropology is not an enemy of the Christian confession. It becomes an enemy only when it turns its back on its true method by dogmatizing on the basis of its formula and hypotheses, thereby becoming the exponent of a Weltanschuung.

If there is no essential conflict between theological anthropology and the anthropology of exact science, what is the difference between these two anthropologies? Unlike the

anthropology of exact science. a theological doctrine of man is concerned not only with the phenomenon, man, but with the essence of man himself. It is concerned "not merely with his possibilities, but with his reality. It is in this way, in the light of God's Word and therefore in the light of truth, that he is known by it."[14] Theological anthropology has the responsibility to make the claim of truth--however, never forgetting that it too may err and therefore needs to correct and improve itself continually.

> But in virtue of its basis and origin it concerns itself with the real man. It not only comments on him, but denotes and describes him. It gives him his name. Interpreting him, it is concerned with the relation of this creature to God, and therefore with his inner reality and wholeness. This is something which the anthropology of exact science cannot do. How can it understand man as the creature of God? The fact that he is this does not belong to what is seen of man by exact science, to the external features which it can investigate. . . . The fact that man is the creation of God, standing as such in a special relation to God, is a fact that is not accessible to human thought and perception otherwise than through the Word of God. [15]

According to Barth, the most crucial problem of study must now be dealt with. The difference between theological anthropology and other types is simple when compared with this problem. Barth asks: "What is in fact the theological standpoint from which we are to understand and describe the being and nature of man as created by God?"[16] It has been indicated that man may be known only in the light of God's Word. The point of departure of this study is that man as well as God is revealed through God's act in Christ. But from this assumption the theologian is presented with the most crucial difficulty concerning the problem of man, the overcoming of

which will be decisive for the whole course of his investigation.

The problem is this: God's revelation--instead of showing us man as we wish to see him, in the wholeness of his created being--shows us man in his "perversion and corruption." In light of the Word of God man is shown as a traitor to his essential being. When man is seen in the light of the Word of God, he is shown to be one who has sinned against his own creaturely existence; he stands in contradiction to his Creator and to himself. He sins against his own nature. The sinfulness of man is not just certain defects in him, but a corruption which permeates his very being. Instead of man responding to God's grace with faithful obedience, he rebels against God, thereby making himself a contradiction. From the very start man is at war with his own being; and he can only be helped because God still lives up to his end of the covenant, irrespective of the attitude of man. And precisely for this reason, it is God's grace alone which can be man's salvation.

When man is seen in the light of God's Word, he can be understood only as a sinner who has rebelled against God. The problem which we face is this: If man is a sinner through and through, and there is no part of his being which is not corrupted and perverted by sin, "how can we possibly reach a doctrine of man in the sense of a creaturely essence, of his human nature as such?"[17] What is known to be human nature is nothing but shame and disgrace which covers man's entire being. This fact cannot be denied or toned down, for if the

theologian does this, then he fails to see the full import of the truth that for the salvation of man"nothing more nor nothing less" was required than the death of Jesus Christ, and for the disclosure of this salvation to us"nothing more nor less than" the resurrection of God's son, Jesus Christ. But, it must be asked, if man is known only in the corruption of his nature, how then can the theologian even start to answer the question concerning his creaturely nature?

This difficulty must not cause us to forget that even in his distortion and perversion, man is still a creature of God. Even though man's nature is wholly controlled by the fact that he is in contradiction to God, "yet this nature is not effaced, and he cannot succeed in destroying it and making himself unreal".[18] Barth is saying that the corruption and distortion of man's being is not the same as the annihilation of his being. Death as such does not mean complete destruction in that it may be said that man cannot cease to exist as God's creature, for the very fact that God still speaks to man means that man still exists. In a footnote, Barth stresses the point that the Formula of Concord was correct in insisting against Flacius that God's work in creating man must be distinguished from the devil's work which corrupted man. "The corrupted nature of man and the sin which corrupts it are two distinct things."[19] Sin, in spite of its corrupting influence, does not produce a new creature. Man the sinner--though rebellious in nature--is God's creature, of whom the theologian is trying to speak.

Yet it must not be forgotten--and this is what makes the problem so difficult--that any tenable distinction between man as the creature of God and the sinful determination of his nature is possible only if his sinful being, his corruption, is minimized.[20] But if man is viewed in the light of God's Word--and the theologian is compelled by the nature of his method to do this--it is just this what cannot be done. Man's sinfulness, when seen in the light of God's Word, is radical and total. If there is no sin which can prevent man from also being the creature of God, then also "there is no creaturely essence in which man is not seen at strife with God and therefore sinful."[21] The theologian cannot penetrate beyond sin (i.e., consider it as a mere accidental determination) to reach undisturbed human nature. Man's nature cannot be traced from what might be called "surviving lineaments," nor can it be inferred from what is known of man in general. Man must be viewed in the light of God's Word, and when this is done, he is seen as a sinner through and through.

According to Barth two points must be insisted upon. On the one hand, the theologian must insist upon the total corruption of human nature--a point which cannot be weakened. Man's disgrace is so radical that it penetrates the whole of his being; there can be no question of receiving knowledge of man which is unaffected by sin. But, on the other hand--this point must not be minimized--it must be affirmed that man is God's creature in spite of his sinfulness. This being the case, where should the theologian go in order to gain insight

into his problem? Since it is the Word of God which discloses man's nature as in contradiction to God, this same Word may in turn reveal what it appears to conceal. Where one appears to be hopelessly blocked, he may be given light into what seems to be complete darkness. The theologian, however, must be very careful at this point and be led by the Word of God alone. If man is a sinner--and this cannot be denied--and if man's nature cannot be traced from "surviving lineaments," where then can one find the necessary insight for this process of inference and deduction? The Word of God gives us the answer to this question, if one looks a little deeper. "If man is the object of divine grace, his self-contradiction may be radical and total, but it is not the last word that has been spoken about him."[22] Because of God's grace--and only because of God's grace --man has a future which cannot be destroyed by man's self-contradiction. The theologian may go even further and say: If man is the object of God's grace--and that fact is assuredly disclosed by the Word of God--"his self-contradiction may be radical and total, but it cannot even be the first word about him."[23] The fact that man becomes a sinner does not mean that he has spoken a valid word concerning himself. Real man therefore is the sinner who participates in God's grace. Even the sinfulness of man cannot be understood unless it is seen in the light of God's grace. In other words, "the grace of God . . . is primary. The sin of man is secondary."[24] (At this point, Barth warns the theologian once again not to take sin more seriously than grace).

In Barth's theology, sin is the major problem. When man sins, he chooses that which he cannot choose as the creature of God because God has denied and rejected sin. Thus, sin is described as the "impossible possibility" in that when man sins he gives himself over to nothingness (das Nichtige); and this is impossible. Yet, man sins; he does what he cannot do. However, although he gives himself over the alien creature, this alien creature cannot produce a new creation. God refuses to let His creature go. His grace is everlasting. When man sins, he does the impossible, but God refuses to let man or the alien creature have the first or last word concerning man, for man even sins within the covenant and not outside it. "He cannot sin without the grace of God, but only against God." Therefore, the sin of man, his disobedience, is understood in the light of God's covenant. This is, "the sad truth of our bondage . . . is far surpassed by the joyful truth that God is free constantly to be the One who created man. . . ."[26] He is "free to cause man to be unalterably that which he is created, the creature to whom He is gracious."[27]

> Again, in his recognition of the wrathful judgment of the gracious God he will be as little inclined to ascribe to himself this self-knowledge as to claim the freedom to justify himself when he has delivered **himself** up to evil. All this is true. But it is even more true that the God of whom as sinner he knows as little as he does of himself has not ceased to know the truth about him; . . . It is even more true that in this unclouded knowledge of man God is God; . . . And therefore God knows that while man may fall, in virtue of this mercy he cannot be allowed to fall, but even in his falling can only continue to be the creature whom He has once-for-all and irrevocably accepted. 28

In order to understand this strange expression (i.e.,

"the impossible possibility of sin" or "the ontological impossibility of sin"), it must be remembered that Barth makes a distinction between man's being and man's sin. To be sure man is a sinner through and through and there is no aspect of his being which is not affected by sin, but despite this, he remains, even as a sinner, God's creature; and his corruption in no wise means the destruction of his being. Man's nature remains, even though it be obscured by its radical corruption. This distinction can only be made in light of God's grace. If man is the object of God's grace, as we know to be in fact the case, then sin cannot be the only and the last prediction that is made about him. Because of God's grace man's being cannot be destroyed, even though he has covered it with disgrace. It cannot be lost because, even though he has fallen away, he cannot alter that which he is for God and has received from God.

Therefore, when Barth speaks of the impossible possibility of sin, he means that man is a real sinner, but he is also a man who participates in God's grace. The grace of God is the first thing that must be said about man, and sin is only second. To be sure, the judgment of God which stands over sin does strike man. But, even here, judgment is not something which stands alone, it is always a judgment behind which God's grace stands. The No of God is always spoken for the sake of His Yes. Judgment is always but a form of His mercy. Therefore, man in his fallen state still remains man. In his rebellion, man breaks the covenant, but since he did not make it, he cannot

destroy it. God maintains his faithfulness in spite of our unfaithfulness, His grace despite our ingratitude.

Here it becomes clear why sin is a mystery. The mystery of sin has nothing to do with the limits of our understanding, in the sense of the noetic incomprehensibility of sin. The mystery consists in the fact that man's rebellion is something which in the very nature of the case cannot be. This is the essence of Barth's doctrine of sin which may be described as an ontological impossibility. But this ontological impossibility of sin is always viewed in the light of Jesus Christ.

Also in the Word of God, man recognizes that he has no capacity to know God; self-knowledge is excluded in its entirety. Only God knows man as man really is. Man can know only his perverted nature. He knows only his disgrace, the shame which covers the whole of his being. The capacity to come to a knowledge of real man is impossible.

After writing at great length concerning the human incapacity for self-knowledge, Barth says: "If by the Word of God we are denied any capacity of our own to recognise our human nature as such, it is the same Word of God which enables us to know it, in a free demonstration of the free grace of God apart from and against our own capacity."[29] Through the Word of God alone are we able to know ourselves. We are told by this Word that God is God; he is free to be gracious to us in spite of our rebellious nature.

Barth has now reached the point where one can see the

reason for the thesis of this section: "As the man Jesus is Himself the revealing Word of God, He is the source of our knowledge of the nature of man as created by God." God's attitude in which the Creator's faithfulness and therefore the unchanging relationship of man who was created by Him are disclosed and knowable, "is quite simply His attitude and relation to the man Jesus."[30] Again Barth writes:

> His election of this man; His becoming and remaining one with Him, His self-revelation, action and glorification in Him and through Him; His love addressed to Him and through Him to those who believe in Him and to the whole of creation; His freedom and sovereignty which in this man find their creaturely dwelling and form, their Bearer and Representative. He is God as even in His eternal Godhead He became this man in His human creatureliness. This is God's **attitude** towards sinful **man.** He answers or reacts to the sin of man by **this** relation to the man Jesus. 31

If God, therefore, has elected man in general regardless of his sinfulness, it is because he has eternally elected this man. In this man Jesus Christ, God's attitude toward sinful man is disclosed. When the theologian asserts then, that man--even in his sinful corruption--is held in God's hand and in spite of his corruption is not allowed to fall, he must look and keep to the man Jesus, for otherwise he does not know what he is talking about.

> The nature of the man Jesus alone is the key to the problem of human nature. This man is man. As certainly as God's relation to sinful man is properly and primarily His relation to this man alone, and a relation to the rest of mankind only in Him and through Him, He alone is primarily and properly man. . . . True man, the true nature behind our corrupted nature, is not concealed but revealed in the person of Jesus, and in His nature we recognise our own, and that of every man. 32

To know the divine attitude toward man is to know the

particular man Jesus Christ, and to know man is to know the human nature of Jesus. Therefore when the question is asked: "What is the creaturely nature of man to the extent that, looking to the revealed grace of God and concretely to the man Jesus, we can see in it a continuum unbroken by sin, and essence which even sin does not and cannot change?"[33] The Word of God Himself is the answer to this question in that the point of departure means nothing but grounding all anthropology on Christology.

Of course, Barth has no thought of deriving anthropology directly from Christology. To be sure, Jesus does become what we are, but he does not do what we do, and so he is certainly not now what we are. He alone is primarily elected; he alone is the receiver and the bestower of grace at the same time, whereas man in general can only be one who has received grace. But when it is said that human nature is one thing in Him and something else in man, this means only that in Him it is not corrupted by sin, "and therefore concealed in its reality, but maintained and preserved in its original essence."[34] Jesus is sinless, but of course his sinlessness does not mean that He has a special constitution of human nature by which he would be so to speak physically removed from sin. It is rather "because as the Bearer of humanity he was Himself its Lord"[35] and thereby held his ground against temptation. And the last point that should be made in this connection is: The difference between Jesus and us is that only in him is real human nature revealed in its original and

basic form whereas in us it remains concealed, unrecognizable. But in all that, the nature of Jesus, to be sure, is a different state than ours, but not a different constitution. If it were viewed otherwise, one's Christology would become docetic.

Having set forth his method, Barth turns to develop the positive content of his anthropology in four sections, which are treated in the following four chapters of this dissertation. The material in the sections is built upon the Christological foundation already laid; each begins by dealing with Jesus as he relates to the particular topic at hand. The section on man as the creature of God begins with "Jesus, Man for other men." The treatment of man's constitution as soul and body is built upon "Jesus, the Whole Man." Finally, dealing with man "in his time," Barth begins with "Jesus, Lord of Time." Thus, the doctrine of man is developed throughout in the light of Christology.

CHAPTER IV

MAN AS THE CREATURE OF GOD

> The being of man is the history which shows how one of God's creatures, elected and called by God, is caught up in personal responsibility before Him and proves itself capable of fulfilling it. 1

This section of Barth's book is introduced by a discussion of Jesus under the heading "Jesus, Man for God." There follows a discussion of the phenomena of the human, and a clarification of "real man."

Barth begins this section by laying down this rule: Theologians do well to remember that it is impossible to give a direct answer to the anthropological question (i.e. What is the outline or form of man?), and then afterwards apply the christological basis of anthropology. Before one can even attempt to answer the question concerning the nature of man, one must first look at the Man Jesus, either directly or indirectly, as attested in the Holy Scriptures. In the Bible the question concerning "Who is Jesus?" is answered by testifying to his particular historical work. "Jesus is wholly and utterly the Bearer of an office."[2] Hence he has no existence as man apart from the office that he holds; his existence is given with his office.

> He is, as He is engaged in the fulfilment of it, in the exercise of its functions, in the claiming of its privileges and in the carrying out of its obligations. There

> is not neutral humanity in Jesus which might give Him the choice of not doing what He does, or of doing something different in its place. He is, as He is active in a specific, and always in the same, direction. [3]

Barth also warns the theologian not to draw the conclusion that Jesus was not a real man. Jesus was truly in every respect a man of flesh and blood. He had a human mother; he ate and drank as a man; even in his resurrection and ascension, he was a real man. He will come to us as man in his parousia. Therefore when it is said that "His being as a man is His work,"[4] Barth does not intend to negate the fact that Jesus is man.

The Biblical witness is not interested in an ex-officio life of Jesus. In fact, it must be said that "Jesus does not merely have a history but is Himself this history";[5] that he "not only does but is His work."[6] And this work is the work of a Savior. But that means that his work is none other than God's own work. "He acts in the name of God, and therefore in His own name."[7] When Jesus acts, God acts. God's work for the entire creation is accomplished in and through this man.

If the work of the man Jesus consists in the abandonment of all other work to do God's work, then when he does the work of God, it does not mean for him anything alien which is forced upon him from without. Jesus exists as a creature in that He is one with God. From this it can be concluded that "who and what man is, is manifest in its fullest significance in the fact that the Son of God has become man in Jesus, and that man is placed so wholly at the disposal of God in Him. It is

in this that He is real man, and may be known in His reality."[8]

"Who and what is man within the cosmos?"[9] has been the crucial question that Barth has been dealing with. This question was posed first in relation to the man Jesus. From what has been said about the man Jesus, another significant question must be raised: "What is the result in terms of the distinctive characteristics of man among other creatures?"[10] (1) The Man Jesus alone is identical with God. When we see and think about Jesus, at once we see and think about God. In this particular man alone, God is revealed to the rest of creation. (2) The presence of God in this man is a saving act. God is the One who acts in this man. God's presence and revelation in this man is not a mere fact but an act. "His presence in Him means that the history of deliverance is enacted and His revelation in Him means that this history may be known."[11] (3) God, by acting in and through this particular man, does not lose Himself in man, in that his willing and doing is and remains wholly His own. In His saving action through this man he demonstrates his sovereignty. (4) The man Jesus <u>exists</u> in the glory of God, and in the act His Lordship. This man--in whom man's salvation takes place--exists within the dominion of God in that He is the coming of the Kingdom of God. (5) The man Jesus, exists wholly in his office and work. He is himself, to be sure, the history he effects. (6) At this point, Barth is now ready to sum up all that has been said. This man is the creature who exists for God. This man <u>is</u> essentially <u>for</u> God in order that

God's work may happen, His Kingdom may come, and His Word may be expressed.

On the basis of what has been said about the particular man Jesus, Barth is now ready to attempt to make a definition concerning the nature of man in general. The Christological statements are, to be sure, the foundation of all anthropological statements, but Christological statements are not anthropological statements. "Anthropology cannot be Christology, nor Christology anthropology."[12] The distinction between Jesus and man in general is not only his sinlessness, but also his unique identity with God. This alone is enough to show that knowledge about Jesus does not, as such, involve knowledge about man in general, for knowledge about Jesus can at best be our foundation for knowledge concerning man in general.

Nevertheless, the Christological foundation is most essential in defining our criteria with reference to the knowledge of man. This approach opposes all other approaches which have as their point of orientation some other criteria than these that are clearly defined by Christology. Therefore, from the above six Christological propositions, it is possible to recognize further at least six boundary points, within which the nature of man can be theologically defined. (1) If the particular man Jesus reveals to man that in his humanity he is confronted with the being of God, then--necessarily assuming that there is a similarity as well as dissimilarity between Jesus and man in general--every man must be conceived as belonging to God. (2) Man's existence is determined in

history, and what is more, in a history connected with the history of the particular man Jesus which locates man in a recognizable relation to the divine redemption established in this man. (3) Man is not an end in himself, but his existence is for the glory of God. (4) Whatever freedom means in relation to man, he can never escape the Lordship of God. (5) Since God has acted on man's behalf as his Deliverer, then man's being consists "in his participation in what God does and means for him."[13] His freedom is his freedom to make a decision <u>for</u> God in the course of a history initiated and sustained by God. Hence, the "ontological impossibility" of sin emerges. Man is not free to decide <u>against</u> God, only <u>for</u> Him. (6) Man is also a being whose existence is spent in service to God.

Two things should be said in relation to these six points. First, according to Barth, these points are no more than boundary points. A theological doctrine of man has not been attained by using these points. A theological concept of man is to be found only as man in general is contrasted with the man Jesus. Secondly, it is necessary at the same time to note that these six points are useful in serving as the criteria by which the theologian can come to terms with anthropological thinking which endeavors to find truth by abstractions, and does not acknowledge that man belongs to God. These points are the criteria by which all other conceptions of man must be judged. To be sure, other conceptions could indeed still point to particular "phenomena of the human", which even theo-

logy may do well to heed, but theology "cannot accept the conclusions of these other conceptions as a true account of man's being,"[14] because these conclusions are arrived at apart from the particular man.

First, Barth mentions the naturalistic conception of man and, in connection with it, the so-called apologetics of modern theology, which was so very anxious to defend man's position in the biological world in contrast to Darwin's theory. In this kind of thinking, one's defense of man as a special creature is governed by the question of what it is that marks man off from other animals. In order to illustrate his point concerning apologetics, Barth surveys the work of modern theologians who have attempted to defend man against scientific models of thought. Zöckler, in conflict with Darwinism, claimed that man is a natural phenomenon, like all other animals who is characterized by "spirit," of which ethics and civilization are the expressions. R. Otto played with the significance of personality, and Titius maintained that the "ideals of Jesus" are the culmination of a plan which can be traced in the scientific account of natural human origins. Barth obviously enjoys himself here. He regrets that these so-called "ideals" of love of God, love of man, and life in God's Kingdom, are not more convincing phenomena of man, and wonders why no apologist of the modern age has yet used the facts that men alone trouble to laugh or to smoke! The approach of the modern apologists is an attempt to know man apart from the man Jesus. By using modern apologetic methods

a knowledge of man's true essence is excluded. The knowledge gained is primarily relative and limited. What we actually observe through self-knowledge are certain particular phenomena of the human, and not man as he really is. Barth writes:

> For it tries to answer the question whether and to what extent man is more than an animal in contradistinction to other animals. It thus makes the fatal mistake of allowing its opponents to determine the form of the question. It assumes with its opponents that man is also and supremely an animal, a higher mammal. Only later in the argument does it go beyond its opponents and see and describe this mammal as something highly distinctive. [15]

The second idea of man to which Barth turns is that of idealism taking Fichte's The Vocation of Man as an example. We are concerned here, according to Barth, with the phenomenon of human conduct, of "ethics," and of "practical reason." In connection with this, Barth takes into account concepts like "person" and personality". In Barth's opinion, "it is certainly good to have advanced from the narrowness of naturalism to the breadth of the ethical approach. But it is not so good that we may think that we have attained to real man, to his uniqueness in creation."[16] Even the significant fact that the man who is understood ethically and idealistically finds that he is identical with himself in two spheres (i.e., "in that of being where he thinks himself and in that of decision in which he realises himself in action . . . passing from the one to the other and back, but without ceasing to be in the one which he seems to have left")[17] cannot deceive us about the fact that man's pecularity would first have to be known to us from another source in order for it to be apparent to us here. Even in idealism, we do not push beyond the mere

human phenomenon.

What has been said concerning idealism and naturalism is also true of existentialism (which Barth describes, drawing freely upon Jaspers). In this instance, it is true, there is an advance to a "crisis situation." And the significant advantage which the existentialist anthropology has over the other two is "that it can show the being of man dynamically and in its basic openness, as his act in relation to another than himself and in encounter with this other rather than self-grounded, self-resting and self-moving."[18] But, in spite of this advantage, it still lacks "any concrete assurance with regard to the counterpart of man which underlies this movement and determines its whence and whither."[19] To be sure, there are "crisis situations," but can it be concluded with assurance that it is in these situations that God meets man as that which awakens the deepest anguish and then on the fulfilment of a given condition tranquillizes him and fills our being with meaning? It is really correct to say that in situations of suffering and earth, conflict and guilt man is confronted with the Wholly Other who thereby gives meaning to his whole existence? And who proves to man that in these "crisis situations" the Wholly Other has met him? Is it not true that modern man, after all proves that it need not be so?

> Humanity is tough. . . . Surely Jaspers himself noticed that it passed largely unscathed through the first world war. . . . And if appearances do not deceive, we have also passed through the second unscathed. If anyone has been changed in these years, it is certainly not in vir-

> tue of the extroardinary situations into which they have led him. . . . Fire, drought, earthquake, war, pestilence, the darkening of the sun and similar phenomena are not the things to plunge us into real anguish, and therefore to give us real peace. The Lord was not in the storm and earthquake or the fire (I Kg. 19:11f.). 21

It cannot be concluded, as the existentialists assume, that these negative situations are inevitably the bearer of transcendence and thereby bring order in lieu of disorder.

To summarize Barth's comments on these three different conceptions, it may be said that the naturalist, ethical-idealist, and existentialist anthropologies are the most important contribution in recent years to the search for self-knowledge. And the theologian can learn a great deal from these works by critically evaluating them. But these different approaches do not reach the real man. It is true that all deal with the phenomena of the human; and hence none of these three conceptions could be flatly contradicted as such. However, they are only the phenomena. Even Brunner fails to reach the true subject, man, when he speaks of human freedom, intelligence, responsibility, personality, and capacity for decision, in such a way as suggests that man has a certain neutrality in respect of God's convenant-history.

After having discussed at length other anthropological conceptions which deal only with the phenomena of the human, Barth reserves the last part of this section for his own constructive theological statement concerning the essence of real man. Thus this part of the section is entitled "Real Man." The theologian is able to speak about real man only if it is clear that "the ontological determination of humanity

is grounded in the fact that one man among all others is the man Jesus."[22] This fact must be the starting point of all theological study concerning the nature of man. If other criteria are used as the point of departure in our study, we will reach only the phenomena of the human.

Jesus, it has been expressed, is the one man in whose existence we have to do directly with the very being of God. Again, he is the one human being in whose existence God's act of salvation has taken place on behalf of all other human beings. On the one hand, he is the creaturely being in whose existence one meets the very embodiment of the sovereignty of God, but on the other hand he is the creaturely being in whom God has actualized His sovereignty as such.

Therefore, from the knowledge of this one particular man, the theologian must derive the criteria which indicate the limits within which the endeavor to acquire knowledge of man in general must always move. These criteria which are given to the theologian by this method keep him from confusing real man with the mere phenomena of man. The ideas of naturalism, ethical-idealism, and existentialism cannot be accepted because, in these determinations of man, his relationship to God, his participation in the history inaugurated between him and God, and the glory, lordship and purpose of God, are not brought out as the primary meaning of human existence.

It may be put another way: Every man as such is Jesus' fellowman. This One became man, and that fact means that a decision has been made concerning the being of every man.

And because this One is also a man, as you and I are men, every man in his place and time is changed (i.e., all of us are something other than what we would have been if this One had not been man too). Also, because this One is man, he is also our human Neighbor, Companion, and Brother. He is man's Neighbor, and in this relationship, man has no choice in the matter. That is, man is not free to decide whether he will allow this man to be his Neighbor. He is definitely his Brother or Neighbor whether man likes it or not. (Once again Barth's idea of the ontological impossibility of sin emerges.) The biblical message addresses man exclusively upon this basis. "No other decisive presupposition is made except that every one who bears the name of man is to be addressed as such in the name of Jesus, and therefore that he stands in an indisputable continuity with Him which is quite adequate as a point of contact."[23] Thus, it is not necessary for us to appeal to man's rationality or responsibility or human dignity or intrinsic humanity as a point of contact. (Here Barth is refuting all forms of natural theology, especially that kind that is represented in Brunner's writings.)[24]

The man Jesus is our Neighbor, Companion and Brother. To be sure, every other man exists as my fellow, yet every other man, in his relation to God, is always comparable to all others; and thus, no man stands out among his fellowmen as their absolute opposite. Only He is their divine Other. Since this One man has a unique relation to God which no man has yet experienced or will experience, He stands among all

men as their divine Counterpart. Therefore "to be a man is to be with this correspondence, reflection and representation of the uniqueness and transcendence of God, to be with the One who is unlike us."[25]

Since the man Jesus is distinguished from other men by his unique relation to God, and since this man Jesus is our Neighbor, then to be man is to be with God. "Whatever else he is, he is on the basis of the fact that he is with Jesus and therefore with God."[26] Once again, Barth continues to develop his idea of the ontological impossibility of sin. If to be man is to be with Jesus who is at once like us and our absolute divine Counterpart, "then the fact that we are with God is not merely one of many determinations of our being, derivative, and mutable, but the basic determination, original and immutable."[27] The possibility of sin is excluded, for godlessness is an ontological impossibility. "Man is not without but with God."[28] This is not to say, however, that man does not in fact sin. Sin is undoubtedly committed by all men, but sin is not a possibility open to man because the real man is with Jesus. Hence, to be in sin is to do the impossible; and therefore, man is existing in a mode of being which is contrary to his humanity. When man is with God, he is being true to his own humanity; but when he sins, he not only chooses the impossible, he also denies God.

At this point, Barth makes two statements concerning the nature of human existence. In the first place he emphasizes "that the being of man as a being with Jesus rests upon the

election of God; and that it consists in the hearing of the Word of God."[29]

Man's existence rests upon God's election! This is his first point. In this One man all men have been elected by God. The starting point must be with God's election of this man, and it will be shown that through this man's election all men are elected. By election Barth means " a special decsion with a special intention in relation to a special object."[30] When it is said that God has elected Jesus, it is not meant that Jesus' existence and meaning of his existence are dependent upon his choice to the extent that he too is a creature. It is true that Jesus himself makes his own choice when he gives himself to God in fellowship. To say that God has elected this man means that Jesus did not elect himself for the fellowship with God even though as man he made the choice. He is elected by God in that "in all this there is revealed in time an eternal counsel of God, in the created world the will of the Creator, in the self-ordination of this man His divine fore-ordination."[31] Predestination, which is God's electing grace, "is the basis of the fact that Creator and creature, God and man, are united at this point and the Kingdom of God comes."[32]

But, it may be asked, why is this true of this particular man?

> It is true of Him because He is the creature in whom the divine election of grace is already made. Among all other men and all other creatures He is the penetrating spearhead of the will of God the Creator: penetrating because in Him the will of God is already fulfilled and revealed,

> and the purpose of God for all men and creatures has thus reached its goal; and the spearhead to the extent that there has still to be a wider fulfilment of the will of God and its final consummation, and obviously this can only follow on what has already been achieved in this man.[33]

What, then, is the will of God as manifested by this man? The will of God, according to Barth, is that the Yes (grace) which the Creator has spoken to his creation should prevail; that all creatures should be delivered from evil and sin, i. e., from nothingness. Man must be delivered from nothingness because it has been rejected and destroyed by God's eternal grace. This is a power which is alien to God's will and therefore has as its chief function that of destroying everything that God created. Nothingness is so-called because God has excluded and separated it from the sphere of being. God did not will or create it; and therefore since he gave no being to it, it can only be called nothingness or non-being.[34] Jesus is the one man who is the penetrating spearhead of God's will, the man who has completely annihilated nothingness, the man whom God has elected before the foundation of the world. Therefore, to the extent that man is with this Man and therefore with God, man himself is God's creature elected and preserved by God's unlimited grace. In the man Jesus God saves his creation from nothingness.

Barth now returns to his main theme--concept of man in general. When it is said that man derives his being from God this description of man is given material content by recalling the gracious divine election of the man Jesus.

To be a man is to be with Jesus, to be like Him. To be

> a man is thus to be with the One who is the true and primary Elect of God. To be a man is to be in the sphere where the first and merciful will of God towards his creatures, His will to save and keep them from the power of nothingness, is revealed in action. To be a man is to be the witness to of this event, and therefore a direct witness of the truth of the basic counsel, the first of all the decrees of God. 35

Barth's general definition of man--i.e., man is with God as he is with this One man--thus acquires a content of almost unfathomable range and significance. With this definition he is able to put emphasis on the fact that even before the beginning, even before man is in the position to rebel and thereby know the implication of his rebellion, God has already decided to help him. He has made provisions for his redemption. The Electing grace of God in the man Jesus is not, therefore, an afterthought but is one which takes place from all eternity.

It is obvious, since Barth grounds humanity in the electing grace of God, that sin emerges once again as an ontological impossibility. Real man is man whose being is being with God and therefore knows that it is impossible for him to be otherwise. It is impossible for man to sin because the man Jesus has defeated nothingness which is the source of man's concrete sinfulness. Real man, i.e., man as seen in the light of God's election, is man who finds it impossible to sin. But the same cannot be said of man <u>in abstracto</u>, in that it can easily be shown that man is in fact one who has been deceived by nothingness. "Of man <u>in abstracto</u> we should have to say at once that the fall and original sin are an ontological necessity."[36] Man <u>in abstracto</u>, i.e., man as seen apart from God's act in Christ, is man who is hopelessly exposed

to the threat of nothingness. However, when Barth ascribes to man the ontological impossibility of sin, he is not speaking of man in abstracto but man in relation to God.

> Yet it is only as we fill out this concept with that of the divine election of grace that we reach solid ground. For man cannot now appeal to his defenselessness, to the natural weakness of all being in face of the overwhelming power of non-being. He cannot bewail and justify himself as a sinner on the ground that he is inevitably delivered up to the forces of evil. He cannot do this because as man he is elected with the man Jesus, and in face of his defenselessness the divine will to pity, help and save is active from the very first. By the very fact that he is man--because as such he has his Head in the man Jesus, and shares in the battle fought and the history of triumph inaugurated by Him--he is from the very first as much preserved and secured as he can be without being himself the man Jesus. The promise which he is given from this source is so weighty and strong that from the very first he can neither bewail nor justify his sin, and therefore his sin can only be understood and described as his ontological impossibility. 37

Sin described as an ontological impossibility discloses to the theologian the seriousness of sin. There is on the one hand nothing in the being of man as created by God which would explain why man should rebel against his Creator, but on the other hand, neither can we explain man's rebellion "by the fact that in himself he is impotent to deliver himself from the power of evil by his decision for his Creator."[38]

> If man actually decided against God, he does so neither on the basis of a possibility rooted in his own being, nor because he is prevented from choosing his legitimate possibility by the superior power of evil pressing upon him from without. On the contrary, when he chooses evil he grasps that which is made impossible for him and from which he is preserved. 39

Yet even though man has chosen what is in fact an impossibility, God has taken this into account by making salvation available to him in Christ in spite of his decision for nothingness. The man Jesus is predestined before the crea-

tion to be the Victor in the defense of man against nothingness.

Barth's second point is that man's existence consists in hearing the Word of God. To be real man, to exist as being with the particular man means that he exists in the sphere of the creaturely world in which God's Word is uttered and becomes known to the extent that man is in the Word of God from the very first. Again Barth grounds his thinking about man in Jesus. This man is God's Word to His creation; he is the divine address to His creatures. He is God's address to His creation. Therefore in the man Jesus man meets His Creator. Speaking of Jesus as the Word of God and of its implication for man in general, Barth emphasizes that in this man the divine address and summons meets man in general. And this address and summons of the Creator is identified with the man Jesus. When Barth says that man is with this man and therefore with God, he means concretely "that he exists because God has spoken and speaks and will continue to speak this Word once and for all, for every past and future."[40] To say that Jesus is the elect of God means that at the very beginning man is "determined for a being which has its ground in the speaking of God. The man Jesus not only speaks but is Himself the divine speech."[41] He is the embodiment of God's message to His creation. "And whatever it may mean for man in general that this man too exists among all others, it certainly means concretely that in Him

the divine address and summons to each and every man is actualized."[42]

In order to clarify what it means when it is said that Jesus is the Word of God to man, Barth asks what it is that this man says to God's creatures?

> If we are to put the matter in the simplest terms we must undoubtedly say--Himself. He speaks by the mere fact of his existence. By the very fact that He is He is the Word of God. And the Word of God at its simplest is to the effect that He, this man Jesus is. [43]

Thus this man is at once the message and the embodiment of the message. He is God's act of salvation. He declares and shows that God has not left his creature alone, and what is more, he provides what is needed to deliver man from the threat of nothingness. The alien force of nothingness will not be allowed to engulf man's being. The presence of the man Jesus is this message of God to sinful man.

After having emphasized that man's existence is grounded in God's election and God's Word, Barth now is able to give a wider content to the concept of man. To be man means that man is a part of the salvation history in which God's Word is spoken. To be sure, in the wider sense creation as a whole forms this sphere, in that God's Word has been spoken on behalf of all His creatures; but it is primarily to man, through the particular man Jesus, that the Word of God has actually been spoken. The act of salvation--i.e., the election of Israel, the Incarnation of God's Word, and the founding of the Christian community--is an event of human history. Man is a special creature only in the sense that he is

addressed and summoned by God; it is he among all other creatures to whom God has made Himself known, thereby disclosing to him the meaning and destiny of man's own being. Yet man does not become a being who is capable of being addressed and summoned by God.

> He does not have something different and earlier and more intrinsic, a deeper stratum or more original substance of being, in which he is without or prior to the Word of God. He is from the very outset, as we may now say, 'in the Word of God.' 44

Whatever else may be said about man, it must be subordinated to this Christological point of departure and explicable only in light of it.

Real man is the man who is summoned by God because he has been chosen. To ask the question "Who am I?" means that man must answer this question by saying, "I am he whom God has summoned through His Word." This is a universal truth which applies to all men, to the extent that they are in God's Word.

If to be man means to be summoned, and if to be summoned means that man has heard and has been awakened, what then can be said about the ear that hears, the reason which understands and other human powers that are brought into play? This question, of course, involves the age old problem of natural theology. Anyone aware of Karl Barth's early works will certainly be curious as to whether he has modified his position on this issue. If there is one thing for which Barth is notorious, it is his rejection of natural theology, his opposition to any attempt to base theological thinking or the knowledge of

God on any other source than God's revelation in Jesus Christ, testified by the Holy Scriptures and sealed by the Holy Spirit. Once again Barth is faced with the question of the capabilities of man in the God-man relationship. Is it not true, as the above question implies, that man, at least, has the ability to hear the Word or receive the revelation? Is it not true that God's summons to man depends upon man's ability to hear? Barth answers these questions in very much the same way as he did in his debate with Emil Brunner.

> The query seems to be just, but it must be dropped at once. Indeed, it must not be raised. For what precedes human being as a being summoned by the Word of God is simply God and His Word; God in the existence of the man Jesus. On the level of our own being, of human being as such and in general, if we see and understand it in terms of summons we are on an extreme edge beyond which we cannot look, at a beginning which on the creaturely level has no basis other than the sure basis which the Creator has ordained in the existence of that one man. We are men as God is our Creator, and speaks as such with that one man as His Word, The question of anything preceding our being apart from the divine summons can arise only if we try to explain ourselves by ourselves instead of by our concrete confrontation with God. 45

Barth consistently rejects all forms of natural theology when dealing with anthropology. On this issue, there is no difference between the so-called early Barth and the Barth of the Church Dogmatics, III/2. In Barth's opinion, it is not the task of the theologian to construct a general picture of man based on his observations or reflections, and afterwards to compare and correct this picture according to the special points of the Christian faith. Instead the theologian ought to take the special view of the Christian faith as his point of departure, and thus look primarily not to the world and to

man in general, but to Jesus Christ. Therefore Barth seeks to find man in the humanity of Jesus. This procedure avoids the embarrassment of having to begin with man thinking about himself. It refutes all forms of self-knowledge.

> The apparent difficulty of recognizing this furthest limit of our field of vision because it is the limit of the being which we are given, the apparent embarrassment of having to begin at this point in our thinking about ourselves, and therefore to reject the question of a creaturely beginning of this beginning, is no smaller (although not of course any greater), and the need to accept the appearance of difficulty and embarrassment is formally exactly the same, as that which confronted us in our thinking about the being of God, where we should like to ask concerning a . . . basis, but cannot do so because the mere question of a presupposition for the divine being outside God Himself is a tantamount to denying God, since God can have only Himself as a presupposition, and can be known to us only in this absence of any other presupposition or not at all. 46

The reason for his rejection of natural theology is not that he is too concerned with God to have any interest in man, but that there cannot be two sources of final truth. There are not two truths. Natural theology assumes that there are two sources of truth (reason and revelation); it presupposes that man has knowledge about himself. And "perhaps the fundamental mistake in all erroneous thinking of man about himself is that he tries to equate himself with God and therefore to proceed on the assumption that he can regard himself as the presupposition of his own being. "[47] The theologian must avoid this mistake by realizing that the presupposition of man is God's act in Jesus Christ. Since the Word of God is man's only presupposition, his being must be understood in terms of a summons which is the starting point and thus cannot be deduced from any so-called higher evidence of reason. If the theologian

attempts to find this higher evidence, trying to find man apart from his summons by the Word of God, he is guilty of denying both God and man.

> On this approach we are simply led back to the qualities of human nature, of phenomena of the human which can illuminate the truth about real man only to the degree that the fact or extent that he is man is established elsewhere. He is a man as he is summoned, and his endowment merely follows as part of the summons, his constitution being his equipment. God in His Word is the basis of this too, and on the foundation thus laid his being as man is a being summoned. 48

At this point it may be helpful to recapitulate Barth's insights concerning the nature of man. He began his discussion by saying that the being of man is a being with God, and that it is derived from the Creator. He then put forward two main propositions: (1) Man's existence rests upon God's election and (2) consists in hearing the Word of God. The third point that Barth advances is that the being of man is a history.

When Barth comes to this third point, the emphasis on the Christological starting point is not abandoned but reinforced. Before one is able to understand what it means to say that the being of man is a history, one has first to look at the man Jesus who is the point of departure of all theological talk concerning man. It can be said that the existence of man is a history because our Christological point of orientation in our inquiry has taught us this theological truth. In the existence of the man Jesus the Creator shows his love for His creation by Himself becoming a creature. In the Incarnation, therefore, is the fulness and sum of what history means. Only in light of this man can we venture to say the being of

man is a history.

Barth opposes being as a history to being as a state. "The idea of a state does involve the idea of something completely insulated within the state in question, the idea of a limitation of its possibilities and therefore of its possible changes and modes of behavior."[49] Since its capabilities do not go beyond these particular movements, "even the concept of the most mobile state is not therefore equivalent to that of history."[50] History occurs when being encounters something new and unique relating to its own nature.

> History, therefore, does not occur when the being is involved in changes or different modes of behavior intrinsic to itself, but when something takes place upon and to the being as it is. The history of a being begins, continues and is completed when something other than itself and transcending its own nature encounters it, approaches it and determines its being in the nature proper to it, so that it is compelled and enabled to transcend itself in response and in relation to this new factor. 51

In Jesus the Creator has become creature, and in Him man is faced with the full meaning of the concept of history. The being of man is history because in this man God has entered history; and therefore the Creator, in this man, takes up the cause of His threatened creature. Only in virtue of the history of this man (i.e., of the fulfilled election of grace and the revealed Word) can we and must we speak of history in that primary sense. Existence is here the identity of the Creator and the creature, and, indeed, as an <u>event</u>. This man Jesus <u>is</u> this event, this history.

> Thus apart from the eternal will and counsel of God, Jesus exists only in this history, i.e., in this history of the covenant and salvation and revelation inaugurated by God in and with the act of creation. Jesus is, as this history

takes place. 52

And now, in light of this truth, what can be said about man in general? Real man is the being whose Neighbor is the man Jesus, and in whose sphere the history takes place. If the Creator has become a creature, then man is the being who is with God because Jesus is with Him. He is that being whom God has summoned and elected because the man Jesus was elected eternally. This is an unmistakable truth which must not be forgotten.

Thus, says Barth, Harnack was right in reminding us that there was once a man Jesus who stood in the midst of humanity. To be sure Barth and Harnack disagree as to the way in which this man should be remembered, but both agree that man cannot be reminded too often of this man. Acoording to Barth, man cannot be reminded of Jesus too often because he alone is the one to whom God has given Himself. He alone is the One whom God has elected and who elects God in return. But he is not all this for his own sake but on behalf of others. Man's being is a history because this man has become what we are so that we might become what we were created to be. Man's existence has the character of history because the Word of God has been spoken for him; and thus he derives his history from this Word. Therefore man's history is secondary since "there is only one 'primal history!'"[53] Other men are what they are because of this man. It can be said that man has history only in the sense that he is a part of this history enacted in the existence of this man. Perhaps it could also

be stated that only as man acquires an existence in the history inaugurated by this man, does he have real, human existence. Or, to put it in another manner, to be man means that man is preserved by God's mercy for Jesus' sake, and adheres to God's righteousness for Jesus' sake.

Barth concludes his section on the "real man" by defining even more precisely that existence which is realized in election, in being summoned by the Word of God, and in history. Human existence, coming from God, is to be realized in gratitude. "If the Word of God in which man is, and is therefore historical, is a Word of divine grace, if he is thus summoned to hear and obey this Word, i.e., to be and to continue to be, in the hearing of this Word, then the being of man can and must be more precisely defined as being in gratitude."[54] The real man is a man who is grateful to God for having done for him what he could not do for himself. And if this is understood in the light of Christ, then it can easily be seen as the only natural response of the creature. When man is grateful, it means that he recognizes a gift. To be grateful not only means that one receives, accepts, and enjoys the gift, but also that he understands it.

In order to define more precisely the relationship between divine grace and human gratitude, Barth set forth four propositions,two concerning God and two concerning man. (1) If the Creator has done for man what man could not do for himself, and if this grace which comes from the Creator through the man Jesus alone is the indispensable, perfect,

and free blessing poured out to man, then the Creator alone deserves the thanks of man. (2) Since man is God's creature who has a covenant relationship with God, and since man has been created not only for the reception and the enjoyment of this gift but also in order that he may understand it, it follows that God can only be thanked by man. And if God accepted anything else in the place of this, he would not be God. (3) When man thanks God, then and only then does he fulfill the true meaning of his existence. To be man in a theological sense means that man is a being who gives thanks to God. (4) "To thank God in this way is incumbent on man alone."[55] It is not meant that man is the only creature who gives thanks to God, because the exact relationship between God and other creatures is not disclosed to us. But it is meant that man is the only creature who has thanks demanded of him in this peculiar way.

> That God's Word of Grace is true and valid is something which may be said in reference to . . . all creatures. But that the creature itself has to actualise this Word, and to do so by accepting its validity, is something which can be said only of man. [56]

The being of man may be summed up by saying that it is characterized as one of responsibility before God. Because this is so, man's life has the character of a knowledge of God, obedience to God, invocation of God, and freedom in God.

(1) To say that the being of man has the character of knowledge of God means that man is a being who not only accepts the Word of God but knows this Word. To be summoned by the Word is to know the Word which has summoned. Such knowledge,

then, is not theoretical, "external" knowledge. It must not be thought of in the sense in which there are two things involved and thus one becomes the knowing subject (man) and the other the known object (God). We do not find God as the little boy finds the cookies in the cookie jar. In the God-man relationship "the known object (God) is the primary and true subject, on the basis of whose original act the second and knowing subject is summoned to action, being made a subject by this summons of the object."[57] The knowledge comes only in this relationship.

(2) When it is said that the being of man has the character of knowledge, it is meant that knowledge itself is an act which involves obedience. To hear the Word means that man knows the Word which has summoned him and to hear and to know means that man obeys; to say "I am" must mean "I will." Those who have seen this view of man as a totally passive one have not read Barth carefully. It is man's "I will" which emphasizes the fact that his being is not merely passive but active.

> Man is . . . purely receptive as regards the movement from God, but he is also purely spontaneous in the movement to God. He is not merely partial function in a dynamic whole. He is not a mere function at all. In this matter, God is Subject, but over against God and in relation to Him man is also subject. I imply that I am subject by saying: 'I will'. And as I do not merely say this, but really will, I posit myself as subject. By willing, I recognise the fact that my being is not simply a gift with which I am endowed but a task for which I am commissioned. 58

(3) Furthermore, since man's being involves responsibility before God, his being has the character of an invocation of

God. And by this is meant that God and man are on different levels; there is a supreme gulf between God and man. Those persons who have assumed that Barth had abandoned this Kierkegaardian emphasis will be shocked to find this is not the case. When theologians speak about the "New Barth",[59] they are mistaken if they think that this newness involves identifying God and man. The Word is God's Word and not man's; God's acts for man in history are His acts, and therefore the works of man cannot be identified with God's. Any statement that God is like man involves the crucial error of saying that God needs man. It is man who needs God, being totally dependent upon Him for his existence, but the converse is not the case. God's act of becoming man is the very foundation of man's being; and God becomes man because He loves His creatures. If, therefore, there is this gulf between God and man, and if God bridges this gulf by becoming man in Christ, then man's proper response to God is that of prayer and thanksgiving, i.e., invoking God. This is an act of humility before the Creator, who alone has made it possible for man to become what he could never have become apart from an unreserved commitment to his Creator. He prays; that is, he submits his decisions to the scrutiny of God's judgment, since he knows that God alone makes perfect decisions.

(4) Finally, the being of man has the character of freedom, which God bestows upon it. Man acts freely because He who is the foundation of all real freedom, has acted freely towards man. That man is free does not mean that he has the

capacity to choose between God and nothingness, good and evil, but rather the capacity to accept the grace which God offers him. "The freedom of man is never freedom to repudiate his responsibility before God. It is never freedom to sin. When man sins, he has renounced his freedom."[60] When man sins he does that which cannot be explained from the side of the Creator. Since evil has no place in God's creation, the affirmation that man is good is correct only if it is understood in the light of Jesus Christ, who discloses to us what real man is.

> Even his sin cannot alter this fact. Sin means that he is lost to himself, but not to his Creator. It does not mean any fresh creation of man in evil. It does not mean that the being of man as such has been changed or replaced because he is involved in the incomprehensible chaos of sin which renders his being unintelligible to himself, if we can no longer discover traces of real man in ourselves or others or human history as a whole, nevertheless, as real man is not, lost to God, he is not unknown to Him, and in His Word--the selfsame Word which convicts us of sin--He has made known to us too the real man who is not effaced by our sin. . . . We are forced to conclude our final discussion of human freedom with the statement that man is not evil but good. This is no optimistic assertion. On the contrary, it best expresses at this point the offence of the Gospel. The fact that man in his misdeeds is evil does not change the fact that God in His deeds as Creator is good, and therefore that even man in his creatureliness and hence in what alone can really be called his deeds is always good. 61

Having spoken at length about real man revealed in Christ, Barth returns to those non-theological anthropologies which he could not accept as the basis of theological anthropology, but which he did not entirely reject. Although they cannot refer to real man but only to his "shadow," they can indicate symptoms of the real man. Natural science seeks man within

the cosmos, and real man does in fact belong there. Idealistic ethics seeks man while he is in the act of distinguishing himself in the midst of the cosmos. "And there does really belong to the potentiality of real man, to the possibility presupposed in his reality, the fact that his being may be such a history initiated and experienced by himself--a history in which he is not only object but active subject, and can and must posit himself as such."[62] Existentialist philosophy sees man in his openness towards that which is outside, and outside in a genuine transcendence. And real man is capable of being related to such an "extraneous entity." So even a non-theological, "yet proper," science of man is theologically possible. Barth even says that is "is not only possible but basically justified and necessary. . . ."[63]

CHAPTER V

MAN IN HIS DETERMINATION AS THE COVENANT-PARTNER OF GOD

This section begins with the subsection, "Jesus, Man for other Men". Hitherto Barth has been speaking concerning the existence of man, and has endeavored to push forward to the real man, despite the profusion of other, non-theological, anthropologies. In this section Barth deals with the question concerning the purpose of God's creation of man. It might be true that this question could be answered on the basis of what has already been said: He is made for God. But it is impossible to catch sight of the reality of Jesus without immediately adding that he is man for other men. It can be said that man has been created for God or that he has been created as God's covenant-partner, but this aspect of man's being is known only in the light of the man Jesus. That man is created for God and that he has been created as God's covenant-partner is decided solely on the basis of the existence of Jesus. He alone is the standard of what man's reality is or is not; he alone discloses to us the purpose of God's creation of man. "This is the distinctive feature of his being in the cosmos."[1]

Man is God's creature who has been created distinct from God. He is God's creature who is not to be identified with

God. In order to view man as God's creature, we must see him as one who is not only determined for life with God, but also as one who exists in the history of the covenant which God has inaugurated for him. He is real man only as he is viewed as one who is distinct from God, and this means that he exists here below on earth. "It is as he is not divine but cosmic, and therefore from God's standpoint below (with the earth on which and the heaven under which he is), that he is determined by God for life with God."[2] The basis and the possibility of a covenant between God and man must be viewed in light of the fact that God has created him as a distinct reality from Himself.

Man is, on the one hand, a creaturely being who lives on earth and, on the other hand, he is God's covenant-partner. Neither of these two facts is to be denied, yet neither can we allow one fact to exclude the other. A proper relationship must be established between the two, since at times there appears to be contradiction between them. When man sins, he rebels against his own being, and therefore against his Creator. He breaks the covenant. This is an inexplicable fact, the absurd impossibility. On the one side, when man sins he denies God, but on the other, God will not allow man to continue in his rebellious actions. The present problem therefore is: "How far his humanity as his creaturely form corresponds and is similar to his divine determination, his being as the covenant-partner of God."[3]

If it is presupposed that man's humanity does in fact

correspond to his divine determination--and this fact must be assumed--then it must be said that it does so indissolubly and indestructibly. It is true, however, that this correspondence and similarity is covered over and made unrecognizable through the sin of man. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the sin of man has created a new creature.

> If our creaturely form, humanity, has this similarity to our divine determination, the correspondence and similarity cannot possibly be taken away from it or destroyed. The power of sin is great, but not illumitable. It can efface or devastate many things, but not the being of man as such. It cannot reverse . . . that which is effected by God. Sin is not creative. It cannot replace the creature of God by a different reality. It cannot therefore annul the covenant. [4]

The task of theological anthropology is to make this point clear.

If man's humanity corresponds to his divine determination, "this means that the mystery of the being and nature of man does not hover indefinitely over human creatureliness".[5] If this is true, does Barth intend to suggest that there might be natural knowledge in reference to this correspondence and similarity? No. Man does not penetrate this mystery by appealing to his natural knowledge of God because there is no such thing. There is only one way.

> We must continue to base our anthropology on Christology. We must ask concerning the humanity of the man Jesus, and only on this basis extend our inquiry to the form and nature of humanity generally. [6]

To be sure, the man Jesus is both human and divine; and he is real man only **in** the unity of the two natures, but this unity

> does not destroy the difference between divinity and humanity even in Him. And if in respect of this unity

> we have to speak of a divinity, i.e., a divine determination of his humanity too, it is not lacking in genuine humanity. [7]

The divinity of Jesus consists in the fact that in this man God's Word has come to man in general. To say that Jesus is divine means that on earth, God Himself has come to us. He alone and exclusively is God's living Word coming to man; He alone and exclusively is God's grace. To say that Jesus is divine means in short, that this man alone is man for God.

Jesus is human as well as divine. To say that Jesus is divine does not mean that his humanity is swallowed up by his Godhead or that his humanity is a mere appearance. His divinity has not replaced his humanity. That he is true God and true man is a mystery which must be affirmed if we are to remain true to revelation disclosed in the Incarnation. He is true man, just as we are men; and to this extent, as we turn to the problem of humanity, Christology must be the basis of anthropology.

It was stated previously that the divinity of Jesus consists in the fact that he is man for God.. If this is true, then his humanity consists in the fact that he is man for man, man for other men. "The man Jesus is, as there is enacted a definite history in which God resolves and acts, and he Himself, this man, fulfills a definite office, accomplishing the work of salvation."[8] This is Jesus's divinity. "But the humanity in which He does that for which He is sent is that He is there in the same totality for man, for other men."[9] Jesus is not working for himself and then for man, but his

continuous work is exclusively for man. He is man's deliverer. Whatever else the humanity of Jesus may mean, it must first and foremost mean that he is man for his fellows.

When it is said that Jesus is man for his fellows, this must not be taken lightly. The captivity of man by nothingness is a very serious matter. It is not that all that Jesus has to do was to explain to man that God wanted to forgive him. The problem of man is much more serious than supposing that the only thing that man has to do is to ask for God's grace, and God will forgive him. Such a notion does not deal with the root of the problem. Saying that Jesus is man for his fellows means that

> He interposes Himself for them that He gives Himself to them, that He puts Himself in their place, that He makes their state and fate His own cause, so that it is no longer theirs but His, conducted by Him in His own Name and on His own responsibility. And in this respect we have to remember that so long as the cause of men was in their own hands it was a lost cause. Their judgment was just and destruction inevitable, so that anyone taking their place had necessarily to fall under this judgment and suffer this destruction. . . . <u>It was not merely a matter of His turning to them with some great gift, but of His giving Himself, His life, for them. It was a matter of dying for them.</u> 10

Several insights may be derived from this radical interpretation of Jesus as man for his fellows. First, saying that Jesus is man for others means that his being, his existence, is determined not by his own needs but by the sinful condition of man. He is pleased to bear the guilt and sins of man; he is pleased to take the place of one who has continued to be rebellious despite the grace of God which is available to him. His life is life for his fellows.

It is also implied that he makes this his exclusive task to the exclusion of all other tasks which might better correspond to his divine determination. After all, who are these men who are worthy of this God-man? Why not ignore these sinful and disgraceful human beings. Well, he does not ignore his fellows. He has only one goal: to give his life so that they might become what they were created to be.

A further step must be taken. It must be said that the work of Jesus is God's own work. The man Jesus, in so far as he is for God, must be for man. Since God does not allow His creatures to be other than that which they were created to be, and since Jesus must be for God, he, therefore, must be for men. It is God Himself who decided from all eternity to be for man, and this means that the work of Christ is not an afterthought on the part of God, but that, even before the creation of man, He decided to be "for man". God Himself is man's deliverer. "The man Jesus is necessarily for His fellows as He is for God. For God first, as the One who gives Him His commission, as the Father of this Son, is for man. This excludes any possibility of the man Jesus not being for man as He is for God."[11]

As it has been said, there is a correspondence and similarity between Jesus as man for God and Jesus as man for his fellows. This means that the being of the man Jesus reflects the inner being or the essence of God. This has important implications for the humanity of Jesus. It means that in this man is seen the reflection and repetition of God Himself, "no

more and no less." "It is the image of God, the imago Dei.

At this point Barth puts in a word of caution so that there may be no misunderstanding concerning the meaning of the idea of Jesus' humanity as the image of God. When he says that the humanity of Jesus is the image of God, he means that this is true only indirectly and not directly, since humanity belongs essentially to the creaturely world, the world distinct from the Creator. As Barth puts it:

> In it we have to do with God and man rather than God and God. . . . We cannot maintain identity. Between God and God, the Father and Son and the Son and the Father, there is unity of essence, the perfect satisfaction of self-grounded reality, and a blessedness eternally self-originated and self-renewed. But there can be no question of this between God and man, and it cannot therefore find expression in the humanity of Jesus, in His fellow-humanity as the image of God. 13

To be man does not mean that man becomes like God. The distinction between God and man which Barth stressed in his Romans is equally emphasized here. Therefore, the Roman Catholic doctrine of analogia entis is rejected by Barth. There is no similarity or likeness between the being of God and that of man. The distinction between the essence of man and that of God must remain. The relationship between the being of man and the being of God can best be expressed with the phrase, analogia relationis.

> The correspondence and similarity of the two relationships consists in the fact that the freedom in which God posits Himself as the Father, is posited by Himself as the Son and confirms Himself as the Holy Ghost, is the same freedom as that in which He is the Creator of man, in which man may be His creature, and in which the Creator-creature relationship is established by the Creator. 14

Or, to put it another way:

> The correspondence and similarity of the two relationships consists in the fact that the eternal love in which God as the Father loves the Son, and as the Son loves the Father, and in which God as the Father is loved by the Son and as Son by the Father, is also the love which is addressed by God to man. 15

This aspect of the God-man relationship is reflected in the very being of Jesus Christ.

Barth began his discussion with the question of the nature of the inner relationship between man as determined to be a covenant-partner with God on the one hand, and man as a cosmic creature on the other. This relationship, to be sure, has been affected by the sin of man, but despite man's rebellious nature, the question must be asked concerning the humanity of man as a sign of divine determination. This question was dealt with first in reference to the man Jesus because this man is the foundation of all anthropological statements. It was concluded that the man Jesus discloses that there is a relationship of clear agreement in that "His humanity, in correspondence and similarity with His determination for God and there with God Himself, as God's image, consists in the fact that, as He is for God, He is also for man, for His fellows".[16] With this as the point of departure, it is now possible to ask and answer this question concerning man in general.

We are now able to go on from here in thinking further about anthropology. It is not possible to derive anthropology directly from Christology, for "Christology is not anthropology."[17] The humanity of Jesus is not found directly in others. To be sure, Jesus is man for his fellows, but He

is this in a way that no other man can approach. Just as he is man for God in a unique manner, so he is man for his fellows in a way that is absolutely peculiar to himself. Despite the fact that man in general is sinful, yet--excluding this fact--there is a difference between man in general and this man in that no other man can say that from the very start his existence is one for others. Of no other man can it be said that he is God's Word, His Grace to men. This alone is true for Jesus, and this cannot be repeated in anthropology. As Barth puts it:

> We are the victims of idealistic illusions if we deck out the humanity of man generally with features exclusive to that of the man Jesus. Man generally may mean and give a great deal to His fellows, but he cannot be their Deliverer or Savior, not even in a single instance. On the contrary, he is the being on whose behalf the man Jesus is that which is peculiar to Him. 18

The point of having Christology as the foundation of anthropology is not that the two are identical, but that Christology--when the question is asked concerning man in general--clearly points us in the proper direction and warns us with equal clarity against its opposite. And yet by indirection it is possible to carry the thought further. If Jesus is all that he is for his fellows, we cannot escape the implication that there is a common or basic form of existence in which it is possible for Jesus to be thus, i.e., to be for his fellows. There must be a "basic form of humanity," in which the presupposition for it has been given in that Jesus can exist for man. It is existence as God's covenant-partner. But man in general is God's covenant-partner, not in virtue of an

inherent capacity for entering the covenant, not in virtue of any claim he can make as though he has merited this partnership, but solely in virtue of the fact that the man Jesus is for him. The grace of God is the basis of man's entering the covenant with God. Since Jesus is for man because he is for God, and since God has refused to allow man to destroy the covenant, by coming to man in Christ, the humanity of man must be the form in which it is not alien to God's grace. There could be no possibility of partnership if God had created the nature of man in such a way that it would have been alien to God's grace and therefore alien to Jesus. A second creation would have been necessary. To avoid this conclusion it must be assumed that there is a basic form of humanity.

What then is this basic form? To what extent does the essence of humanity correspond to the determination of man to be a partner of God? The criterion for answering is the humanity of Jesus. We cannot start with the assumption that there is a general picture of man to be known apart from the man Jesus. It is true that the humanity of Jesus cannot be identified with the humanity of man in general, but despite dissimilarity there is also similarity between his humanity and man's to the extent that he is the basis of all anthropological statements. What is found to be characteristic of man in general apart from the humanity of Jesus is that which is the basis of dissimilarity, that which excludes the possibility of human nature as a covenant-partner of God.

Therefore, since the humanity of Jesus is the basis of

anthropological statements concerning the humanity of man, and since Jesus's humanity is characterized as man for his fellows, the being of man is thereby determined as co-being with his fellows. The notion of egocentric man must be eradicated from Christian anthropology.[19] To conceive of man apart from his fellows is to see him in opposition to the man Jesus and therefore himself. To see man as he really is, to see him as revealed by the man Jesus means that he is viewed as man with his fellows. This is his basic form. If man is seen in any other way, if man is seen abstracted from his fellows, real man is not seen at all. It is true that Jesus is the Deliverer and Savior of sinful man, and therefore of the man who denies his fellowman, acting as though he has no God and no fellows, and therefore showing himself to be essentially non-human. Nevertheless, this does not mean that man as sinner has ceased to be man, or that we are obliged to interpret his inhumanity as humanity, or the work of nothingness as the work of God. Even the sinful man who denies his humanity is man who must be viewed in the light of Jesus Christ. The fact of sin does not mean that God ceases to be God and therefore man, man. In this condition, man does not destroy his nature by sinning, he can only shame it. The fact that God remains God means that in Christ God pledges that He will not allow man to cease to be man. Therefore, any anthropology which speaks to man in abstraction (i.e., apart from his fellowman) is ruled out.

Barth develops the meaning of man's existence as existence

for others by analyzing the statement "I am." When I use the word "I" in reference to myself, two things happen. In thinking and speaking this word on the one hand, I make a distinction, but on the other, I make a connection. "I distinguish myself from another who is not I and yet also not it, not an object, but one who can receive and estimate and understand my declaration 'I' because he can make a similar declaration to me."[20] When I make a distinction between another person and myself by using "I," I also presuppose that he is like me. "In other words, . . . with my 'I' I also address him as "Thou,'"[21] and this also implies that when I say "I" and therefore addresses him as "Thou," I invite him to say "Thou" to me in return.

On this basis, Barth is able to explain what he means by "I am." It can be said that "I am" means that I posit myself and therefore distinguish myself from the rest of God's creation. But if we remember that "I am" implies a "Thou," then it can also be said that "I am" implies that the absolute self-sufficient "I" is an illusion: for as an "I," I am not alone. When I say "I", I do not thereby mean something empty, not an abyss, but a full reality.

> As I am, the other is like me. I am as I am in a relation. And this means that as I posit myself . . . I at once come up against the fact that there takes place a corresponding self-positing and being on the part of the one whom I must see and treat as Thou as I think and declare myself as I. With this self-positing and being of his he comes towards me, or rather the Thou comes . . . and comes in such a way that I cannot evade him, since he is like myself . . . and therefore my sphere is not mine alone but his as well.[22]

And that signifies that our existence is such that it is

one in an encounter with another man. Humanity without the fellowman is not true humanity. Man becomes what he is created to be only as he exists in this encounter with his fellows. This is the similarity between Jesus and man in general.

The analysis of existence in encounter cannot easily be summarized. Most that has been written concerning the nature of man, written from the viewpoint of the possibilities which are peculiarly open to man, fails in its purpose, because, in all that pertains to man-in-himself (i.e. not in concrete encounter with a fellow-man), man can either be human or inhuman. That which is characteristic of humanity is that its existence is in encounter.

Now this existence in encounter is first of all an existence in which one looks the other squarely in the eye. To see in the human sense means to see another not as an object but primarily as a fellow-man. The other person in return sees the "I" as a fellow-man and not as an object. I can only see another in a human sense as he sees me in the same sense. If I fail to visualize him as a "Thou," then I prevent him from seeing me as a "Thou" and vice versa. Therefore, to the extent that one man conceals himself from another, he prevents himself from knowing others and others from knowing him. This existence is inhuman, even though in other respects he exists as the highest peak of humanity. A man, then, can only be truly human in openness; and in this openness, a man must look for the individual and not the group. If a man thinks he sees and knows a group, then ambiguity inevitably arises, and

encounter with the real individual man is blocked.

In the second place, existence in encounter consists in listening and speaking to another. Openness is not enough. Being in encounter is being which takes the responsibility in this relationship to disclose himself to the other by self-expression. Through speech man must do his best to enable the other person to make statements which are true concerning him. Conversely, man must listen, so that he will be in a position to receive the self-expression of the other. The other does for me what I do for him, so that I am not left to form my own opinion about him apart from his self-expression to me. My hearing is human, therefore, in so far as I open my ears for him and let him speak to me.

Thirdly, being in encounter consists in mutual aid. The openness between "I" and "Thou" and the act of speaking and hearing is only a preparatory stage for an even higher form of existence. This existence is characterized by men rendering mutual assistance to each other. Thus, an act in which a man refuses to help the other, or an act in which he refuses to accept help from the other, is inhuman.

Finally, existence in encounter is characterized by mutual gladness. These acts are not to be done for the sake of duty, but because one enjoys these congenial activities. "We gladly see and are seen; we gladly speak and listen; we gladly receive and offer assistance."[23] This gladness occurs not neutrally, nor with a capacity to do otherwise, but actually out of the profonnd mystery of existence. Man is only free to exist in

the manner described.

Barth is very eager to emphasize that humanity, as just described, is not the same as Christian love. Christian love (ἀγάπη) is not a determination of humanity, and conversely it is not a matter of asserting that humanity might not also be found outside the Christian sphere. If we remember that humanity does not mean solitude but fellowship, it becomes unnecessary to conceive of EROS AND AGAPE to be sharply opposed.[24] Thus, Barth endeavors to correct the current fashion to write off Greek life and thought as necessarily hostile to the Gospel. Barth asserts that there is a humanity which enables all men positively to appreciate what they are by God's creation, and it is on the basis of that humanity that theologians must speak.

"Humanity," however, "is not an ideal which he man can accept or discard, or a virtue which he can practise or not practise."[24] The basic form of man's being is in encounter, and whereas he may despise or dishonor it, he cannot destroy it. No credit is due to man on that account; Barth is simply asserting that being in encounter is a determination of man's existence. And this can best be understood as Barth uses the term "cohumanity" to denote being in encounter. God's creating man "male and female" is the sign of our cohumanity. "We cannot say man without having to say male or female and also male and female."[25] The relationship between male and female is an expression of humanity as humanity is meant to be. The marriage of male and female is not an accidental

determination but a primary one, which enables us to know there is no existence of man above the existence of male and female. Barth designates the passage concerning the creation of man for woman (Gen. 2:18-25) as "the Old Testament Magna Carta of humanity."[26] In creating woman as a companion of man God refuses to allow man to be alone. The relationship between man and woman is the original determination which is the precondition of all other relationships.

> The whole of Gen. 2:18f. points to the man who is fellow-human as such, as the creature of God, in his divinely given nature, and therefore originally and not secondarily. And it speaks of the co-existence of man and woman as the original and proper form of this fellow-humanity. It singles out this among all other possible relationships as the one which belongs to the creation-history preceding all others, and which alone can come into question when it is a matter of describing the nature which man has been given by God. [27]

Now it is possible to see what Barth means when he speaks of humanity as being likeness and hope. The unique picture of marriage is not based upon the fact that naturally and sociologically it represents a value above all other values, but upon the fact that "behind the relationship of man and woman . . . stands the controlling original of the relationship between the God Yahweh - Elohim and his people Israel."[28] And in the new covenant this man-woman relation is the relation of Jesus Christ to his community.

Having said all this, emphasizing that "our corresponding being is a being in the encounter of man and fellow-man,"[29] Barth goes on specifically to deny the possible inference that man is God's covenant-partner by nature. He was created in order that he might <u>become</u> God's partner; but he is not

constituted as such. That God has inaugurated a history of salvation, a plan which includes man does not mean that man has earned this partnership or that it is a partnership between two equals. Rather, it is a matter of God's sovereign grace, a gift freely bestowed upon man despite his rebellious nature. Nevertheless, Barth affirms that this partnership really is something which properly belongs to our nature; it is a part of our essence to be a covenant-partner with the one who is responsible for our coming into being. Such an assertion, however, cannot become a point of orientation for natural theology. To say that man is a covenant-partner means that this fact is true and knowable only because God has made man His covenant-partner in the history of His free grace. Therefore, we may continue to say that in this, his permanent and continuing humanity, man is in the IMAGO DEI, that is, in an existence which has not been destroyed by sin but maintained inalienably by reason of our hope. The objective grounding of human existence is in God's grace revealed in Christ. In developing this concept of IMAGO DEI, we must think in terms of an analogy of relation and not of the Thomist analogia entis. Man exists in the image of the living God who Himself confronts Himself to become one God in the KOINONIA of the Holy Spirit. And, as we readily see, man's existence is made possible through this same Spirit.

CHAPTER VI

MAN AS SOUL AND BODY

Heretofore Barth has been concerned with humanity as being **in** encounter with God and therefore with his fellows. But now how is this being, so defined, constituted? What about its soul (Dasein) and body (Sosein)?[1]

Barth begins his approach to the problem by saying:

> Man's being exists, and is therefore soul, and it exists in a certain form, and is therefore body. This is the simplest description of the being of soul and body and their relationship. Man is soul and body--this is in brief the constitution of his being. [2]

He then undertakes to clarify and explicate this definition. At once we recognize that there are non-theological disciplines which have dealt with man's constitution, but they cannot be permitted to serve as our point of departure. Christology must always remain as the foundation of all theological talk concerning man's nature. By looking at the constitution of the humanity of the man Jesus, we receive instruction and guidance. Only through him do we find certainty and clarity which thus qualify us to set forth propositions in which the Christian understanding concerning the constitution of the humanity of men generally may be expressed and comprehended.

The title of the first subsection is "Jesus, Whole Man". Two points are readily made concerning Jesus. The first is the provisional soul-body distinction. Whatever this means,

it cannot mean that the man Jesus is in any sense two kinds of beings. He is one whole being, who ate, drank, lived among men and women, died on the cross, and was raised from the dead. In all this he was one man, soul-and-body--besouled body.

The second point concerns the fact that the life Jesus lived in the flesh was devoid of all traces of disorder, because it was under his control. "He was both soul and body in an ordered oneness and wholeness."[3] The uniqueness of his manhood is thus interpreted through what is said concerning his relation to the Holy Spirit, a relation with the abiding Holy Spirit (in contrast to man generally, with whom the Spirit abides only partially). Human nature has been degraded to "flesh," soul and body lacking Logos; but through the work of God in the man Jesus, sinful flesh has been rectified, so that human existence is established in peace and order.

"Jesus", therefore, "is true man in the sense that He is whole man, a meaningfully ordered unity of soul and body."[4] In order to give a true constitution of the man Jesus, one must be guided by the New Testament to think of the presence and power of the Holy Spirit. "The relationship of this man to the Holy Spirit is so close and special that He owes no more and no less than His existence itself and as such to the Holy Spirit."[5] But it is not this unique relationship to the Holy Spirit that makes him the Messiah (as in Adoptionism); rather it is because he is the Messiah that the Holy Spirit dwells in him completely. And this special relationship of

Jesus with the Holy Spirit reminds us that the man Jesus is at the same time true God.

> It is in this way, this higher unity of his existence with that of God Himself, that He is whole man, a meaningfully ordered unity of soul and body. Can we disregard or fail to note that the constitution of His being as man is a repetition, imitation and a correlation of the relationship in which He is primarily and at the same time true God and as such also true man? Soul and body are clearly related to one another in the man Jesus, as His being as Son and Word of God the Creator is related to His creaturely constitution as soul and body of this man. 6

In other words the wholeness or oneness of the man Jesus is grounded in oneness of his existence with the existence of God. Between Jesus' soul and body there is the same corresponding relation that there is between his divinity or body with his humanity.

The unity of the body and soul in the man Jesus has other analogies. The relationship between the soul and body may be compared with Jesus and his Church. Just as Paul likens the Church to the body and Christ to the Head, the soul is the head of the body. Just as the Church depends upon its Head (Christ) for its existence, apart from the soul the body is dead. Just as Christ and the Church are inseparably bound together and belong together, so also the soul and body are inseparably one.

This unity of body and soul has further analogies such as, the duality of heaven and earth, justification and sanctification, Gospel and Law, faith and works, Church and State, preaching and sacrament, creed and orthodoxy; but we must always remember that these are only analogies and therefore not be <u>equated</u> with the soul and body relationship.

Only after having described what constitutes the humanity of Jesus, can we now turn to the constitution of man in general. This procedure condemns all pictures of men generally which do not take into account humanity as found in Jesus. "The picture of the man Jesus demands an understanding of man which is controlled from this standpoint."[7] The fact that the being of man as soul and body is established, constituted, and preserved by God is expressed by saying that man has "spirit." Negatively, this means that man is not without God; he "is" as he is dependent upon his Creator. When we say "man" or "soul and body," we indirectly say God, not in the sense that man is God, but that no part of man's constitution is without God.

> Man without God is not; he has neither being nor existence. And man without God is not an object of knowledge. Again, the fact that he is not without God is not a supplementary, optional or purely historical determination of his constitution which might well be lacking according to his decision, or according to his positive or negative formulation of his relation to God, so that provisionally at least it might be disregarded in describing his constitution. [8]

However, the negative statement that man is not without God is not sufficient in itself. Positively, "man exists as he is grounded, constituted and maintained by this God."[9] To say that is not to imply anything about man's capacities toward God, but simply to say something about the God who has called man out to be His covenant-partner. Because God refuses to let man be otherwise, he is as he is constituted and preserved by God's grace. There is no other possibility.

> Our starting point, the human nature of Jesus, forbids us at this point to look at any kind of height selected

> and adorned by ourselves. Man is from the God whom the man Jesus called His Father and whose Son He called Himself."[10]

Furthermore, to be man means that we are grounded, constituted, and maintained by God as the souls of our bodies. The expression "soul of his body" affirms that man is an earthly creature who lives in space and time. He has visible form.

> To be man is not only to be soul in a particular spatial body, but to be soul of the one such spatial body, and therefore to be wholly bound to it, to be one with it, and therefore to belong with it to the visible, outward, earthly world of being particularly limited in space, a being which with it is visible shaped and material. [11]

That man is constituted as the soul of his body is a free act of God. His existence is by God's free grace. In himself man is nothing, but because of God's act of grace man is prepared and equipped for the history which has been inaugurated by God for him. Apart from God's free act of grace man is not man.

This fact that man is the soul of his body by and from a new, free, and gracious act of the God of Israel can and must be understood to mean that man exists because he has spirit. It has been stated that the man Jesus is man as Messiah and as Son of God; and because he is Messiah and Son of God, the Holy Spirit indwells his manhood completely.[12] Upon this basis, men generally have been given the spirit and can now participate in His manhood. Saying that man has spirit does not mean that he possess spirit in the same sense that his constitution consists of body and soul. Spirit is something that comes to man and thereby determines his being.

Thus, to say that man is as he has spirit means that God has made a covenant with man. Spirit is God coming to man, God establishing a fellowship with man his creature. Man's existence thus depends entirely upon God's free acting grace.

Spirit, therefore, describes God's operation toward man. He is the ground of man's covenant role with God. He is the action and attitude of the Creator toward the creature. In light of this, we can understand the meaning of Barth's thesis for this section. "Through the Spirit of God, man is the subject, form and life of a substantial organism, the soul of his body. . . ."[13] Because of the Spirit of God man is the soul of his body. The term "Spirit" points to God's being and action for men, whereby the soul is awakened as the life of the body which man is. This action thereby relates the Spirit to the soul, and the body is related to the Spirit through the soul.

That man has Spirit then, means that man lives and is therefore the soul of his body. Yet four delimitations must be set forth before that equation can stand. First, saying "that man has Spirit means that God is there for him."[14] That is, man does not have Spirit because in essence he is divine but because of God's gracious act toward man. Every moment man lives is a reminder that he lives and breathes because God has willed to continue to act graciously toward him. In light of this, we must restate the above proposition by inserting the word "may." That man has Spirit means that man <u>may</u> live and <u>may</u> therefore be soul, and <u>may</u> therefore be

the soul of his body. Secondly, Spirit is the basic determination which enables man to be the soul of his body. This is the second "may" which is necessary for the constitution of man's being. The Spirit "is the 'may' on the basis of which the soul is awakened and made soul, and material body is besouled and thus becomes an organic body and is maintained as such."[15] Thirdly, although the Spirit is in man, he cannot be identified with any aspect of man. The Spirit creates the soul and dwells in the body through the soul, but the Spirit is not the soul of man. When man dies, the Spirit returns to God who gave Him. Finally, the Spirit stands in a unique relation to the soul, in that the soul is the life of the material body and it is on the basis of the soul that the Spirit, God's gracious attitude towards man, takes place in man. The Spirit comes to the body only through the soul. In this sense, the soul is superior to the body.

Having carefully delimited the idea of man's being as the soul of his body, Barth turns to examine it from three different points of view: soul and body in their inner unity (i.e., their interconnection), and in their material relationship (i.e., their order).

(1) Although soul and body are not identical they must nevertheless be conceived together. Whereas the dichotomy between Creator and creature can never be transcended, that between soul and body must be transcended. It is true that the inner structure of man reveals two poles--one creative and spiritual (soul) and the other created and natural (body)--

but both must be conceived as belonging together within a creaturely whole. The interconnection of soul and body, however, is not the same as the God-man relationship. The God-man dichotomy can never be transcended in conception; it is transcended in fact, but only in God's act in Jesus Christ. The togetherness of God and man is of grace and never of nature. Soul and body do not exist independently of each other. The soul, which is aroused by God's Spirit, is the life of man; but there can be no soul in isself but only soul of a body. To deny the body, therefore, is to deny the soul, in that there can be no soul without a body. This togetherness or wholeness between body and soul is the basis of man's being a Subject, a being in covenant-relationship with God. Yet the idea of soul must not be confused with Spirit; soul is a continuation within man of divine being and action denoted by the word "Spirit." Soul must be the soul of a body, while Spirit does not have a complement. The existence of soul is the existence of a creature with its own being and action; it is the life of a corporeal being, the life of a genuine subject and therefore the life of a genuine body which is social and material.

The insistence upon the unity of soul and body serves as a corrective to three misconceptions. The first consists of the abstract dualist approach of Greek anthropology (followed frequently by the Early Church). In Greek thought the soul is spiritual and immortal, and the body is material and mortal. They are two parts, two substances of which man is composed

This conception is not in harmony with the Christian anthropology despite its acceptance for centuries within the language of the Church. The second misconception is abstract monistic materialism. In this conception the soul is denied. The real is only that which is spatial and material. "This is the theory according to which the one substance of man consists in his corporeality, while the soul is treated in practice as at most the boundary of the only real problem, that of the body, and its particular existence is flatly denied."[16] The third misconception is abstract monistic spiritualism. This is opposite of monistic materialism. According to this view, the real is only the soul. It asserts that the soul is the only substance of human reality. None of the three offers insight into the real man. Both monisms, spiritualistic and materialistic, seek to demonstrate the unity of human reality, yet both fail to see the real man. Materialism, with its denial of the soul, makes man "subjectless"; while spiritualism, with its denial of the body, makes man "objectless." Man, however, must be seen as both subject and object, a unity of body and soul. Whatever distinction must be made between soul and body, the two cannot be seen as independent alien substances, but as intimately and essentially connected.

(2) Now, however, we must be certain that the soul-body unity is conceived without confusion. The Word of God distinguishes in man a center, where his life happens, and a periphery, where it is articulated. That is, the Word differentiates the soul from the body. This differentiation becomes

important at the point of man's self-awareness and responsibility.

> As he is . . . continuously involved in self-recognition and self-responsibility, he is man, and he continuously affirms his ability for it, and therefore the particularity of his human creatureliness. If man is the soul of his body . . . then in his case at least the meaning is that he is qualified, prepared and equipped for this activity. Soul and body, as the essence of human nature, are in any case the presupposition and precondition, the potentiality, which underlies the actuality of his being in the Word of God. 17

Thus man has both center (soul) and periphery (body). He knows himself to be one whom God has called into partnership and the election involves responsibility before God. The distinction, however, between center and periphery in the being of man must not be understood to mean that man has two substances, but that he has two moments of creaturely existence. Since man may meet and stand before God, two inferences immediately emerge concerning man's creaturely nature; and these inferences point up the necessary proper distinction of soul and body.

First, the being of man is being which "is capable of perceiving the God who meets him and reveals Himself to him."[18] If God created man to have being through His Word and as His covenant-partner, then it necessarily follows that He created him as a being with the ability of perception. This rationality, however, must not be understood in an abstract sense. In fact, human rationality is alienated from its proper content, God, if it is understood apart from the covenant-relationship initiated by God. (Here again, no room is permitted for natural theology.) The Bible has no interest in abstract rational knowledge for its own sake. In the Bible, God acts in order that man may encounter Him and acknowledge Him, but

it is in that very fact that we find a warrant for a distinction between the act of perceiving (wahrnehmen) and the act of thinking (denken) . The empirical moment of knowledge and the moment of acknowledgment are distinct though inseparable. Furthermore the act of perception has a unique connection with the body, and thinking with the soul. Whereas soul is that which enables man to make what is other his own, body is that capacity in man to expose himself to what is other. The two poles of activity are distinct, but neither is possible without the other. Man therefore

> has awareness as he is the soul of his body; he thinks as he is the soul of his body. In this differentiation the one act of perception is the act of the whole man, as in the Bible we see him confronted with God. 19

The priority of soul is expressed by saying that the soul is the agent of knowledge, whereas body only participates in the act of knowledge.

Secondly, to know God, from the Biblical view-point, is to act.

> In His dealings with man, God summons him to this ability. He presupposes from the very outset that even on man's side the fellowship between man and Himself must not be limited to a fellowship of knowledge, but that it can become a fellowship of action. 20

Here again there is a double aspect, willing and desiring. Willing has a special relation to the soul, and desiring to the body; but the soul, which is the subject, first allows the desiring to be "my" desiring.

(3) Thus, when Barth comes to speak of the "soul and body in their order," he has already cleared the way by affirming the "primacy of the soul," both in apprehension and in action.

But body is not therefore to be understood as a mere accidental appendage of real man. It is best understood as "the openness" of soul. Yet the order of priority established between the two poles of man's being is significant. The Creator deals with the creature as with one who is capable of controlling and serving himself. This control by the soul and service of the body is a fact of human nature which is best described by the Greek term λόγος or Latin term ratio (i.e. rationality). It is apparent, therefore, that man must not think of himself merely as soul (a thinking, willing creature), nor must he think of himself merely as body (a perceiving, desiring creature). He is the body serving his soul. The real man who engages in this total activity is one who exists as a created person because he exists for the Person who has made him. He is elected to be the creature of God and God's covenant-partner. Conceived thus, man is a being whom God can encounter, to whom he can give"His promise and His command." and whom "God can make Himself like" in order to have an intercourse with him "on an equal footing" by "binding Himself to him and having a common history with him."[21]

CHAPTER VII

MAN IN HIS TIME

God's Word, which alone gives the answer to the question concerning the nature and being of man, discloses the significant fact that man "lives as the soul of his body"! He is not a timeless spirit which has become entangled in a temporary and perishing material body. Man is constituted as the soul of his body because God, His Creator, has breathed His divine Spirit into the material of his earthly frame. But that presupposes that man is temporal. Time is the condition under which man exists. He exists as he exists in time. Since "his life is a series of the acts of his own movements, enterprise and activity,"[2] he is in the situation of moving "from his own past through his own present to his own future,"[3] while remaining identical with himself. In fact life and time are inseparable. If man has no time, he has no life; both belong together. Even divine life, life of the eternal God, is not without time, for His eternity is true and original time. But, in contrast to God's time, man's time has the character of the succession of past, present and future, so that his present is only his as his past ceases to be, and his future is as his present is no more, so that in fact man only has time as it is given to him. With God, however, "in His eternity, in the uncreated self-subsistent

time which is one of the perfections of His divine nature, present, past and future, yesterday, today and tomorrow, are not successive, but simultaneous."[4] From God's viewpoint present, past and future are involved in one another; they exist in and through each other, so that there is no present and no future of God which does not contain His present and future. God does not need time as something outside himself in order to live His divine life. He is the Creator of the time which is the condition of man's life. And this time, which is totally unlike God's eternity in that it involves the succession of events, becomes the arena of divine acts and human responses. Man's time, therefore, must be understood as finite because it depends upon God's actions. And this means that man's time is an allotted time, a time in which man's past, present and future are preceded and followed by the actions of God.

At this point, Barth sets forth the Christological foundation which he adopts in his investigation of the problems connected with man's being in time. On this basis, it is possible to establish the reality of man's time, i.e., the fact that his past, present and future are no mere appearances or fleeting shadows. Barth takes as his point of orientation exclusively the Word of God as made manifest in Jesus Christ. Consequently he begins his discussion with "Jesus, Lord of Time."

The man Jesus, like all other men, lives in time. He is born, he grows up, and he dies. His life in time is no mere appearance; he is a man of flesh and blood. This being

the case, two things must be said concerning this man's life in time. First, he lives as one who is not only with God but as one who is <u>for</u> God. He has time in so far as he is for God. "In this time of His He lives as the One He is in virtue of His unity with God."[5] As he lives in unity with God, he is the supreme Judge; it is a life lived for God and therefore men. His life does not belong exclusively to Himself, in that "He represents the grace of God, and thus gives man what is right, what is his due. Secondly, if he is God's Elected One who lives in his time in so far as he is for God, then he also most live for men. He can only be and live for God as he lives for man. "He is, on the one hand, God's representative to men, and, on the other, man's representative to God. And he represents the gratitude of man, and thus gives God what is right, what is His due."[6] It is this fact which makes Jesus the Contemporary of all men.

> The man Jesus has therefore His time, but He has more than just His own time. He lives in His time, and while it does not cease to be their times, His time acquires in relation to their times the character of God's time, of eternity,in which present, past and future are simultaneous. Thus Jesus not only lives in His own time, but as He lives in His own times . . . He is the Lord of Time. [7]

He is in fact God's time becoming our time.

But it is impossible to understand the history of the man Jesus unless one's eyes are kept focused on the New Testament account of the resurrection. Man, who is the soul of his body, is born, he grows up, and he dies. The same can be said of the man Jesus. However, it is at this point that the man Jesus is distinguished from all other men, in that

the history of man generally comes to an end, but Jesus has what might be called a "second history." The further history of this man begins on the third day after his death. Therefore if one is going to understand the real significance of designating Jesus as Lord of Time, then it is imperative that his eyes must always be focused on Easter history--the history of the forty days between his resurrection and ascension.

> It is impossible to read any text of the New Testament in the sense intended by its authors, by the apostles who stand behind them, or by the first communities, without an awareness that they either explicitly assert or at least tacitly assume that the Jesus of whom they speak and to whom they refer in some way is the One who appeared to His disciples at this particular time as the Resurrected from the dead. All the other things that they know of Him, His words and acts, are regarded in light of this particular event. . . . Whatever they proclaim in His name, the power of their message, derives from the fact that it was conveyed and entrusted to them by the man Jesus after He has raised from the dead. And . . . whatever His being in time means for their being, and for that of all men in their time, derives from the fact that Jesus was among them even in this particular time, the Easter time. 8

And it is important to point out that wherever the New Testament refers to the Resurrected Christ, it has reference to <u>real</u> history. It is clearly a misreading of the New Testament witness to suggest that the significance of Jesus consists in His being the mere embodiment of timeless truth or reality. Revelation in the Biblical sense is not a communication of timeless truth, it is at all times salvation <u>history</u>. Always everywhere Jesus meant history, and the truths that came from him were the effects of the impact of that history. When the New Testament, therefore, speaks of an Easter history--the time after the ending of Jesus' temporal existence--

it means real history. From this Easter history emerges the meaning and significance of this temporal existence. Here Barth stands against Bultmann, from whom the disciples' faith in the resurrection of Jesus was not the result of a resurrection history, but was the outgrowth of a new and deeper meaning of the Cross as life's victory over death. The resurrection was the fruit of faith; faith was not the fruit of the resurrection. From Barth's viewpoint, however, Bultmann is turning his back on the New Testament witness, moving from the Biblical idea of revelation as salvation history and making the revelation a matter of timeless, non-historical truth (especially the truth of life's victory over death). To do that entails surrendering the Biblical conception of time and man's life in time. The Resurrected Lord was a manifestation of the Godhead hidden in His earthly life; but this manifestation was real history and not some leap of human imagination. In the Resurrected Lord, God's time burst through the limits of man's time by entering that time. It is true, however, that the Easter history is not history in the ordinary use of the term (i.e., in the sense that can be verified by modern historical tools). "We may well accept as history that which good taste prevents us from calling 'historical fact', which the modern historians will call ' saga' or ' legend' on the ground that it is beyond the reach of his methods. . . "[9] But it is an unwarrantable assumption that everything which does not fit into the accepted canons of historical credibility is <u>a priori</u> non-historical or is not a real happening.

This assumption denies the Biblical idea of revelation as salvation history.

What then does it mean for this study to say that there was an "Easter history"? It means that the man Jesus was manifested among his disciples in the "mode" of God, that Jesus, who was in the "mode" of God, became manifested there, the disciples learned that it was also manifested, though in a veiled manner, in the Lord's earthly life. The disciples realized that in this man God has come to them. The Resurrected Lord was the concrete demonstration or proof that God is gracious; He is the God who delivers men from the power of death and thus renews His covenant with them, because He desires to give them part in His own eternity. The time of the man Jesus is therefore "the time of all times."[10] All other times are now controlled by this time. And this means that the reality of man's time is established and is therefore no mere appearance of illusion. "But it also means . . . that there is no such thing as absolute time, no immutable law of time. . . . There is no God called Chronos."[11] The limits of man's time are not fixed principles, but are determinations of the God who is His grace has entered man's time and established His lordship over him.

Having stated that the time of the man Jesus was a time which has definite period with a beginning and an end, and having emphasized that his time was the time that God has taken for man, Barth goes on to stress that both the time after and the time before the Incarnation was also his time.

We look first at the time after. After Easter and Pentecost, the New Testament community recognizes the real presence of Jesus among them. He is present among them in such a manner that He who was once past becomes present. His yesterday becomes today. This must be said of this man, but cannot be said of other men in their time. Where the Holy Spirit is (i.e., the Spirit of Christ), there is much more than tradition, much more than the memory of a historical person of the past; there is real presence. The earthly life and work of Jesus are not dismissed as if now they were somehow inapplicable to his present reality. What is prohibited, however, is merely historical relation to him. A community which develops because of a merely historical tradition or memory or influence could only be a community without the presence of the Holy Spirit. Still, Jesus' past is not abrogated by his presence now. "His yesterday is not cancelled by His today. . . . The fact that the man Jesus was includes that He is no longer."[12] Furthermore, the presence of Jesus in New Testament community "is full of import for the future."[13] The fact that the man Jesus is present now in and through the Holy Spirit impels his community to look forward to the final consummation. This consummation will be discussed below, but now the point must be made that the one who will come in his glory is identical with the one who was present in the past and really present to His community today. Therefore a "consistent eschatology." which regards the present as a time of emptiness and lack,

is not in harmony with the New Testament eschatology. Once again, a community which has this type of eschatology is a community without the Spirit.

Turning to the time before the Incarnation, we have already seen that the reality of Jesus in the present compels us to look to the past. In fact, the apostolic "today" possesses its secret and its power from that "yesterday," the referent of the great confession, "Et incarnatus est."[14] But the past being of Jesus cannot stop at the limit of this man Jesus in history was not an act of divine caprice and not an historical novum. Man speaks of the prophetic history of Israel whose existence is grounded in God's covenant which was realized and consummated in the event of the man Jesus, and learns that this history was his time also. But our thought must travel further still. Like the Incarnation, God's covenant-relationship with the people of Israel, was not a historical novelty. Creation itself is the presupposition of God's covenant, as the basis for fellowship between God and man, man and his fellowman. The beginning of time is Jesus' time as well as the time of the covenant people. Furthermore, our thoughts concerning Jesus cannot stop even at the limit of the beginning of the world. Since the man Jesus manifested himself in the resurrection as the appearance of God among men, and since his time of God for men, his past goes back to the eternity of God.

Having already shown the identity of the One who is

present today with the One who is to come, Barth turns to examine more closely the being of Jesus in the future. The concept of time and history are not emptied of meaning by the fact that Jesus is to come. However, the importance of Christ's Parousia must not be lost sight of, since, apart from the resurrection history and its meaning as promise, it would not be unthinkable that the future should unfold itself as a development of what man calls "Christianity." Such a conception is, of course, alien to the thought of the New Testament, which does not look forward to some idea or ideal that is to be actualized in the slow movement of time, but rather to the coming of Christ Himself who is the fulfillment of the divine covenant and who is man's Judge and Redeemer manifested to all men. The Christian life, therefore, is not only a life of love of the revelation now present; it is a life of hope in the Lord who is to come. The meaning and importance of Jesus as present and past cannot be seen properly, except from the perspective of a third dimension, indicated by the Parousia. If this third dimension is dropped, man inevitably comes to regard Jesus as a mere figure of the past and to interpret his presence in the community only as a psychological phenomenon.

Barth observes that the New Testament expectation of the Parousia could not but have the character of a proximate expectation. How could he who had fulfilled the divine covenant and who had given his life for it be thought of

except in terms of an imminent return? Christ's life, death, resurrection and Parousia are inseparable moments that belong together as God's movement to man which breaks into history. But it does not follow that the delayed Parousia inevitable provides the occasion for disillusionment and skepticism. He who is to come in his Parousia is also present today; and thus, each day is a day of Christ because it is a day of his grace coming to us. For this reason alone, each day becomes a day of hope. The life of the Christian, therefore, is a life of advancement from faith to faith, from faith realized and confessed to faith renewed.

Jesus, then, is the Lord of time. His time is the time which God has for man. It is thus the day of the Lord which covers and sustains and gives meaning to human days. Jesus Christ is God Himself, who in Himself knows only pure beginning pure continuance, and pure end; yet who takes man's time, which exists in a succession of events, into His own life. God's time in Jesus becomes our time and thus breaks through the limits of our time. All this is an expression of His grace. This cannot be explained through human philosophies, but only in light of God's act in Jesus Christ who is God's Word to man.

Building on the foregoing foundation, Barth proceeds to examine general man in his time. What has been said about the man Jesus cannot be said of man generally. "Our anthropology can and must be based on Christology, but it cannot be deduced from it directly. What is to be predicated of the

being of the man Jesus in time is true because this man is also God."[16] Jesus is Lord of time in the sense that past, present, and future acquire their significance in and through him. This cannot be said of man's time. In fact, apart from God's revelation in Christ which throws light upon human time, man is driven to the inevitable conclusion that he has no real time and therefore no real being. The past, for example, becomes "the time which we leave and are in longer."[7] To be sure, he may on occasion preserve particular memories that enable him to recall the past, but what is recalled is not the past itself, but only certain pictures of it. The past no longer belongs to him; he no longer has it at his disposal:

> We are no longer the people we were years ago, yesterday, or even this morning. Of course we should like to cling to what was, but the present and the future are already beckoning us. We must press on. The past is already slipping away, never to return. It is a mere conjecture, and a highly dubious one at that, to suppose that we are still what we were and still have what we had. [18]

What has been said concerning the past may be said with even greater decisiveness about the future. Here anticipation is substituted for the reality anticipated. And even that anticipation fails to become realized, because man is a very poor forecaster. When he fills the thought of the future with definite conceptions, plans, desires, or purposes, he does not give them reality. He has merely formed pictures of a future which is not at his disposal.

The situation is even more disturbing when one looks at the present, even though man is apt to think that he is truly the possessor and master of the present. His optimism is ill-

founded.

> Here, where midway between the vanished past, which have largely forgotten or only dimly remember, and the unknown future which awaits us (or perhaps does not await us!), we think we can take our ease and enjoy in impregnable security our being and having, and our identity with ourselves, we find that we are wholly and utterly insecure. For what is our present but a step from darkness to darkness, from the 'no longer' to the 'not yet', and therefore a continual deprivation of what we were and had in favor of a continual grasping of what we will (perhaps)be and have? 19

The present is not at man's disposal; he cannot make it his own; he cannot dwell in it. He can only hurriedly move out of it. Just where time appears to be most real, he finds himself drifting into the void.

Thus, apart from Christ man has no time; this ultimate truth is unavoidable. Man may, of course, endeavor to hide this fact from himself by taking the metaphysical way, postulating the infinity of time, instead of recognizing that time is something that is <u>given</u> to him and which therefore he possesses only because God has entered our time in Jesus. According to this metaphysical concept, time has no beginning or end or limits of any kind. But this so-called infinity of time is nothing but a vast abyss, in which the reality of time disappears before his eyes.

Although, in contrast to the man Jesus who is the Lord of time, man in himself has no real time, it is also possible to speak of a similarity between Jesus' time and the time of man generally. He was not only the Creator but also creature, not only eternal but also temporal. This means--and here the similarity is being emphasized--that the antithesis between

Jesus and man points not merely to a contrast between creature and Creator, but to the Creator's judgment upon the creature. It points to man's existence under God's wrath.

The being of man has been described as having no time, a passage from darkness into darkness. But the being of man so described is not man's true being as God created him to be, but rather the being of man in his rebellious nature. It is the being of man living under the conditions of sin, living in contradiction to his true being, and therefore in a wholly unnatural existence rather than a natural one. Saying that Jesus exists in time means that God will not allow man to live in contradiction to his true being. He will not recognize as valid this inauthenic existence under the condition of sin. In fact, this opposition has been overcome "God has vindicated His right and ours"[20] by giving us, not the lordship of time, but a real and genuine time which corresponds to our nature as His creatures. "God is righteous";[21] He turns to man in His mercy thereby assuring man is his status as God's creature, and also of the reality of the time given by the Creator of the creature.

Since it is possible to say that the existence of the man Jesus is God himself breaking the barrier between time and eternity, he thus becomes our guarantee that our time as willed and created by God is <u>real</u> because it is <u>given</u> by God to man. With Christology as the point of departure of this study, it can be affirmed that <u>time is real</u>. It is not the abyss of a man's non-being. The existence of God in the man

Jesus means that the Creator Himself takes time and has time for man; he is temporal in our midst just as we are. And because of His existence as man among men, a true and proper existence in time is opened to man, an existence in the time which God has willed, affirmed, and assumed. On this basis alone, can one say that time is real for man. God gives it, and man receives it and lives in it as a gift.

To say that God, by becoming temporal in Jesus, has given man time, means that man receives a real present, past, and future. From the view-point of the present, this means that man may and ought to take his present as the Now God has prepared for him. If man is really in time, he is so now. The whole of man's existence is involved in the fact that it is above all a Now. Hence, to ask if man is real in the Now, becomes an acute question. Is the Now a reality? This question can be answered in the affirmative only from the side of revelation. In the revelation of God in Christ man sees that God Himself is real now. He who is the Creator has accomplished the transition from the past to the future while remaining constantly identical with Himself. He is the Creator who has given man time because He loves him with an eternal love and thus will not let love for man be abrogated by man's rebellion. Therefore God's present confers a real present upon man. In relation to Him man's "Now" possesses a durable reality. Because God is eternally now, man is really now in the time which He has given him. And the meaning of man's now is that it is an opportunity for him to fulfill his relationship to

God and his fellowmen.

Just as the Creator's gift of time guarantees to man a real present, it also confers a real past. Since "the eternal God was then, in the past, the surety and pledge of the reality of our created time and of our real being in it,"[22] man has a real past. Man's past is established in reality only because God has established his being in a covenant relationship with Himself. It stands under God's judgment.

The future, of course, is the most problematic dimension of time because it has the character of the "not yet" and is therefore utterly non-existent. There may be no future at all; and even should there be one, it remains out of our reach until it ceases to be future and has become present. Man's only basis for supposing that his future is real depends essentially upon his recognition that God Himself, who is the real future, will forever be what He now is and what He was in the past. He will always be the God whose love for man is rooted in an eternal decision which determines man's very being. Since man's created being is constituted in his relation to this God, man can therefore take the step which moves out of the present into the future, knowing that this step does not lead into the void but to God, the Creator of the future.

Man's time then is real because it is something given, something assigned to him as the creation of God. It is the form of his human creaturely existence. He cannot say what time means for other beings; he can only speak of time in relation to himself, since revelation tells about the God-man rela-

tion and not about the whole cosmos. From revelation it is clear that man's time is rooted in the willing and giving of God.

Barth here enters a word of caution to prevent misunderstanding about theological anthropology. The reality of man's time and of his being in time cannot be established by any theory, even when the conception of God is made the systematic principal of that theory. The expression "God" in itself leads us nowhere. God as an idea, the principle of a system of interpretation, even if it is decked out with all the qualities of the Christian conception of God, could only lead to a dead end. The new factor which must be taken into account is not the idea of God, but God as event, as real happening, God as actually meeting with man. In short the new factor is the man Jesus, who as the Resurrected one, stands before man as the Lord of Time.

Having established that man's time is real because it is given by God, it is now possible to consider the special problems connected with the fact that his time is an allotted time, a time which "begins at a certain point, lasts for a certain period and finally comes to an end."[23] When man's time, given by God,is looked at in terms of its wholeness, we are immediately faced by the fact that it is bounded and finite, that in itself it does not possess duration and continuance. This is the great riddle which confronts us. For man's being demands permanency, or rather duration. Human life cries out with fundamental rightness against this limitation of time. Man does not want to cease to be but to be.

He abhors the idea that once he was not and soon he will cease to be. "Human life would always like to regard itself as an unfathomable, inexhaustible reality."[24] This notion arises primarily, not from a mere life hunger or will to be, but from the fact that time is given to man by God for the fulfillment of that whereunto his being is determined. In and of himself he possesses no claim whatever to an ever-enduring existence. It is from the standpoint of God's covenant relationship with him that man rebels against his limited existence. He is created to be God's covenant partner, and this means that his life has been determined to be lived for God and therefore for his fellowman. But a being so determined appears to call for ever-enduring existence. It demands perfection without limitations. If man is to achieve the goal set by his determination, must not his time be an unlimited one? His determination as God's covenant partner is not bounded by limitations, and this appears to require that his duration must also be unlimited.

> To be unfathomable and inexhaustible is proper to it, as its craving for duration is legitimate. It is rightly protests against the fact that it has an allotted span of time, for if it is to fulfill its determination it would seem to need unending time. 25

Is it, then, possible to escape this dilemma by pointing to the difference between God's being and man's by asserting that the Creator by right belongs to an unending existence and that man owing to his nature, belongs to limited existence? Although the premise is true, it does not solve the problem. Since God Himself has determined man's being as one in covenant relationship with Him, and since this relationship is the

relationship of God, and since it is God Himself in relationship, it is necessarily a boundless one. Therefore the limits set on man's time still pose a serious problem.

The question may, however, be asked whether inexhaustible time would satisfy the conditions which are necessary for the fulfillment of man's determination? The answer is, of course, No. For time is only the indispensable opportunity given to man by God. If man had boundless time, this could only mean an increase of the opportunity ad infinitum. But opportunity is not realization; and an unlimited time would simply be the perpetual postponement of realization. What man's being really demands is not boundless time but a removal of the negation which stands between it and this realization. And it makes all the difference whether man understands his life in an abstract way as "limited," or whether he comprehends it as bounded and encompassed by God. If the former, then man's desire for the fulfillment is but a stretching out his hands into the void. On the other hand, if the time in which he lives stands in direct relation to God, then what lies behind and before his time is not void but God Himself, who has completely destroyed all void. Limitation now becomes a definition or a description which indicates a history. Since man is the subject of history, and since his relation with God is an historical one, his time must be an allotted time and not endless time. It is God Himself who surrounds our time and thus stands at the limits of man's existence. He gives us time in order that man may respond to him, and not that he may fulfill

some independent plan of life. God, because He is in Himself not timeless but pure beginning, pure continuance, and pure end, creates man's time and thus promises him a participation in the fullness of His own being.

It is not enough merely to introduce the idea of God; it must be affirmed that the God of whom we speak is the gracious God. He who creates man's allotted time is the same God who has called man into fellowship. Man's existence depends solely upon the grace of God.

> Thus from this standpoint . . . his nature does not permit him to sin. If he does so, he cannot blame his nature for it. His nature, as that of a temporally limited being, is a powerful invitation and direction to throw himself upon God's free grace, to give Himself alone his trust and full obedience, and in so doing to fulfill his determination and satisfy his craving for duration and perfection. If he fails to do this but falls into sin, he does not conform to his nature but denies it. [26]

What has been said concerning man's time as allotted and thus bounded by God's grace is said only in light of the man Jesus himself. "He Himself is God's free grace."[27] Once again true anthropology springs out of Christology.

The problem of an allotted space of man's time has two aspects, that of its beginning and that of its ending. The latter, of course, is the more disturbing of the two. It does not seriously disturb man to consider the fact that once he was not, but to realize that he will no longer be places a heavy burden on his life. Yet man's beginning, his emergence from non-being, is in fact just acute a problem. "Fot it means . . . that even from my origin I am threatened by annihilation, being marked as a being which can only advance towards

non-existence."[28] In one sense, the problem of man's beginning is even more acute than that of his ending. His ending--his plunge into non-being--is yet in the future and thus can be temporarily forgotten. Man's emergence from non-being is, however, something which has already taken place and thus cannot be avoided. It is an undeniable fact that once he was not. The answer to this problem is given to man in the Word of God by whom he learns that what was before him was not nothingness but the being of God. He was before man was, and because He was man was. He turns to man in his grace and this makes himself his protector and the guarantor of his existence. Man's existence depends essentially upon God's grace, and because of His grace man's existence is real. From the very beginning of man's existence a promise is attached to his continuing existence in the world and to his ending. On this basis, man can pursue his goal without fear that his way might turn out to be an impossible way.

In spite of its problematic nature there is at least a positive element in man's beginning. He emerges from non-being into being. But man's ending appears to be totally negative. From being he plunges into non-being. Life is in revolt and protest against its ending; it does not want to cease to be. It struggles after more life and cannot but regard death as unnatural and therefore its enemy. Death is not a natural fact but a dynamic power overshadowing man's entire existence. This is the testimony of the Holy Scriptures, especially of the Old Testament, where the overcoming of death in resurrection is still in the future. Therefore, if man's

death is understood as an immediate relation with the God who was before our beginning, if man's existence is one in which he advances to meet Him, then the fact that life comes to an end is placed in an entirely different light from its beginning. The ending of life becomes a sign of God's judgment, the divine No, and thus points to man's guilt. To be sure, man's life in time, from beginning to end, is one determined for fellowship with God and therefore with fellowman. But man has not accepted his life in that relationship; he has rebelled against his own existence. Since man has been and is a rebellious creature, what can be the result of his meeting God but judgment and rejection? Nevertheless, we cannot proclaim as a universal truth that this judgment is actually accomplished, and the ending of life is in fact man's rejection. The presupposition of the New Testament is that man is spared the divine No, because the man Jesus has endured it on our behalf. This being the case, what can be generally announced is that man's death, while not in itself being his rejection by God, is a sign of the divine No on the guilt of human existence. Apart from the man Jesus who has intervened on our behalf death would actually be the execution of God's judgment. Death, therefore, does not belong to God's creation; it is not man's friend.

According to the divine revelation, the God with whom man is directly confronted in death is the gracious God. He is the God who, regardless of man's sin, will not break His promise. This God is the Lord of death. He takes from death

its power of finality and thus makes it become for man a sign of judgment and not the execution of judgment. He calls man to recognize that he is an object of His grace. We may not, indeed,

> boast of an immortality which is ours when we say this. We do not glory in anything of our own. . . . Yet we cannot refrain from saying, without any boasting that according to His own Word He is this, and that as such He is our Helper and Deliverer and therefore our hope. We cannot refrain from speaking of God Himself. And therefore we must see ourselves as those who in the midst of death are already out of its clutches and victorious over it. . . . As those who must die, we shall nevertheless live. 29

The hope is ours because God is gracious, and His grace has become an event in the atoning death of Jesus Christ and has been made manifest in his resurrection.

We are now in a position to answer the question whether the ending of man's time belongs to the creative ordinance of God and may therefore be acclaimed not as an evil but as a good. Heretofore man's death, even in light of Jesus' death, has been understood as essentially evil. The fact that the death of Jesus was necessary in order to redeem man from the power of death would seem to indicate the abnormality of death. If this is all that can be said, would it not imply that our beginning, as well as our ending, be exposed as an evil? Should we not be driven to the conclusion that an everlasting time is the only time which would correspond to a relationship with the gracious God?

A solution may be found when it is realized that in the discussions hitherto we have assumed an equivalence between death as the termination of man's allotted span, and death

as the negation of man's being through the No of God upon his guilt. However, while it is true that in life we cannot but regard man's death as God's judgment on his existence, we cannot stop there. The death of Jesus Christ on the cross was on behalf of man, and this means that this death on the cross was not necessary but was the freely accepted end of his life. He died, not out of anthropological necessity, but as the manifestation and proof of the free grace of God to man living in contradiction to the divine determination of his being. He who knew no guilt or sin took upon himself death as the divine judgment. Does not this prove, then, that dying in the sense of reaching the end of an allotted space of time is not in itself evil? Furthermore, on this Christological foundation, it is possible to see that when man's life comes to an end in death, he goes to meet God's judgment; but more than that he meets God's Yes in His No. The ending of life therefore is not in itself evil; it cannot contradict the true nature of man as God's creation.

"Man as such, therefore, has no beyond"[30] for he has no need of it; "God is his beyond."[31] The future of man does not consist of some new infinite temporal existence which leaves his present existence behind itself. It is a future which consists of the glorification of man's temporally-ending being; it is the redemption of his real self. And this redemption is understood positively as eternal with God and as a sharing in His own divine life. In this redemption man will be manifest in the presence of God, and before the pres-

ence of all others, in the reality of his temporal existence. He will be seen as one whose being is ever glorified through God's free grace. God, not the grave, is man's goal.

PART III

CRITIQUE OF BARTH AND THE WRITER'S VIEW CONCERNING THE DOCTRINE OF MAN

CHAPTER VIII

CRITIQUE OF BARTH

A. BARTH'S CONTRIBUTION TO CHRISTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY

It has been clear in the foregoing chapters that the most striking feature of Barth's anthropology is his effort to begin, continue, and end the doctrine of man in the man Jesus. The present writer submits that Barth's Christ-orientation is his most significant contribution to Christian anthropology. Already we have noted that Barth's founding of anthropology upon Christology does not mean that the former is absorbed by the latter. Nevertheless, Barth has insisted that the Christian anthropologist cannot construct a general statement about man, based upon reflections and observations apart from Christ, and then proceed to correct this picture according to the special standpoint of the Christian faith. Barth correctly contends that the peculiarly Christian perspective must determine theological anthropology from the beginning. This means that he looks primarily, not to the world of men generally, but to the man Jesus, in an effort to perceive in that particular man the reality of man in general. So far from expressing dualistic tendencies, as some have charged, Barth's approach actually eliminates the dualism latent in much traditional anthropology and provides radically unified concepts both of

the knowledge and the being of man. Founding the doctrine of man upon Christology places the anthropological problem precisely where it belongs, at the point of man's sin.

Knowledge about Real Man. Barth contends that any speculative anthropology can lead only to some sort of picture of man in abstracto; any encounter with real man is possible only in Jesus Christ. An important implication of Barth's contribution to the "natural theology' debate is that man apart from Christ is bereft, not only of proper knowledge of God, but of true knowledge about himself. All such knowledge is derived from the single source, the man Jesus; there is no second source upon which man can base theologically valid observations and reflections about himself.

Nevertheless, Barth's attitude toward scientific anthropologies is remarkably open and positive (again charges to the contrary notwithstanding). His only stricture respecting these anthropologies is that they cannot by themselves penetrate to the real man. They can describe human phenomena, but any effort to develop an inclusive hypothesis about man from these investigations lead only to abstract man. When these non-theological anthropologies concede the abstractness of their views, along with their consequent tentativeness and ultimate inadequacy, they can be of service to theological anthropology. They can discover features of human existencies that can be transformed into symptoms of real humanity by the Christian anthropologist.

The Being of Man. Not only man's self-knowledge but his

very being is derivative from the man Jesus. The reality which exists in the perfect humanity of Jesus exists in the humanity of man in general as a destiny and a possibility willed by God. Here Barth correctly asserts the priority of actuality over potentiality. Jesus is man living perfectly for God; man in general is God's creature destined to live in fellowship with Him. Consequently, man has no existence as a self-contained being but only as historical being, a being in history. And historical is not equivalent to a being with mere historicity, i.e., a being undergoing a series of earthly events. A Christian must assert, as Barth does, that man exists primarily in action in the presence of God and with God; that is what it means to be a being in history. Man's existence is dependent upon the fact that God has called and is calling him into existence. He is summoned into existence, in order that he may live in gratitude, freely responding to God with his knowledge, his obedience, and his worship. Since this calling of man by God is the content of the creative act of the One who has called, then it must be affirmed with regard to this creative act that man is good.

The Problem of Man's Sin. Building on the Christological foundation, it is possible to see why man's sin is the "only paradox" in Barth's theology. In the light of Jesus Christ it must be said that man is good; yet, when man is viewed as he actually exists, it must be asserted that he is a sinner. Brunner tries to solve the problem by distinguishing between the form and content of the imago Dei in man. Man is created with the capacity to respond to God (the form of the imago).

and this he retains, even though he gives the wrong response, thus destroying the content of the imago. But this approach falls short of the heart of the problem; it speaks of man in the abstract. The problem is that man is good; God has made him so, and there is nothing he can do about it. He did not create himself; neither can he destroy himself. He does not have the freedom to reject God, because freedom means obedience. He cannot even deny this freedom, because denial is not a possibility open to him. On the other hand, man does in fact rebel against God. He does that which is impossible for him to do. He refuses to live by grace. This fact cannot be explained by pointing to man's freedom. Man was indeed made free, but his freedom was freedom for God. It did not include the possibility of following two directions: toward evil, as well as toward good. Man's freedom excludes the possibility of sin; yet he is a sinner through and through.

Thus emerges Barth's view of the ontological impossibility of sin. It is this view, providing as it does the decisive background of his statements concerning the grace of God, and developed from the Christological starting point, which constitutes one of his major contributions to contemporary theology. It is indissolubly bound up with his idea of freedom, freedom for God. Man has freedom in God's freedom, who in the man Jesus has made man free in this way. Man is free only in this man, apart from whom man simply is not. He is as he lives in this freedom.

The Humanity of God. It is in the light of the Christ-

orientation of Barth's anthropology that his provocative phrase, "the humanity of God," must be understood. Already implied in Dogmatics, III/2, the concept is made explicit in a later lecture. The "humanity of God" is

> God's relation to and turning toward man. It signifies the God who speaks with man in promise and command. It represents God's existence, . . . the intercourse God holds with him, and the free grace in which He wills to be and is nothing other than the God of man. [1]

Clearly this way of speaking has nothing to do with the confusion of God and man which Feuerbach so effectively revealed in his contemporaries and which provided the occasion for Barth's earliest anthropological statements. It is derived solely from the implications of God's action and revelation in Christ. Just as clearly, however, Barth's speaking of the "humanity of God" has provided the most convenient symbol for those who accuse him of turning about-face in recent years. Even though Barth did not publish the phrase until after the publication of Dogmatics, III/2, "the humanity of God" may properly stand, for both Barth's disciples and his opponents, as a symbol for much that seemed quite "new" in III/2.

"The New Barth." From his Romans to Dogmatics, III/2, it is undeniable that Barth shifted his emphasis from God's wrath to His grace. We need not look far to find the shift described in Barth's own words. Speaking of his early writing; "We viewed this 'wholly other' in isolation, abstracted and absolutized, and set it over against man, this miserable wretch. . . ." [2] His shift in emphasis is described thus: "Theologically, the message of God's grace came to seem more urgent

than the message of God's law, wrath, accusation and judgment (though that is certainly not to be suppressed either)."[3] There is little room for doubt that Barth has accurately indicated the main point of the "change" or "development" with respect to his doctrine of man. Consequently, when Dogmatics, III/2, was published Brunner felt that only the phrase, "the new Barth," would properly denote the change.[4] The present writer submits that Brunner's description was unwarranted from two points of view.

In the first place, the shift in Barth's emphasis was a proper response to the developing theological situation. Barth began a dialog with his early writings, and it would have been irresponsible of him not to have "kept talking" as he heard what people were making of his early statements. A theologian cannot say everything at once, nor can he say one thing, as if that were all there is to be said. He says what needs to be said at the time he is speaking. Since Brunner's proposition that a new Barth had emerged was actually a claim to a delayed victory in the natural theology debate of the 1930's let us take that issue as a case in point.

It must be remembered that the famous debate took place against the grim backdrop of the rise of National Socialism. Barth feared that Brunner's insistence upon a "point of contact" would give comfort to many who were blurring the line between God and man in an effort go give ideological support to Hitler's regime. By confusing man's deed with God's deeds, many whose purpose was not to clarify the gospel (as Brunner's

certainly was) could and did regard Hitler's work as God's work. Observing this, Barth denied quite properly that there is any intrinsic likeness between God and man. He went on to assert that National Socialism was in fact the work of Anti-Christ. Brunner, of course, did not identify the work of God with the work of man, but his position ran the danger of doing just that, especially when he spoke of an unscathed capacity to receive revelation.

The term,"the new Barth," is inappropriate, in the second place, because it ignores the broad consistency of Barth's frame of reference from first to last. We may lift up four points to show that the development in Barth's thought may most profitably be regarded as a shift in emphasis rather than a denial of his "former" position.

(1) In the natural theology debate, as in the Dogmatics, Barth was insisting upon the priority of actuality over potentiality. The revelation of God in Christ is the primary reality and starting point, while human response is secondary and derivative. This is one reason that Barth rejected Brunner's particular form of natural theology in the 1930's. Brunner spoke of man's "addressability" and of his "verbicompetence" (Ansprechbarkeit and Wortmactigkeit); he referred to him as a "word-receptive being" (Wortemfangliches Wesen). These terms place almost exclusive emphasis upon man's potentiality and obscure his actuality. Brunner's insistence upon the preservation of the form of the imago Dei was also, according to Barth, a distortion by overemphasis upon potentiality.

The actuality of God's revelation in Christ must always be clearly seen as primary; and everything that is said about man must be said in the light of that revelation.

(2) Barth's rejection of natural theology is clearly consistent with his Christ-centered anthropology and his consequent assertion of the humanity of God, secondly, in that it was aimed against latent dualism. There is one truth and one source of truth. Natural theology threatens to drive a wedge between cosmology and soteriology, between creation and the covenant, between man's knowledge of the world and his perception of the grace of reconciliation. In what some regarded as an unjustifiably vehement attack upon Brunner, Barth was saying in polemical style exactly the same thing that he could later assert more gently and in greater detail: Creation is the outward basis of the covenant, and the covenant is the inward basis of creation.[5]

(3) The third point of consistency is perhaps the most obvious, but must nevertheless be lifted up in this context. It is that Barth maintains the primacy of the Word of God as a methodological principle from first to last. The Word is the foundation of all Christian doctrines; not "religion" but the Word of God is the object of Christian theology. Brunner, along with Barth's other critics, has failed to show that Barth has departed from this intention anywhere in the long progression from Romans, through the natural theology debate, to Dogmatics, III/2, and "The Humanity of God."

(4) Finally, Barth has consistently worked within the

framework of the polarity of sin and grace as revealed in Christ. In the debate with Brunner the sinfulness of man was emphasized, as was necessary in the light of Jesus Christ. Sin can never be dismissed as an accident, lest the cross of Christ be emptied of its power. Sin can be known only in terms of the reality and fearfulness of the cross, in which the corruption and depth of man's guilt are revealed in their full seriousness. When Brunner distinguished between the form and content of the imago Dei, he appeared to overlook the depth of man's sin. The cross demonstrates that apart from Christ man is a "throughgoing" sinner, not good but totally evil.

In Dogmatics III/2 the grace of God is stressed, again in the light of the same Jesus Christ. There man is still the creature who refuses to be governed by the grace of God. But when a full anthropology is constructed on the Christological foundation, it can be seen that the sin of man is secondary, while God's love is primary. In the light of Jesus Christ man knows that he cannot have the last word.

B. SHORTCOMINGS OF BARTH'S DOCTRINE

In spite of, or perhaps because of, the monumental quality of Barth's anthropology, certain inadequacies must be noted. Two in particular will be discussed.

In the first place, we must seriously question Barth's idea of "the ontological impossibility of sin." This idea is closely related to his doctrine of election.[6] Taken together, the two ideas offer a strong argument that Barth is a univer-

salist. In his analysis of election it becomes evident that for him the issue in election is the gracious decision of God in Jesus Christ. Man is not in any sense a co-operating agent who adds his own share in achieving salvation. God's decision which was made for man in Jesus Christ can only be accepted and acknowledged by man in faith. Election is therefore God's gracious decision for man; and thus it is sovereign election. According to Barth the sovereignty of God's election can be understood correctly only as Jesus Christ is perceived as the electing God Himself and as both elected and rejected man. This idea defines the place of man in election. Using this idea as the point of departure, it must be affirmed that in Jesus Christ God has elected all men; no man is excluded from His universal election. God has said Yes to man in Jesus Christ, in His election and rejection of this man, and this decision that has been made cannot be undone. Sin cannot nullify this decision. On the other hand, a tension arises because every human response is not yes. Man does in fact say no to God's Yes. In connection with this we meet the conception of the ontological impossibility of sin. Can sin destroy God's Yes? Barth's answer, as has been pointed out, is in the negative. Even though Barth does not intend to expound the doctrine of universal salvation, still he speaks of the powerlessness of man's sin.

When Barth emphasizes God's electing grace in Jesus Christ to the extent that man's rebellion is finally overcome and suppressed, then he moves to the brink of universalism--and

perhaps beyond. Brunner has criticized Barth at this point. Both men agree that the knowledge of our election is based solely on the revelation of Jesus Christ, but Brunner rejects some of the conclusions that Barth has drawn from the idea. Particularly he repudiates the idea that Jesus Christ is the only rejected man. This would, according to Brunner, mean that "there is no such thing as being 'lost', that there is no possibility of condemnation, and thus that there is no final Divine Judgment."[7] Barth, of course, does not wish to stand with the "illustrious theologians who have taught this doctrine of apokatastasis,"[8] and yet, he goes even further than they. "For none of them ever dared to maintain that through Jesus Christ, all, believers and unbelievers, are saved from the wrath of God and participate in redemption through Jesus Christ."[9]

According to Brunner, Barth's idea is diametrically opposed to the New Testament which teaches that "there is no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus,"[10] and which in this connection always speaks of the importance of man's faithful response. He thinks that Barth has obscured the significance of man's subjective decision of faith by emphasizing God's objective decision in Jesus Christ. "The result is that the real decision only takes place in objective sphere, and not in the subjective sphere."[11] Over against this Brunner says that, of course, grace is for all but only in so far as they believe. If man excludes himself, he is excluded.

It is true that Brunner does put man's subjective decision

of faith and God's objective decision in Jesus Christ on the same level, and thus it is understandable that Barth will have no part of this. This is the very thing that Barth throughout his dogmatics has been concerned to oppose. Actuality and potentiality are not on the same level.

Nevertheless, the writer is convinced that Brunner has touched the heart of Barth's problem. He has discerned the weakness of his doctrine of election and thus his anthropology. Brunner's use of the illustration of people who seem to be perishing at the sea indicates that he visualizes the weakness in Barth's doctrine. "In reality they are not in a sea where one can drown, but in a shallow water, where it is impossible to drown. Only they do not know it."[12] This illustration gives a fair picture of Barth's doctrine that the decision which God has taken in Jesus Christ cannot ultimately be invalidated.

There is clearly a close connection between Barth's idea of the ontological impossibility of sin and his doctrine of election. If God's electing grace in Jesus Christ makes sin and nothingness an ontological impossibility, then all mankind will inevitably be reconciled in spite of their sin or rebellion. God's grace is for man, i.e., for all men, and there is nothing that man can do to change this fact.

It is true that Barth emphasizes the sovereignty of God's grace in order to leave no room for human co-operation in salvation. Yet, in his effort to perform this task, he has excluded much of the New Testament witness concerning the

necessity of faith in salvation; and this faith of which the New Testament speaks is not spoken of in a meritorious sense. In dealing with the problem of belief and unbelief, the theologian must have as his point of departure the Holy Scriptures. According to the Bible, God's act in Jesus Christ for man is a sovereign salvation, i.e., our salvation in no sense comes from us but from God. Nevertheless, at the same time, the New Testament seems to indicate with great clarity that man's response, man's reaction, to this act in Christ is not without significance. The Bible invites men to faith and warns men against unbelief. In Hebrews the Church is warned against unbelief and against refusing to receive the grace of God (12: 15; 12:25; 4:11; 6:4-6). To be sure, faith is not some kind of human achievement or merit, but the response of faith is a necessary ingredient for salvation. Man can say no to God, and this no is not swallowed up by the overpowering might of God's Yes.

We note that in I Thess. 2:13 Paul gives thanks to God because "when you received the work of God which you heard from us, you accepted it not as the word of men but as what it really is, the word of God, which is at work in you believers." The Word of God elicited man's faith and thus became effective. In addition to the passages from Hebrews and I Thess., the biblical use of such expressions "as except you believe" and "whosoever believes" is enough to indicate the necessity of faith as a human response to God's act in Jesus Christ. Furthermore the New Testament writers were convinced that the fore-

going fact does not detract from the sovereignty of God's grace.

When Barth, therefore, speaks of the ontological impossibility of unbelief or sin, he appears to go against the New Testament witness which holds to the possibility of unbelief. It is true, however, that Barth does not intend to deny the "reality" of sin when speaking of its impossibility. But even so, his idea of impossibility is unacceptable because the Holy Scriptures seem to speak in an entirely different manner concerning the reality of sin. As Berkouwer puts it:

> When sin and godlessness are designated in terms of a divine accusation of utter seriousness and sin is related to man's responsibility and to death, any and every use of the concept 'impossibility' and particular 'ontological impossibility' as a speculative effort to speak where Scripture does not speak unwarranted. 13

As a second point of criticism, Barth's interpretation of time and eternity appears to be in contradiction to the Holy Scriptures. We have noted that in his earlier publications, Barth asserted a fundamental qualitative distinction between time and eternity. However, in contrast to this earlier (so-called Kierkegaardian) distinction, he later came to lay very strong emphasis on the temporal quality of eternity. But the Platonic influence which controls the conception of time in the early publications, especially in the Romans, is still operative in his Dogmatics, II/1 and III/2. Here still, despite everything, he maintains the qualitative time-eternity distinction; that is, he does not regard eternity as "an infinite extension of time both backwards and forwards."[14] For him "time can have nothing to do with God."[15] In fact "God and

eternity must be understood as the element which surrounds time on all sides. . . ."[16]

This interpretation is much closer to Platonic thought than to the Bible. For Plato eternity is not endless time;" it is timelessness."[17] Hence time is but an imperfect copy of eternity. But the Bible has an entirely different way of speaking of time and eternity, and thus this absolute distinction found in Plato is not present. To be sure, there is a difference between time and eternity in biblical thought but this difference is quite unlike Platonic thought. Eternity, according to the Bible, is endless extended time stretching backwards and forwards. The chief difference concerning time and eternity is that eternity is unlimited, and time is limited. "Thus time and eternity share this quality,"[18] because "eternity can and must be expressed in this 'naïve' way, in terms of endless time."[19]

The writer contends that Barth's anti-biblical interpretation of time and eternity has affected his understanding of the afterlife. In Barth's analysis of man's time, he came to the conclusion that, if his time is created, and if there was a time when it was not, then there must be a time when it will cease to be. This conclusion is inevitable when one starts with a sharp distinction between time and eternity. The chief problem for Barth was the apparent conclusion that the end of finite life means curse and threat. But, using the man Jesus as the point of departure of anthropology, he concluded that this could not be the case. Since Christ' death

was the voluntary end of his human life, his death was not anthropologically necessary; therefore, death as such is not to be identified with judgment. The fact that human life will come to an end is a part of God's good creation. Thus Barth introduces the very difficult idea of the eternalizing of finite life. The Christian does not hope for a kind of endless prolongation of his existence in time. Instead, man in his finiteness will meet with God in the "moment" of resurrection and will participate in His eternity, which is essentially different from existence in time.

This interpretation certainly appears to conflict with the witness of the New Testament. It may be questioned whether the Christian hope has not been narrowed down to the point where it becomes a quite unimaginable moment of meeting with God. Following the implications of a Christ-oriented anthropology, we conclude that such an orientation does not qualify the connection between death and judgement. Rather it leads us to assert that man may hope for unlimited time, because Jesus Christ is not only the crucified One but also the risen and <u>living</u> Lord. The man Jesus is the one who could say: "I died, and behold I am alive for evermore" (Rev. 1:18). When the Bible speaks of the hereafter, it is not interested in some vague idea of the eternalizing of finite life. Here, we are reminded especially of the comfort which Paul had when he wrote that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that is to be revealed to us (Rom. 8:18). Paul is concerned with the reality of salvation in

Jesus Christ, in being with him, and always being with him (I Thess. 4:17).

We may lay the blame for Barth's faulty conclusions here, not upon the Christological starting point, but upon the fact that he has not really abandoned his original qualitative distinction between time and eternity. The only possible solution to the problem of death under that premise is the eternalization of the finite. If time is totally unrelated to eternity, then it is possible to assert that death is not in itself evil, but a part of the basic difference between God and man. Then Jesus Christ becomes, not the guarantor of life everlasting, but the proof that the end of life is not in itself evil.

A word of caution is necessary at this point. We have seen that Barth has used the language of philosophy in his Romans and the Church Dogmatics (especially II/1 and III/2). He has admitted that his Romans was wrapped in Platonic and Kantian thought forms; he saw his error and sought to correct this in his later writings. Church Dogmatics, II/1 and III/2, were written in the 1940's, and Platonic terminology is not as striking in these volumes as in his Romans. In his book entitled The Humanity of God, Barth has endeavored to correct his former writings even further. Here he says that his early theology was only partially right, and the expressions that were used are misleading and wrong. He is referring to such expressions "wholly other" breaking in upon us "perpendicularly from above," and the "infinite qualitative distinction" between

God and man.[20] In this connection Barth also emphasizes that the deity of God "has the character of humanity."[21] God's deity includes his humanity. Barth says that he received this new insight because of his new look at God's act in Jesus Christ.[22]

If God's deity includes humanity or has the character of humanity, then eternity is not timelessness as Barth appears to have described it in his Church Dogmatics II/1 and III/2. He has said that "time can have nothing to do with God," but if God's deity has the character of humanity, then there must be some relationship between time and God; there must be time in God. Either this is a contradiction of which Barth is unaware, or, as is more probable, a part of the process of development which is characteristic of his theology. Just how much this new emphasis affects his views concerning the afterlife, we do not know. Perhaps it will be necessary to wait for further explanation of his views on this matter in the next volumes of the Dogmatics.

CHAPTER IX

TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT

A. PRESUPPOSITIONS

A critical study of any competent theologian's doctrine of man inevitably leads the critic to clarify his own thoughts about Christian anthropology. This writer will undertake, therefore, to set forth a sketch of his own anthropological statement, beginning by drawing out the major presuppositions of that statement.

There are two points to be brought out here. (1) The systematic theologian cannot construct a doctrine of man until he has defined the nature of the theological task. Anthropology, like other doctrines, is drawn from a prior understanding of the source, norm, and methods of the theologian's work.

(2) Conversely, the theologian's understanding of his task as a whole will inevitably affect his doctrine of man. Therefore, the critique of an inadequate anthropology will soon have to proceed backwards to its author's definition. These two points, though elementary, are overlooked often enough. They can be illustrated by a comparison of the work of Karl Barth with that of L. Harold DeWolf and R. Bultmann.

Regarding the theological task, Barth says, "dogmatics

is the scientific test to which the Christian Church puts herself regarding the language about God which is peculiar to her."[1] The task of systematic theology, therefore, is to criticize and revise the language of the church. The first thing to note about this definition is that it sees theology as exclusively a Church discipline. As the Church speaks about God, the theologian's task is to make sure that this thoroughly human speech about God agrees with the essence of the Church, that is, with Jesus Christ, God in His gracious approach to man in revelation and reconciliation."[2] This criterion further implies the primary source for systematic theology is Holy Scripture, since that is the witness to the revelation in Jesus Christ.

In Barth's definition of the task of dogmatics, he referred to it as a "scientific test". There are three reasons why that designation is appropriate.

> 1. Like all other so-called sciences, it is a human effort after a definite object of knowledge. 2. Like all other sciences, it follows a definite, self-consistent path of knowledge. 3. Like all other sciences, it is in the position of being accountable for this path to itself and to every one--every one who is capable of effort after this object and therefore of following this path. 3

Dogmatics is, therefore, not an arbitrary activity or mere idle talk. She is not a step-child in the scholarly world, futilely mimicking at a distance the gestures of her more fortunate sisters.

With this brief suggestion of Barth's conception of the task of dogmatics, it is now possible to discern how it is

closely related to his doctrine of man. If the task of theology is conceived as being that of analyzing the proclamation of the Church, and if the essence of the Churhh is Jesus Christ, then all Christian doctrines must be interpreted in the light of Jesus Christ. Therefore, if one wants to take issue with Barth's anthropology, it must be done from the standpoint of his understanding of the task of dogmatics. It is fruitless to critizize Barth for taking Christology as the point of departure for his anthropology, if one stops there. What he says about man follows from what he says about the task and method of dogmatics.

For comparison, DeWolf says of systematic theology that it is "the critical discipline devoted to discovering, expounding and defending the more important truths implied in the experience of the Christian community."[4] Like Barth, DeWolf sees theology as a Church discipline; and in calling it a "critical discipline" he means virtually what Barth means by calling it a "science". But there the similarity between the two definitions ends, for DeWolf's including of the functions of discovering and defending Christian truth contrasts sharply with Barth's limitation of the task to critically expounding what is a given truth.

The method which he uses to analyze any doctrine is that of "comprehensive coherence." Comprehensive coherence "is the process of examining an idea or object in the widest possible context of thought and experience."[5] If this method is used as the criterion for truth, then only those solutions of a

problem which are supported by the greatest weight of evidence from all quarters are accepted as true. "It is assumed that the truth is not contradicted by experience nor by other truth and that we can have evidence of the truth of an idea only through its significant relation to some experience."[6] With this kind of approach man's rational capabilities, as well as the proximate unity of truth, is emphasized.

When one turns to DeWolf's doctrine of man, one sees a chain of reasoning entirely different from Barth's. DeWolf, instead of accepting a Christological starting point, carefully weights anthropologies from many quarters, non-theological as well as theological, as his criterion requires him to do. If one wishes to criticize the resultant doctrine of man, the only logical starting point is with the basic criterion of comprehensive coherence.

The present writer also sees systematic theology as a function within the Church. The primary task of the Church is to announce to mankind the gospel that it has received. This proclamation takes place through teaching, preaching, the sacraments, and deeds of love. The purpose of the Church, therefore, is not to preserve or to glorify itself; it is to proclaim the revelation of God in Jesus Christ that has brought it into being and upon which its existence depends. Systematic theology is the discipline which has the responsibility of continually examining the proclamation of the Church in the light of Christ.

Since we understand the theologian's task in this way,

we have no logical alternative to saying that if a doctrine of man is to be Christian, it must take the revelation in Christ as its only source. We cannot say this casually or mechanically, merely mimicking a catch word, but only out of a deep conviction about the theological task. If, amid the many modern voices that speak of man, limiting our ground to Christ alone seems harshly arbitrary, let us ask as theologians: What other source have we? To be sure the other voices are not necessarily speaking falsely about man (although some are). Indeed we ignore them at our peril. The findings of the natural and behavioral disciplines must be scanned for insights about real human phenomena. Philosophies must be seriously encountered in order to gain understanding of what man thinks of himself, if for no other reason. But this stricture must be entered: navel gazing--even competent scientific or sophisticated philosophical navel gazing--cannot yield a true and comprehensive understanding of the nature of man. The theologian, whose job it is to square the Church's speech with a norm that is given, has no logical basis for reaching "beyond" Christ to trim bits from other sources for a crazy-quilt anthropology The revelation in Christ is the only logical--the only conceivable--source for a theological statement about man. The being of man, the way of human existence, can be understood only in the light of its revelation to Christ, the Word made flesh.

This means that man can have the proper conception of himself only when he knows the God revealed in His Word. It is only in the light of this Word that we can understand the aim

of the existence of man and his failure to attain this aim. The truth of man, which is man as he was created to be, is more original than his untruth, which is his rebellion; but he cannot perceive either the truth or the untruth about himself apart from Christ the Word. For the believer this knowledge of human existence is bestowed through faith. In faith two things happen: God gives Himself to the believer, and He gives him knowledge of himself; both God's being and man's being are disclosed. Apart from Christ, man has no knowledge of his true being. Since real self-knowledge is objective rather than subjective, this fact holds true for the unbeliever. Although he does not know it, his existence is also grounded in the Word of God; his unbelief does not change the fact.

It may be helpful here to present an extended illustration of what can happen when a theologian finds the heart of his doctrine of man apart from Christ. The case in point is Bultmann's acceptance of the substance of Heidegger's anthropology. Bultmann assumes that Heidegger's idea of the fallenness (Verfallenheit) of man is identical with the similarly designated Christian concept, and that Heidegger goes wrong only when he thinks that man can deliver himself from this fallen state by his own efforts. However, we must observe that Heidegger's notion bears little resemblance to the Biblical idea of fallenness.

According to Heidegger, man's understanding of himself is the most important aspect of his being. If man understands his being wrongly, then he is not living the authentic life. This non-authentic existence is the state of fallenness. The basic characteristic of the state of fallenness is that the

self fails to understand itself. Dire consequences follow. A man begins to think of himself as one among many selves, or he loses himself in "the others". He fails to make a distinction between the being of inanimate objects (Vorhandenheit) and the being of man(Dasein). When one thinks of himself as one among many, he applies to Dasein a category which really belongs to the category of Vorhanden. The greenness of a chair may be equal to the greenness of a door; but a minister's death is not the same as the death of those whose funerals he conducts. When man refuses to face up to his own existence, he is living in the state of fallenness. The man who seeks to find his security in the material world and ignores the fact of his own death, is one who does not understand his existence. Therefore, one sign of conversion from fallenness is turning from the supposed securities of this world to an acceptance of one's own death.

There are, of course, some points in which this concept of Heidegger's seems to agree with the Christian idea of fallenness. Bultmann's mistake is to assume that the two substantially coincide. He writes:

> Heidegger's existentialist analysis of the ontological structures of being would seem to be more than a secularized, philosophical version of the New Testament view of human life. . . . At every point he is confronted with an alternative. Either he must immerse himself in the concrete world of nature . . . or he must abandon all security and commit himself unreservedly to the future, and thus alone achieve his authentic Being. Is not that exactly the New Testament understanding of human life? 7

And we must answer emphatically, "no!" When the Christian speaks of the fallenness of man, he means rebellion against

God. Therefore, he means something radically different from a concept offered by a philosopher like Heidegger, who leaves the question of God an open one. Therefore, when Bultmann presupposes that Heidegger understands man in the Christian sense, he himself misunderstands the Christian doctrine of man. When theological anthropology speaks of fallenness, it means man in a state of rebellion against God who has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ; the very knowledge of this fact is given only in the light of the Word made flesh. It is only after a man has encountered Christ, then--and only then--is he able to talk about man.

It is not being suggested here, however, that Heidegger's existentialist analysis of man can be ignored by theological anthropology. Bultmann's mistake is not that he has used non-theological anthropology, but that he has allowed Heidegger's anthropology to be the point of orientation of his attempt to set forth a Christian understanding of man. We do not mean to imply that other anthropologies have not gained valid truths about man. On the contrary, the truths about man procured by scientific and other anthropologies are indispensable for the theologian. While non-theological anthropologies cannot penetrate to true man, i.e., man in fellowship with God, they can discover individual features of human existence, which the theologian can transform into symptoms of real humanity.

Christian anthropology does not deny that man is a part of the physico-chemical world and thus is subject for instance to the law of gravity like everything else. Christian anthro-

pology affirms with biochemistry that man is also a being composed of calcium, phosphorus, carbon, nitrogen, and other elements. Christian anthropology does not deny the presuppositions of zoology that man is an animal with a unique central nervous system which gives him his biological superiority over other animals. In his relationship with non-theological anthropologies the theologians ought to keep two things in mind. (1) No theological statement may contradict experience. (2) Everything that can be learned about man from experience ought to be included in any doctrine of man. That is, although a theological view of man must be understood in the light of the truths of revelation, which are not accessible empirically, yet that view does not in any way conflict with empirical truths. On the contrary, the theological view incorporates the latter truths into their proper context. Therefore Christian truths includes "natural" knowledge, i.e., truth about man acquired independent of faith. Such a view of natural knowledge includes philosophical, as well as scientific knowledge. Thus we do affirm with Heidegger that man is a fallen creature. Theologians cannot spurn truth, just because it comes from a non-theological source. Indeed, when theologians cease to be aware of the truths gained by contemporary sciences and philosophies, they run the risk of trying to speak to man apart from the world in which he lives.

What then is the problem? It is that the theologian cannot take any non-theological anthropology as a starting point. He cannot forget about the message that was given to

him. Bultmann is inclined to "take unbelief too seriously," letting Heidegger tell him what to say. This stricture must be kept in mind: The decisive questions about human existence are not perceived by other anthropologies. Apart from the basic truth about man known exclusively in and through the Word of God, the truths gained by other anthropologies become mere abstractions about human nature and thus give us a distorted picture of human existence. While the theologian must be aware of other anthropological truths, they must not be his point of departure.

We conclude, therefore, that if systematic theology is primarily concerned with God and not man, then its task is to express in ordered speech--with contemporary thought in mind--the proclamation of the Church, the Kerygma, of what God has done for man in the man Jesus Christ. Every Christian doctrine is an explication of God's act in Christ. The Christian gospel speaks to man, and only secondarily does it speak of man. Because--and only because--we know the message which comes to us in Jesus Christ, we are in a position to speak accurately concerning ourselves. The Christian revelation of God disclosed in Christ for man's salvation involves an ontology of what man is and man might be, in that as men know God they discover what they themselves are. If we expect to speak about "true man", Christology must be the point of orientation. With this as our basic perspective, we can now turn to the doctrine of man proper.

B. AN OUTLINE OF THE DOCTRINE OF MAN PROPER

Building on the presuppositions already stated, we begin by asserting that, since the Christian understanding of man is based on faith in Jesus Christ, we must therefore reject any understanding of man which claims to discover the essence of man from direct intuition or introspection. To state the point negatively, since man is a sinner (a presupposition to be developed later), his sinfulness has made him incapable of perceiving the final truth about himself until he submits to being told it by God in Christ. The Word of God, therefore, is the source and the norm of truth about man. From this point of departure, the doctrine of man can be presented under three headings.

Man as a creature of God with a special place in God's purpose. The sharp distinction between creature and the Creator must be maintained from the beginning. The creatureliness of man means that his existence can be explained only in the light of the Creator. The Bible knows nothing of independent self-existent man who is as he lives for himself. Rather it speaks of man as a created, dependent being who is as he lives for God. Man did not bring himself into existence; and what he does between the cradle and the grave is shaped by God-given talents. Therefore, if he has any vital significance, it is a significance grounded exclusively in his relationship as a being dependent on the Creator. "It is he that hath made us and not we ourselves."

It is true, however, that to be man means to be different from other animals and plants, God's other living creatures. (This difference will be discussed later.) This should not, however, lead us to the conclusion that man is other than a creature. "Man, whatever may distinguish him from other creatures, has this in common with them, which distinguishes him from God: like them, he has been created."[8] He is, to be sure, the highest and last creature; yet, creatureliness is a fact that cannot be disputed.

This truth comes to us from our Christological starting point. When we meet God as revealed in His Word, we immediately know ourselves to be wholly dependent creatures. To know God as Creator is to know ourselves as creatures. Therefore, in this sense, man is no different from the worm. Like the worm, and all other creatures, man is dust of dust, and thus fully dependent. The fact that in Genesis I each plant and animal is recorded as having been created through God's Word indicates that the writer wants to emphasize the distinction between God and his creation, including man.

On the other hand, man's creatureliness cannot obscure the vital point that man is different from the rest of earthly creation in that he is created in the imago Dei. The phrase imago Dei has been much debated subject in the history of theology.[9] All Christians agree that "God created man in His own image," but disagree concerning the definition of that image.

Owing to the fact that there is much disagreement concern-

ing the definition of the image of God, it is important that we in some measure justify our definition of it, which is based on our Christological point of orientation. It is true, that the phrase "image of God," is used only three times in the Old Testament (Genesis 1:26-27; 5:1-3; 9:5-6), and all three references belong to "P," the Priestly document. Nevertheless, this should not lead us to the conclusion that the Old Testament is concerned only with the distance between God and and man, and thus, that the idea of the image of God is alien to the thought of the Bible and is an invasion from the Greek world. While the Bible is concerned to emphasize the creatureliness of man by stressing his basic dependence on the Creator, yet the latter emphasis does not lead the biblical writers to identify men wholly with nature over against the divine otherness (Psalm 8). The Bible never exalts God at the expense of man. According to the Bible, God is far above nature and man, but man, in his own lesser degree, has been raised out of the sphere of nature by virtue of a special relationship with the Creator (Gen. 1:26). Therefore the one thing that the image of God means is that man in some sense is a special creature. His special relationship with God, instead of decreasing his sense of dependence, enhances it. Unlike other creatures man is a creature who is created for worship. All creatures were created by God, but man is the only creature who knows that fact. And thus, he is the only creature capable of response to God.

Luther made a similar point. We may question whether he

was wise in speaking of the image of God in terms of an "original righteousness,"[10] but we must agree that he was right when he spoke of the image in terms of a personal relationship with God. To say that man was created in the image of God, for Luther, means that "man was in a relation to God that was wholly based on and governed by God's grace, to which man responded with faith."[11] This was the image of God in man, or his "original righteousness." It was the kind of relationship which is analogous to a child's relationship to his father. Just as the child responds to his father in obedience and trust, man in the image of God responds to God with trustful obedience. Commenting on Luther's view of man's original righteousness, Phillip Watson writes:

> It was a state in which his whole life was so centered in God, that in thought, will and action he was governed solely by the good and gracious will of God. It was as if he had "no will of his own," no desire but to do the will of God, whose word of command and promise he implicitly believed. That was what constituted man's 'original righteousness'--the right relationship to God, and therefore to all else, for which and in which he was created.[12]

Barth also has made a similar emphasis in this connection. We may question whether there is an indirect reference to the Holy Trinity in the Genesis account, but we certainly agree with his emphasis on the "I-Thou" relationship. In his Dogmatics III/1 Barth seizes upon the fact that twice the Priestly writer, after saying that God created man in his own image, adds the words "male and female he created them".[13] According to Barth, this is a simple and clear correspondence between the being of God and the being of man, and thus in both there

is included an "I" and a "Thou." In the being of man, the basic relationship is between man and woman; in the being of God, it is among the persons of the Trinity. In both cases the personal relationship is stressed. Man is a being who has his existence as he exists in personal relation to God.

Related also to the concept of the image of God is the idea of freedom. To be created in the image of God means that man is free. However, it is this idea of freedom that has caused much debate between Brunner and Barth. For Brunner freedom means that man is created with the possibility of responding to God with either yes or no. This is what Brunner calls the form of the image. Barth, on the other hand, does not agree with Brunner's distinction between the form and the content of the image. For him, to say that man is free means that he is free for God; this is the only possibility open to him. Freedom does not mean that man is open to two possibilities, yes or no. The writer agrees with each in part. Brunner is correct when he says that man can say yes or no to God; this is proven by the fact that man has already said no to God (This aspect of man's nature will be discussed in the next section). But this negative possibility cannot properly be called freedom; it is rather a denial of freedom. Real freedom is when man obeys God because he trusts him. Therefore Barth is closer to the truth when he says that real freedom means that man has only one possibility as God's creature, that is obedience. But Barth is wrong when he implies that man's no is not a negative possibility open to him. Barth knows that as a matter

of fact man has already registered a No which he continues to say even after Christ. However, in Barth's theology, this No appears to be annihilated by God's yes. To say that man is created in the image of God means that he is free. Freedom is not something he attains, but it is given by the Creator through His Word. Freedom means that he is free to worship the Creator. According to the Biblical writers, freedom is not something that man possesses merely by virtue of being human, as Brunner's formal image implies. Freedom is not a capacity, a potentiality, or an ability; it is not an object to be discovered as one finds cookies in a cookie jar. Freedom is a relationship. Being free in the Biblical sense means that man is free for God and therefore for his fellows. In so far as I am free for God, then, and only then, am I really free.

Modern individualistic concepts of freedom are ruled out. Freedom is not a property which I possess. It is nothing more nor less than my relation with the Creator. One may ask how we know this? How do we prove it? Referring again to our Christological orientation, we answer that this is knowledge given in and through the Word made flesh, apart from whom we have no freedom. The gospel tells us that God does not wish to be free for Himself but for man. The fact that God did not retain his freedom for Himself is proved in that He allowed man to be free for Him. Because God is free for man in Christ, now man is free for God.

The concept of the image of God raises another issue

which should be mentioned. The image is not an *analogia entis* in which man's being, as such is in the likeness of the being of God.

> There is no such analogy between God and man, if only because God, the only One existing in and for himself in his underived being, yet at the same time existing for his creatures, binding and giving his freedom to man--must not be thought of as being alone; inasmuch as he is the God who in Christ bears witness to his 'being for man.' 14

Man is like God not in the sense of an *analogia entis* but of *analogia relationis*. And this *analogia relationis* is not something that is a part of man, not a structure of his being, neither is it a capacity. It is a given relationship in which man is free for God because God is free for him in Christ. Thus Bonhoeffer says:

> The analogy, the likeness must be understood strictly as follows: the likeness has its likeness *only* from the original. It always refers us *only* to the original, and is 'like' only in this way. *Analogia relationis* is therefore the relation given by God. The relation of creature with creature is a God-given relation because it exists in freedom and freedom originates from God. 15

The writer concludes that the idea of relationship which, of course, involves freedom is the primary meaning behind the Biblical conception of the image of God. The theologian must not be led into philosophical speculation, since the Biblical witness itself must be the primary guide to truth. It is just this kind of speculation which led some theologians of the past (owing to the influence of Greek philosophy) to identify the soul with the image because the body was regarded as evil. The Bible rejects the Greek soul-body distinction, insisting that somehow the whole man, not just a "part" of

him is like God.

How then are we to understand the image of God? The image of God is understood only as Jesus Christ remains as the primary principle who leads us to knowledge of man. In Christ we see who God is, but also we see who we are or what God intends us to be. "He is the image of the invisible God. . . . For in Him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross" (Col. 1:15, 19-20). Christ was like us in that he was truly human, a man in flesh and blood. But he was unlike us in the spirit he displays in his words and deeds. He displayed perfect trust and obedience to God even though it led him to the cross. Because of this unlikeness we cannot identify knowledge of Christ with knowledge of man in general. But from the Word made flesh we can say that the image of God in man means that man is created to be God's son, God's agent and representative in the world.

Man as a fallen creature. Because Jesus Christ reveals to us what man is as God created him to be, the Christian knows that man as he actually is is a fallen creature. He does not need the story of Genesis to tell him that; he knows that if Christ is man as God intends him to be, then the rest of men are fallen. The story in Genesis 3 is an attempt by the writer to tell us not how sin got into the world, but that man is one who has broken his right relationship with God. It tells us that man believes that "he can understand God better from his freely assumed standpoint and from his

notion of God than he can if he would subject himself to his Word."[16] And thus modern questions about what existed before the Fall are irrelevant, because the writer of Genesis knows man only as he exists outside Paradise. He refrains from speculations about man within Paradise.

> The story throughout contains statements of faith that are made from the standpoint of fallen man. At no point is this boundary transgressed not even in ch. 2; for what is said about the rivers of Paradise, the creation of man out of earth, the creation of the beasts, of the woman and her fate--all those things are creative acts and decrees that have the same validity for post-paradise man. The narrator does not give a direct, positive description or paradisiac conditions of life. He limits himself to pointing out the great disorders of our present life--shame, fear, the dissonances in the life of the woman and the man--and ascribing them to human sin. And this, of course, is the chief concern of the entire narrative. [17]

Furthermore, the question of how man got into this situation where he inevitably rebels against the Creator is not properly a theological question, for it presupposes that man can go behind the existence forced upon him as a sinner. If he could answer that question he would not be a sinner.

The Adam and Eve story tells us not only that the relationship between God and man was broken but that it was broken because man was not content to remain a creature. Genesis 3 is not, therefore, a historical account of how a man named Adam fell from grace. It is a myth or parable; and just as the truth of the Parable of the Prodigal Son is in no way dependent upon the events' having actually occurred, the truth of the story in Genesis is not dependent upon a historical Adam and Eve. In fact "the Hebrew word <u>'ādām</u> ('man') is a collective and is therefore never used in the plural; it means literally 'mankind'."[18] If we take the story literally,

as some theologians have done, we run into unnecessary problems which have nothing whatever to do with the message of the narrative. Adam is best understood as

> the head of the body corporate of mankind, of which all men are members, or the parent-stem of the family tree of humanity, from which every man derives. Consequently, what happened to Adam was not something that affected himself alone, but all his children as well. In other words, Adam was Man, as we should say; not merely the first human being, but humanity. 19

This saves us from the problem of understanding sin as inherited from some man in the past. This has always outraged the moral conscience of modern man, and rightly so. Man's problem is not that he has sin which was inherited from the first man, but that he himself is in rebellion against God. "We do not need any help from Adam to make us guilty; our own sin is quite sufficient for that."[20]

What, then is man's problem? On the one hand, he is created in the image of God; and this means that he has a special place in God's purpose. Yet, on the other hand, his high place in creation tempts man to forget that he is a dependent creature, and so he longs to be like God and to take His place. He refuses to let God be at the center of his life; he puts himself at the center. When this happens, instead of loving the neighbor as God would have him love, man turns the neighbor into an object to be used, an "it" rather than a "thou". Sin is thus a separation from God, resulting from man's own self-oriented life. From this basic sinful condition comes the sins of man, the countless expressions of the unnatural life of a fallen creature.

Luther's interpretation of what happened at the Fall is pertinent here. His description is still one of the best, even though he thought of Adam as a historical figure.[21] According to Luther, at the Fall Adam fell from his proper relationship with God to an improper one. Instead of man accepting God's Word and responding to his grace with obedient trust, man was led to doubt His Word and thus to disobey Him. The broken relationship with God disordered all other relationships. Man was led to believe that he could govern himself, thus making God secondary and himself primary. In this situation, man is no longer in the image of God, but in the image of another will, alien and hostile to the will of God. Therefore, Luther could say: "For man must be an image, either of God or of the devil; for he is alike the one he complies with."[22]

The Fall means that man no longer wants to be dependent. He wants to be like God. This is the sin which has been known as "pride." Man is "curved in upon himself." Reinhold Niebuhr has taught us that man is by nature so concerned with himself that all of events of the world are judged in terms of the effect upon himself. As Niebuhr puts it: "All men are persistently inclined to regard themselves more highly and are more assiduously concerned with their own interests than any 'objective' view of their importance would warrant."[23] Thus everything he does is always done in light of his own self-interest. Theologically, this means that man is now a creator; he is his own boss, and his only allegiance is to himself. He renounces God's Word by not allowing God's Word to disclose

knowledge about himself, attempting instead to go behind the given Word of God, in order to procure his own knowledge of God. He renounces life given by the Word and tries to snatch it for himself.

Another aspect of man's fallen state, which is often neglected in contemporary theology, is what the New Testament calls the "powers of evil." While the New Testament writers leave no doubt that man is completely responsible for his disobedience, they nevertheless understand man to be in bondage to a hostile force whose purposes are alien to God's will. Modern men find it difficult or impossible to believe that there are other forces in the world which are hostile and evil. We tend to look down on the primitive idea of "demon possession." Granted, we cannot solve the ontological problem concerning the nature of these forces, because we do not have the necessary knowledge to do so. (For the New Testament, that problem is quite beside the point anyway.) Still we must insist that, according to the New Testament, man is a fallen creature, and this means that he is not only "curved in upon himself," as Niebuhr puts it, but he is also a creature who is controlled by unholy spirits. Whatever else we may say about the New Testament view of unholy spirits, we must affirm that it is "speaking of concrete realities of human experience."[24] Furthermore, we are wrong if our contemporary scientific age require us to say that "unclean or unholy spirits" cannot possess human beings, shutting our eyes to the reality of demonic forces that are at work in the world. We cannot attribute all of the evil at work in the

world to man. To do so is a mistake, because much of the demonic evil is essentially destructive and alien to human nature. As. P.S. Watson says:

> Whether demons and the devil 'exist' or not, there are undoubtedly spiritual forces that are real enough in this world, and human nature is by no means insulated against them. There are ideas, doctrines, ideologies, philosophies of life, in which 'spirits' good, bad, and indifferent, find expression, and through which they influence men. [25]

However, the New Testament does not stop with the bondage of man alone; somehow the Fall of man affects the whole creation. Therefore, the whole world is in need of redemption.[26] Modern theologians, in an attempt to keep up with the times, have sometimes ignored this emphasis. While we are not saying that everybody ought to believe that there is a devil lurking about, waiting for an opportunity to influence us to do an evil act, we are concerned to stress that the Christian idea of the Fall means that man, while remaining entirely responsible for his sinful condition, has somehow allowed himself to become a slave to evil powers whose purposes are alien to the will of God, and that this situation in turn affects the entire cosmos.

We cannot leave the idea of man as a fallen creature without saying a word about "original sin." Two things must be said: (1) the Augustianian formulation of it must be rejected. The idea of inherited guilt, in the sense that all men are held responsible for the sins of one man, cannot be reconciled with the revelation of God in Christ. We are invited to repent of our own sins, not those of the first man. The Bible is concerned with a man's personal relationship with God; and sin is the result of a relationship broken when man puts him-

self at the center of life in God's place. Therefore, to say that a man is a sinner is to say something about his personal relationship with the Creator; and nothing whatever about the first man. (2) While the term, "original sin," has been misused, it must be retained. It expresses the fact that sin is a dominant force, and also that sin is universal among men. Sin is not something that can be taken lightly; neither is it something that one can put on or take off at will. We would like to think that every man is born with a clean slate, i.e., with the opportunity to be sinful or not to be sinful, but this is not the case. When we look at events around us we know that somehow sin has infiltrated the whole human race.

> Whatever one thinks of the doctrine that Adam was our federal representative who took us into sin with him, that doctrine does point up the fact that humanity is somehow a whole, that we cannot vote ourselves out of the human race. When we follow the Reformation and pray, 'Lord, we are by nature sinful and unclean,' it is not pious nonsense, but a sober analysis of man as we find him. Certainly if we believe that Christ is the Second Adam, man as God intends man to be, we can only confess that something is radically wrong with the whole human race. Even if there were no story of Adam and Eve, the Christian doctrine of Christ would lead us to a doctrine of original sin. 27

Man as a Redeemed Creature. Man is thus in a situation in which he can do nothing. He is so "curved in upon himself" and thus so controlled by the powers of evil that he is powerless to do anything about his salvation. From the standpoint of man the broken relationship is irreparable; he cannot get back, unless God does something about it.

While man deserves to die, God will not let man have the last word about his existence. Man is still God's creature.

and what happens to the creature affects the Creator. God will not let His purpose for the creature be destroyed. Therefore, He has provided for man's redemption. There are three stages of redemption: (1) the preparation in Israel, (2) the decisive act in Christ, and (3) the consummation.

The plan of salvation began with Israel. God chose a people; a covenant is made. "I will be your God, and you will be my people." The question is sometimes asked, Why did God choose the Jews? to which the only real answer is, we do not know. However, we can say a little more than that. While we cannot say exactly why God chose Israel, we can be sure that she was not chosen because of favoritism. "It was not because you were more in number than any other people that the Lord set his love upon you and chose you, for you were the fewest of all peoples" (Deut. 7:7). Related to the idea of God's election of Israel is also the fact that many times the people of Israel had to suffer simply because she was God's people. Therefore, Israel was chosen in order that she might become God's people and thus carry His message of salvation to the whole world. It was Paul's knowledge of God's mighty acts in the life of this people which enabled him to say that "when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son" (Gal. 4:4).

Therefore, the decisive act against man's sin and its demonic nature was done by God becoming man in Jesus Christ. The man Jesus discloses to us not only the nature of man but the nature of God. Through him we know that the fundamental opposition is not between man and God but between the holy

and the unholy, the divine and the demonic. God invades the human condition in order to defeat Satan. The preparation in Israel is what had to be done before actual invasion could take place. And after this preparation was made, God invaded the occupied territory of human nature in order to set it free from sin and the corruption of evil powers.

The New Testament writers were convinced that "Christ's whole life was a deliberate offensive against all the powers of evil."[28] Christ came into the world to destroy the works of the devil (I John 3:8). At the very beginning of his ministry there was a conflict with Satan in the wilderness (Luke 4:1-13; Mark 1:12ff; Matthew 4:1-11), and this conflict continued throughout his ministry. Every exorcism was a binding and despoiling of Satan (Mark 3:27).

The conflict between Jesus and Satan came to its climax with Christ's death on the cross. Near the close of his ministry, "when the days drew near for him to be received up, he set his face to go to Jerusalem" (Luke 9:51). Christ died on the cross because of his voluntary obedience to his Father's will which meant giving his life as a ranson for many (Mark 10:45). On the cross the decisive battle was fought and won by Christ; therefore the tyranny of Satan has in principle come to an end. Man has been delivered from the kingdom of darkness. When we are controlled by demonic forces, we become slaves to them; and good news is that their power is broken and we can now share in the victory won by Christ. The battle was fought and won on Good Friday, and the triumph was revealed to men at Easter.

Because the battle with Satan has been won, men of the new order stand unafraid of the powers of evil, which can no longer keep men from God. Paul says: "I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus Our Lord."[29] "In all the uncertainty that marks this earthly life there is still something which is absolutely fixed and certain, namely God's election and Christ's love. . . . In this second part of the epistle to the Romans Paul has said much about the powers . . . which rule this world, and about the Christian's freedom from them."[30] According to Nygren, God has given us an overwhelming victory over these powers in Christ, and thus death, "the last enemy," has been defeated, and all dominions have lost their power.

We are freed from slavery in order to do God's will. "For freedom Christ has set us free" (Gal. 5:1). Now that we have been liberated from the bondage of these powers, it is our task to live and behave as free men. When we submit to the hostile powers, we squander our freedom. The liberation won by Christ was not merely from bondage but also to a new life. "Paradoxically this new freedom could also be designated as a slavery--under Christ. But this 'slavery' was a father-child relationship characterized by joy."[31] Slavery in this sense is real freedom. It means that we are able to participate in the new life of the Spirit and the power of the resurrection.

While men of the new age know that they are free, they must never lose sight of the tension between the "now and the not yet" which characterizes this present age (II Timothy 1:10; Ephesians 1:22; Hebrews 2:8; 10:13). The crucial battle has already been won on the cross, but the campaign is not over. Therefore, there is a constant conflict going on in this age between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Satan. According to the New Testament, Satan has been defeated, and men can now enter the kingdom of God (Galatians 1:4). In Christ, God entered into history, and the miracles are offerred as evidence that Jesus has overcome the forces of evil (Luke 11:20). Therefore, we may say that the kingdom of God has come. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the New Testament teaches that the kingdom of God is still to come. Although the decisive battle has been won, the warfare continues. Cullmann puts it this way: "The decisive battle in a war may already have occurred in a relatively early stage of the war, and yet the war still continues."[32] "The battles of Stalingrad and El Alamein really settled the issue of the Second World War."[33] But the war continued for years. In the New Testament the victory over Satan was accomplished in the first coming of the Suffering Servant; yet the final victory will be postponed until the <u>parousia</u> of Christ. Even though the enemy has been decisively defeated on the cross, the "mopping up operations" continue.[34] Therefore we trust Christ until the victory is made manifest in the final consummation.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. P. S. Watson, Let God Be God, (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1947), P. 33. See also Anders Nygren's Agape and Eros, trans. P. S. Watson (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1953), p. 681f.

2. Watson, op. cit., p. 34.

3. Ibid., p. 34.

4. T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction To His Early Theology 1910 - 1931 (London: SCM Press, 1962), pp. 38, 39.

5. Notice the influence of S. Kierkegaard which Barth acknowledges in the Preface to the second edition of the Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 10. We will have occasion to mention this point later.

6. Ibid., p. 25.

7. Ibid., p. VI.

8. We will have occasion to mention this article later.

CHAPTER I.

1. Romans, p. 10.

2. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript. trans. D. Swenson and W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 369.

3. Romans, pp. 35, 36.

4. Romans, pp. 330, 331.

5. Karl Barth, Theology and Church, trans. L. P. Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 338, 339.

6. Romans, pp. 243, 244.

7. Romans, p. 168. Notice the Anselmic language.

8. Romans, pp. 168, 169.

9. Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton (New York: Harper and Row, 1928), P. 167, cf. 140.

10. Ibid., p. 150.

11. God and Man, trans. David Cairns (London: SCM Press, 1936), pp. 114, 115.

12. Emil Brunner, Natural Theology, trans. Peter Frankel (London: The Centenary Press, 1946). P. 78. This is an English translation of the German Natur Und Gnade Gesprach Mit Karl Barth (1934), see P. 18. See also John Baillie's Our Knowledge of God (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), p. 29f. Please note that the writer follows closely Baillie's interpretation of Barth and Brunner. See also his critique of Barth and Brunner.

13. Natural Theology, p. 22.

14. Natural Theology, p. 24.

15. John Baillie and Hugh Martin (eds.) Revelation (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1937), pp. 48, 53. It is interesting to note that the problem of Romans 1:18ff. is not specifically discussed in Barth's Commentary.

16. Natural Theology, p. 30. The German word Worwortlich, which is translated as "literal," is probably the most emphatic word in the German language. The writer does not assume that Barth's interpretation of Brunner is correct. We are only trying to show how his understanding of Brunner affected his doctrine of man.

17. Natural Theology, p. 88.

18. Natural Theology, pp. 88, 89. (Emphasis added with with exception of the words this and humanitas.)

19. Translated by Harry R. Boer (Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1956).

20. Natural Theology, pp. 75, 75.

21. Berkouwer, op. cit., p. 19.

22. Romans, 221.

CHAPTER II.

1. Barth, The Doctrine of Creation, Volume III, Part 3. G. W. Bromiley and R. S. Ehrlich (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1961).

2. Ibid., p. 345.

3. Ibid., p. 345.

4. It should be pointed out that Barth uses the German word das Nichtige (nothingness) in order to distinguish his term from Heidegger and Sartre's das Nicht (nothing). According to Barth these terms refer to the same reality.

5. Quoted from Barth's Introductory Essay in Ludwig Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. XII, XIII. See also Karl Barth's Theology and the Church, trans. L. P. Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 217 ff. These are two different English translations of the same lecture which Barth delivered at Munster in the summer of 1920.

6. Ibid., p. XIII.

7. Ibid., p. XXIV.

8. Ibid., p. XXI.

9. Karl Barth, Protestant Thought from Rousseau to Ritschl, trans. H. H. Hartwell (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 358. This is an English translation of eleven chapters of Die Protestantische Theologie Im 19. Jahrhundert (Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag A. G., 1952).

10. Ibid., p. 359.

11. Ibid., p. 359.

12. Ibid., p. 359.

13. Ibid., p. XXIV.

14. Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Volume I. Part 1, trans. G. T. Thompson (New York: T. & T. Clark, 1936), p. 145.

15. Ibid., p. XXVIII.

16. Ibid., p. XXVIII.

17. Ibid., p. XXVIII.

18. Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 360.

19. Feuerbach, op. cit., p. XXIX.

20. Barth, Protestant Thought, p. 361.

21. The one exception to this rule was Barth's Protestant Thought.

22. Quoted from Berkouwer, op. cit., p. 21.

23. "How My Mind Has Changed", Christian Century, (September 13, 1939), p. 1097.

CHAPTER III.

1. Karl Barth, The Doctrine of Creation, Volume III, Part 2, trans. H. Knight, G. Bromiley, J. Reid, and R. Fuller (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960), p. 222.

2. Ibid., p. 3.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 3.

5. Ibid., p. 4.

6. Ibid., p. 7.

7. Ibid., p. 19.

8. Ibid., p. 19.

9. Ibid., p. 19.

10. Ibid., p. 21, 22.

11. Ibid., p. 22.

12. Ibid., p. 22.

13. Ibid., p. 23.

14. Ibid., p. 25.

15. Ibid., p. 25.

16. Ibid., p. 26.

17. Ibid., p. 27.

18. Ibid., p. 27.

19. Ibid., p. 28.

20. Ibid., p. 28.

21. Ibid., p. 28.

22. Ibid., p. 31.

23. Ibid., p. 31.

24. Ibid., p. 32.
25. Ibid., p. 33, 34.
26. Ibid., p. 38.
27. Ibid., p. 38.
28. Ibid., p. 38.
29. Ibid., p. 40.
30. Ibid., p. 41.
31. Ibid., p. 41.
32. Ibid., p. 43.
33. Ibid., p. 43.
34. Ibid., p. 51.
35. Ibid., p. 51.

CHAPTER IV.

1. Barth, The Doctrine of Creation, III/2, p. 55.
2. Ibid., p. 56.
3. Ibid., p. 56,57.
4. Ibid., p. 59.
5. Ibid., p. 60.
6. Ibid., p. 60.
7. Ibid., p. 62.
8. Ibid., p. 64.
9. Ibid., p. 68.
10. Ibid., p. 68.
11. Ibid., p. 69.
12. Ibid., p. 71.
13. Ibid., p. 74.
14. Ibid., p. 74, 75.

15. Ibid., p. 90.

16. Ibid., p. 94.

17. Ibid., p. 94.

18. Ibid., p; 114.

19. Ibid., p. 114.

20. Ibid., p. 114.

21. Ibid., p. 115.

22. Ibid., p. 132.

23. Ibid., p. 134.

24. Please note his comments concerning Brunner's book Der Mensch im Widerspruch (English translation is entitled Man in Revolt) on page 128 f.

25. Ibid., p. 135.

26. Ibid., p. 135.

27. Ibid., p. 135, 135.

28. Ibid., p. 136.

29. Ibid., p. 142.

30. Ibid., p. 142.

31. Ibid., p. 142, 143.

32. Ibid., p. 143.

33. Ibid., p. 143.

34. See my "The Idea of Satan in the New Testament and in the Theology of Karl Barth" (unpublished master's thesis, Northwestern University, 1963) for an extended discussion of Barth's concept of nothingness (das Nichtige).

35. Ibid., p. 145.

36. Ibid., p. 146.

37. Ibid., p. 146. (Emphasis added.)

38. Ibid., p. 147.

39. Ibid., p. 147.

40. Ibid., p. 148.

41. Ibid., p. 148.

42. Ibid., p. 148.

43. Ibid., p. 148.

44. Ibid., p. 150

45. Ibid., p. 151. (Emphasis added.)

46. Ibid., p. 151. (Emphasis added.)

47. Ibid., p. 151.

48. Ibid., p. 151, 152.

49. Ibid., p. 158.

50. Ibid., p. 158.

51. Ibid., p. 158.

52. Ibid., p. 160.

53. Ibid., p. 161.

54. Ibid., p. 166.

55. Ibid., p. 171.

56. Ibid., p. 173.

57. Ibid., p. 176.

58. Ibid., p. 180.

59. See Karl Barth's The Humanity of God, trans. John N. Thomas (Virginia: John Knox Press, 1960).

60. Ibid., p. 197.

61. Ibid., pp. 197, 198.

62. Ibid., p. 200.

63. Ibid., p. 202.

CHAPTER V.

1. Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/2, p. 203.

2. Ibid., p. 204.

3. Ibid., p. 206.

4. Ibid., p. 206.

5. Ibid., p. 207.

6. Ibid., p. 207.

7. Ibid., p. 207.

8. Ibid., p. 208.

9. Ibid., p. 208.

10. Ibid., p. 212. (Emphasis added.) Notice the Anselmic language.

11. Ibid., p. 217.

12. Ibid., p. 219.

13. Ibid., p. 219.

14. Ibid., p. 220.

15. Ibid., p. 220.

16. Ibid., pp. 221-222.

17. Ibid., p. 222.

18. Ibid., p. 222.

19. See Barth's analysis of Nietzsche, Ibid., pp. 231-242.

20. Ibid., p. 244.

21. Ibid., p. 244.

22. Ibid., p. 246.

23. Ibid., p. 265.

24. It is important to note that Barth is using the Greek words Agape and Eros in a different sense than Nygren. See Nygren's Agape and Eros.

25. Ibid., p. 285.

26. Ibid., p. 286.

27. Ibid., p. 291. Barth has already expounded this text in his Church Dogmatics III/1, p. 288 f.

28. Ibid., p. 292.

29. Ibid., p. 297.

30. Ibid., p. 320.

CHAPTER VI.

1. Dasein and Sosein translated literally mean "thereness and thusness," or "being there and being thus."

2. Church Dogmatics III/2, p. 325.

3. Ibid., p. 332.

4. Ibid., p. 340.

5. Ibid., p. 333.

6. Ibid., p. 341.

7. Ibid., p. 344.

8. Ibid., p. 345.

9. Ibid., p. 346.

10. Ibid., p. 346-347.

11. Ibid., p. 349.

12. To invert this statement leads to Adoptionism.

13. Ibid., p. 325.

14. Ibid., p. 362.

15. Ibid., p. 363.

16. Ibid., p. 382.

17. Ibid., p. 396.

18. Ibid., p. 399.

19. Ibid., p. 406.

20. Ibid., p. 406.

21. Ibid., p. 427.

CHAPTER VII.

1. Church Dogmatics, III/2, p. 437.

2. Ibid., p. 437.

3. Ibid., p. 437.

4. Ibid., p. 437. It is significant to note that Barth made this same point in an earlier volume. "Eternity is God in the sense in which in Himself and in all things God is simultaneous, i.e., beginning and middle as well as end, without separation, distance or contradiction. Eternity is not, therefore, time, although time is certainly God's creation or, more correctly, a form of His creation. Time is distinguished from eternity by the fact that in it beginning, middle and end are distinct and even opposed as past, present and future. . . . Eternity is not, then, an infinite extension of time both backwards and forwards. Time can have nothing to do with God." The Doctrine of God, Volume II, Part I, trans. T. Parker, W. Johnson, H. Knight J. Haire (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1957), p. 608. (Emphasis added.)

5. Ibid., p. 439.

6. Ibid., p. 440.

7. Ibid., p. 440.

8. Ibid., p. 442.

9. Ibid., p. 446.

10. Ibid., p. 455.

11. Ibid., p. 466.

12. Ibid., p. 468. (Emphasis added.)

13. Ibid., p. 468.

14. Ibid., p. 474.

15. Ibid., p. 475.

16. Ibid., p. 512.

17. Ibid., p. 512.

18. Ibid., p. 513.

19. Ibid., pp. 513-514.

20. Ibid., p. 518.

21. Ibid., p. 519.

22. Ibid., p. 536.

23. Ibid., p. 554.

24. Ibid., p. 555.

25. Ibid., p. 556.

26. Ibid., p. 570.

27. Ibid., p. 571.

28. Ibid., p. 574.

29. Ibid., p. 611.

30. Ibid., p. 632.

31. Ibid., p. 632.

CHAPTER VIII.

1. Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. John H. Thomas (Virginia: John Knox Press, 1960), p. 37.

2. Ibid., p. 45.

3. "How My Mind Changed 1938-1948", The Christian Century, Volume 66 (January - June, 1949), p. 298.

4. "The New Barth," Scottish Journal of Theology, Volume 4, (1951).

5. Karl Barth, The Doctrine of Creation, Volume III, Part 1., trans. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957).

6. Karl Barth, The Doctrine of God, Volume II, Part II, trans. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957).

7. Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946), p. 348.

8. Ibid., p. 348.

9. Ibid., p. 348.

10. Ibid., p. 349.

11. Ibid., p. 351.

12. Ibid., p. 351. Wingren makes a similar point in his analysis of Barth's idea of nothingness. "Barth likens evil to a hornet without a sting. The movement of the hornet may inspire fear in a person who does not know that the sting has been removed. But such a person is mistaken. The power of the hornet depends entirely on this mistake, not on anything that the hornet possesses. Man needs only to be told how it really is." Wingren, Theology in Conflict, trans. Eric Wahlstrom (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958), pp. 37-38. Berkouwer also says, in this connection that "Barth's meaning [his doctrine of election] can . . . be indicated by the illustration of liberation from an occupying enemy. The armies of liberation have already entered the occupied city and the capitulation has taken place, but the wonderful news has not yet penetrated into all the streets and suburbs of the city. This detracts nothing, however, from the fact of the objective liberation." Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth. p. 265.

13. Ibid., p. 233.

14. Barth, The Doctrine of God, Volume II, Part 1, trans. T. Parker, W. Johnston, H. Knight, J. Haire (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), p. 608.

15. Ibid., p. 608.

16. Ibid., p. 619.

17. Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time, trans. F. V. Filson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1949), p. 61. The writer accepts Cullmann's interpretation of the biblical idea of time and eternity.

18. Ibid., p. 63. (See also John 1:1, 17:24, I. Cor. 2:7, Col. 1:26, Heb. 4:9.)

19. Ibid., p. 63.

20. Barth, The Humanity of God, p. 42.

21. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

22. Ibid., pp. 37-65.

CHAPTER IX.

1. The Doctrine of the Word of God. Volume I, Part I, trans. by G. T. Thompson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936), p. 1.

2. Ibid., p. 3.

3. Ibid., p. 7.

4. A Theology of the Living Church (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 18.

5. Ibid., p. 28.

6. Ibid., p. 28.

7. Hans Werner Bartsch (ed.), Kerygma and Myth (London: S.P.C.K., 1957).

8. Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939), p. 90.

9. For an account of how men have thought about this idea, see David Cairns, The Image of God in Man (London: SCM Press, 1953).

10. See R. Newton Flew and Rupert E. Davies (eds.) The Catholicity of Protestantism (London: Lutterworth Press, 1950), p. 41f. See also David Cairns, op. cit., p. 124. Please note that Cairns appears to think that Luther equated "original righteousness" with the imago Dei, while the writers of the Catholicity of Protestantism make some qualifications.

11. Philip Watson, The Concept of Grace (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959), p. 82.

12. Ibid., p. 82.

13. Translated by J. Edwards, O. Bussey and H. Knight (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1958), p. 183f.

14. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, trans. John Fletcher (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1959), pp. 36, 37.

15. Ibid., p. 37.

16. Gerhard Von Rad, Genesis, trans. John Marks, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), 86.

17. Ibid., p. 97.

18. Ibid., p. 55.

19. Newton Flew and R. E. Davies (eds.) op. cit., p. 44.

20. William Hordern, The Case for a New Reformation Theology, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1959), p. 131.

21. While Luther actually thought of Adam as being a historical figure, he "did not think of him in terms of modern individualism as if he were simply an isolated individual who once existed long ago at the beginning of human history." Flew and Davies (eds.), op. cit., p. 44.

22. Quoted from Ibid., p. 42.

23. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), p. 17.

24. P. S. Watson, op. cit., p. 48.

25. Ibid., p. 49. See my "The Idea of Satan in the New Testament and in the Theology of Karl Barth" (unpublished master's thesis, Northwestern University, 1963).

26. See my master's thesis, p. 60f. See also II Cor. 5:19: Col. 1:19-20.

27. Hordern, op. cit., pp. 130-131.

28. G. F. Lewis, The Johannine Epistles (London: The Epworth Press, 1961), p. 63.

29. Romans 8:38-39.(Emphasis added.)

30. Anders Nygren, Commentary on Romans, trans. C. Rasmussen (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1949), p. 348.

31. Ragnar Bring, Commentary on Galatians, trans, Eric Walstrom (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1961), p. 234.

32. Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time, trans. F. V. Filson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1949), 84.

33. G. P. Lewis, op. cit., p. 84.

34. Ibid., p. 84.